Alessandra Nisch
Putin’s Wars: Testing Boyd’s Strategy of ...

President Putin made three foundational assumptions in launching his war against Ukraine that should have been correct but were not. First, Putin assumed the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and easy fight. Second, he assumed the world would denounce the invasion but tacitly allow it. Third, Putin assumed the war would deter NATO expansion.

Putin’s Wars: Testing Boyd’s Strategy of Applied Friction

ISIS

#Reviewing Grand Delusion: A New Book Takes Aim at American Foreign Policy in the Middle East, With Limited Results

#Reviewing Grand Delusion: A New Book Takes Aim at American Foreign Policy in the Middle East, With Limited Results

Simon reviews more than four decades of American endeavors in the region from the perspective of eight presidential administrations ranging from Jimmy Carter to Joe Biden. The book’s chapters illuminate cabinet-level thinking on vexing national security issues: Iranian influence in the Levant in the 1980s, the response to the U.S. Marine Corps barracks bombing in Beirut, the Persian Gulf War, the unsolvable Israel-Palestine quandary, and the rise and fall of Saddam Hussein and the resultant chaos in Iraq and Syria.

#Reviewing Soldiers of End-Times: Assessing the Military Effectiveness of the Islamic State

#Reviewing Soldiers of End-Times: Assessing the Military Effectiveness of the Islamic State

Soldiers of End-Times: Assessing the Military Effectiveness of the Islamic State is a timely study of the effectiveness of the military tactics and strategy of the Islamic State (IS) from 2014 to 2019. Throughout his study, Levy examines how IS fought their form of an effective conventional war. In examining the effectiveness of IS military operations, Levy is one of the first to attempt to create a larger study on IS. Levy is restricted in his study by the novelty of his subject. The fall of IS is still very recent at the time of publication and many of the U.S. defense sources are still restricted to the general public.

#Reviewing Homegrown ISIS in America

#Reviewing Homegrown ISIS in America

In the book Homegrown: ISIS in America, the authors provide a highly detailed account of ISIS activities in the United States. The book explores an area which has been underexamined in the terrorism/counterterrorism, security, and intelligence literature. Culminating over four years of collected research, the authors use the following sources for data collection: The Program on Extremism at George Washington University, court documents, trial attendance, interviews, and approximately forty Freedom of Information Act requests.

#Reviewing The Caravan

#Reviewing The Caravan

Azzam’s legacy is a complicated one. It is difficult to pin down the exact extent of his influence and where others have distorted his ideas. Moreover, even though Azzam was critical of the previous era of transnational hijacking and terrorism, he ultimately became the inspiration for a subsequent, more violent movement, one that resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of Muslims, most of them at the hands of other Muslims. But as complex as Azzam’s legacy in the evolution of global jihad has been, Thomas Hegghammer’s masterful book will certainly contribute to our growing, collective understanding of his important role.

#Reviewing Hunting the Caliphate

#Reviewing Hunting the Caliphate

It is only at the end, perhaps, that the two authors diverge on the true lessons of the fight against ISIS, to include the tenuous gains resulting from the application of overwhelming military force. The mantra to “Kill ISIS” perhaps comes at a cost at all levels of war—strategically, operationally, and tactically. Read critically, Pittard and Bryant’s first-hand accounts provide a starting point for wrestling with the true costs of war on humanity and the limits of hunting.

#Reviewing Shatter the Nations

#Reviewing Shatter the Nations

Giglio laments that Americans, who still claim to be at war, have made little effort to understand the Islamic State beyond their high-profile attacks. Part memoir, part commentary, and part war story, Shatter the Nations is an accessible, engaging primer on the Islamic State and the challenges facing the region that hopefully serves as an antidote to the war weariness and lack of interest Giglio observes in the American public.

The Challenge of Deradicalization: What Happens After?

The Challenge of Deradicalization: What Happens After?

Preventing violent extremism is important, and governments need to shift at least some focus from basic incarceration to deradicalization or disengagement. As countries continue to develop a policy on how, and if, they’ll accept returning citizens who lived and fought with Islamic State or other terrorist organizations, they need to be prepared for what happens after.

