Alessandra Nisch
Putin’s Wars: Testing Boyd’s Strategy of ...

President Putin made three foundational assumptions in launching his war against Ukraine that should have been correct but were not. First, Putin assumed the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and easy fight. Second, he assumed the world would denounce the invasion but tacitly allow it. Third, Putin assumed the war would deter NATO expansion.

Putin’s Wars: Testing Boyd’s Strategy of Applied Friction

Bargaining Across Levels: Divide and Conquer

Bargaining Across Levels: Divide and Conquer

It is time that the United States and its allies plan for the long haul of supporting the Government of Afghanistan instead of remaining fixated on the immediate crisis at hand. For far too long the international community has tried and repeatedly failed to create a durable peace on a Western timeline. By dividing the insurgency into smaller manageable groups, pressuring amenable Afghan leaders, and aligning the win sets across all levels, the United States may eventually help the Government of Afghanistan bargain a tenable peace and achieve an honorable exit from its longest war.

The Temptations of the Brown Box

The Temptations of the Brown Box

While harnessing technological improvements in the civilian sector to improve the capability of logistics, the U.S. military must proceed with caution. While many of the technologies––such as delivery drones and 3D printing––are in their nascent stages, asking important questions about the why, how, and in what context these technologies will be used might help alleviate future friction. U.S. strategists should be clear-eyed about what future logistics innovations can and cannot accomplish.

Reflections on Airpower: Offensive Strike

Reflections on Airpower: Offensive Strike

As the Islamic State advance was brought to a stop, coalition aircraft were free to attack the enemy from their front line positions to deep behind into the territory they held. The uncontested hold of the air provides us the ability to target and destroy the support network that keeps the self-declared caliphate fully functioning. From Mosul to Raqqa, the destruction of logistic depots, training camps, communication facilities and financial complexes, in addition to the destruction of their fighting units in direct contact with friendly forces, applies pressure on every aspect of the organization.

The Ugly Rhymes of History? #Reviewing Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies

The Ugly Rhymes of History? #Reviewing Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies

Insurgency is an old concept. If you were to travel back to Iraq between 2334 and 2279 BC, you would find a man called Sargan. Sargan ruled a vast empire spanning from Southern Iraq to Southern Turkey, enforced by overwhelming military power. His Akkadian hordes, armed with high-tech composite bows and sophisticated logistics, laid waste to all before them. Their strategy was a simple one; ‘mass slaughter, enslavement, the deportation of defeated enemies, and the total destruction of their cities.’ For years their technological edge and brutal strategy allowed the Akkadians to dominate. When they inevitably fell, however, they did not fall to a superior empire. They were victim to a new phenomenon: a tireless, guerrilla-style attack from the unsophisticated barbarian hordes all around them. In 2190 BC the city of Akkad, near modern Baghdad, finally fell.

The Case for AF-PAK Federally Administered Tribal Areas

The Case for AF-PAK Federally Administered Tribal Areas

The present center of gravity in Afghanistan is the Taliban subsystem of the greater Pashtun social system enabled by Pakistani elites. The insurgency is effectively wielding power to meet their independence and removal of foreign occupation objectives. Re-analyzing the critical factors and engaging the critical vulnerability of ineffective governance forces nonlinear change. Ineffective governance by all relevant actors is mitigated by transforming Afghanistan into a federal system of government with semi-autonomous areas. This includes political accommodation, ethnic nationalism, financial incentive structures, and power sharing.

War Isn't Precise or Predictable — It's Barbaric, Chaotic, and Ugly

War Isn't Precise or Predictable — It's Barbaric, Chaotic, and Ugly

Democracy will always benefit from the requirement to persuade the public––to gain consensus on, and legitimacy for, the use of force in order to defend or pursue national interests. If this opportunity is ceded for fear of being unconvincing, or in fear of explaining the ugliness it will entail, then a society will find itself bereft of clarity in the political objective and therefore unable to craft strategy appropriate to the task at hand. Furthermore, the failure to have these discussions leaves the populace underprepared for the brutality and sacrifice that war may require.

The Wages of War Without Strategy

The Wages of War Without Strategy

In this––our final installment––we appeal to each element of the Clausewitzian Trinity to do its part. To remain silent as practitioners of policy and war, we believe, would perpetuate the betrayal of those troops and civilians––American and foreign––who have made the ultimate sacrifice for reasons this country still struggles to articulate.

Reflections on Airpower

Reflections on Airpower

When I look at our presence in the Middle East, the word that comes to mind is “persistent.” It is this persistent presence that has led to the development of the sprawling bases you see in Jason Koxvold’s photographs. These photographs will give a unique look into the locations and lives of Airmen who are the foundation beneath the operations of Airmen like me as we conduct missions in support of America’s national interest.

#Reviewing Gold, Dollars, and Power: How U.S. International Monetary Policy Could Have Lost the Cold War

#Reviewing Gold, Dollars, and Power: How U.S. International Monetary Policy Could Have Lost the Cold War

While certainly not a primer for domestic or international monetary policy, Gavin does a great job in connecting what seemingly could be disparate strategic policies –– security, military, economic, international relations, etc. –– and ensuring they are considered together. At a time when the U.S. is looking for innovative ways to exert power, any national security professional desiring a deeper understanding of how monetary policy could be both an opportunity and a vulnerability should read Gavin’s book.

The Weaker Foe – Part 3: Transforming to Win Future Wars

The Weaker Foe – Part 3: Transforming to Win Future Wars

For the past several decades the Army has promoted agile and adaptive leadership. This type of leadership is good when you are the strongest Army in the world and you’re focused on rapidly adapting to dynamic situations during operations. However, an entirely different type of leadership is necessary if you intend to transform the organization from the way it is today to the way you want it to be in the future. In the years ahead our Army needs transformational leaders who will shape our culture to one that demonstrates cunning, embraces asymmetry, generates unforeseen problems, and takes risks in order to win decisively.

Military Incidents: Not the Edge of the Abyss

Military Incidents: Not the Edge of the Abyss

Recent provocations concerning Iran and North Korea raise concerns about the U.S. fighting another war. The U.S. Navy’s history with challenging Iranian actions in the Strait of Hormuz and the perceived escalation of North Korean provocations via ballistic missile development conjure thoughts of a third world war. Yet history offers lessons on the U.S. responding to foreign aggression far away from America’s territorial borders.

The Conspiracy of Cells of Fire Resurgent

The Conspiracy of Cells of Fire Resurgent

Due to the overwhelming emphasis on extremist organizations claiming religious motivation, it is too easy for groups such as the Conspiracy to get lost in the background. Allowing this might prove to be a costly mistake. Last month’s G20 summit in Hamburg and the CCF prisoner solidarity riots in Athens serve as a reminder of what these anarchist collectives are capable. The United States would be remiss to place such a destructive force on the backburner.

#Reviewing Embers of War

#Reviewing Embers of War

To the casual student of history and foreign affairs, France’s war in Vietnam is typically a brief aside in a 50-minute lecture about America’s Vietnam War that goes something like, “You can’t truly understand America’s war in Vietnam without understanding the Franco-Indochina war,” stressing its importance, but not going much further. Indeed, this lack of coverage is reinforced by the countless books describing the American war in the 1960s. Fredrik Logevall's newest book, Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam, analyzes the roots of America’s involvement, beginning with the French war.

Strategy Considerations Across the Spectrum of Warfare

Strategy Considerations Across the Spectrum of Warfare

The most complex challenges that will emerge in the future, and which will pose the greatest challenge to the U.S., are the very technologies which are being developed today, such as remotely-piloted, cyber, and energy weapons. As the world becomes smaller through technological advancements and the conduct of war becomes blurred by non-state actors and automation, Clausewitz’s instrumental view of war as the continuation of policy through other means is a salient reminder that success cannot be achieved without the proper alignment of strategy to policy.

What Does Victory Look Like in Afghanistan?

What Does Victory Look Like in Afghanistan?

More U.S. troops are likely headed back to Afghanistan soon, while the Trump Administration is also now considering withdrawal. Before either option—or anything in between—is considered, the U.S. needs to decide what version of victory it wants before it can decide on a strategy, but debates often consider strategies in isolation, and this is a mistake. Strategies must be judged relative to the realistic alternatives.

Professional Disobedience: Loyalty and the Military

Professional Disobedience: Loyalty and the Military

To be a professional member of the military means to be obedient; to be disobedient is, therefore, unprofessional. However, the Nuremberg trials and events of My Lai demonstrate the concept of obedience is not that simple. Military members are expected to disobey manifestly illegal or immoral orders, so obedience cannot be an unconditional virtue.

Beyond the Trenches with the U.S. Navy in the First World War: #Reviewing Crisis at Sea

Beyond the Trenches with the U.S. Navy in the First World War: #Reviewing Crisis at Sea

Crisis at Sea is an exhaustive study of the U.S. Navy in the European theater. William Still brings a remarkable attention to detail in his latest volume, providing a thorough account of America’s role at sea in the First World War. Eleven years after its publication, this is still the definitive resource for its subject, and likely will remain so for many years to come.

Creating a Safe and Prosperous Cyberspace: The Path to Ise-Shima Cybersecurity Norms

Creating a Safe and Prosperous Cyberspace: The Path to Ise-Shima Cybersecurity Norms

Over the last 30 years the international security environment has been characterized by several security deficits, which are defined as a government’s inability to meet its national security obligations without external support. Intra-state, transnational, and regional actors challenge a sovereign government’s ability to provide a secure environment for their citizens. While evident in countries like Syria and Afghanistan, it is also true in the cyber world.