The Logistics of Terror: The Islamic State’s Immigration & Logistics Committee

The Logistics of Terror: The Islamic State’s Immigration & Logistics Committee

Seemingly, the group was defeated after the Anbar Awakening and second Gulf War, but the organization waited patiently in the shadows for the right opportunity to strike back and regain relevance. During the interlude following the second Gulf War and the establishment of the caliphate, the group did what it has always done well—survive.

Post-ISIS Antagonists and the Looming Struggle

Post-ISIS Antagonists and the Looming Struggle

While future insurgencies may be inevitable, they can be marginalized. It is incumbent upon the international coalition to commit to a sustained presence in Iraq and the freed areas of Syria for years to come. This presence must include substantive improvements to security forces, reconstruction of decimated communities, and reconciliation of Sunni populations at the national level. This effort may take up to a decade, if not longer, the United States must leverage members of the coalition to the greatest extent possible, and policy makers must be made aware of the sobering timeline and costs required.

The Strategic Implications of Non-State #WarBots

The Strategic Implications of Non-State #WarBots

Over the past year, a primitive type of WarBot has become a formidable battlefield weapon: the small unmanned aerial system. The threat materialized in October 2016 when a drone booby-trapped by the Islamic State killed two Kurdish soldiers. Within a few months, the Islamic State was flying tens of aerial bombardment missions each day, displayed the capability to drop grenades down the hatches of tanks, and reportedly flew up to a dozen aircraft at a time. The threat was so severe that the Mosul offensive nearly stalled.

Changing Calculus and Learning from our Enemies

Changing Calculus and Learning from our Enemies

Suicide Bombing has been the subject of scholarly works and studies in multiple campaigns. For the U.S. military, suicide tactics have been an integral part of the threat environment for well over a decade. Familiarity with the concept generates a bit of complacency, but this is a false familiarity obscuring the reality that suicide bombing has changed in the last decade.

The Wages of War Without Strategy

The Wages of War Without Strategy

In this––our final installment––we appeal to each element of the Clausewitzian Trinity to do its part. To remain silent as practitioners of policy and war, we believe, would perpetuate the betrayal of those troops and civilians––American and foreign––who have made the ultimate sacrifice for reasons this country still struggles to articulate.

Thoughts on the Practicalities of Implementing the Iraqi National Security Strategy

Thoughts on the Practicalities of Implementing the Iraqi National Security Strategy

Is it possible to intervene in another nation-state and pushback against the weight of that nation-state’s history? Can the weight of history be sufficiently balanced by intervention, allowing for the creation of enduring conditions that protect the outsider’s strategic interests? Today, the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the constraints on resources and time, probably make this an unattractive policy option. Instead, managing not resolving, the threats that pose risk to strategic interests is probably a more reasonable policy approach. This means accepting that an intervention in the affairs of another nation-state is limited to advise, assist and enable; and that the intervention will be a long-term commitment that works with the grain of history to achieve incremental progress.

#Reviewing American Power & Liberal Order

#Reviewing American Power & Liberal Order

Overall, American Power is a policy framework that is easy to read and yet full of substance. It bridges the gap between intellectual and practical policy. And while there is nothing necessarily revolutionary about the framework, it hammers home the United States’ role in the world as a promoter of democracy and the liberal order. I am in agreement with Miller that democracy promotion and the liberal order will always be in the United States’ interests.

A Response to "U.S. Strategy for al Qaeda and ISIS: It’s Groundhog Day"

A Response to "U.S. Strategy for al Qaeda and ISIS: It’s Groundhog Day"

A recent article on The Strategy Bridge by James Dubik suggests U.S. policy on Islamic extremism suffers from Groundhog Day syndrome: endless policy repetition going nowhere. I wholeheartedly agree, but offer a different take on his argument. Islam is, at the most basic level, waging a war against itself, and we would do well to attend to this.

Fellow Travelers: Managing Savagery and The Gerasimov Doctrine

Fellow Travelers: Managing Savagery and The Gerasimov Doctrine

Both ISIS and Russia seek to present themselves as a solution to unbearable problems. If they are simultaneously the cause of those problems, or seek to exacerbate them, that is irrelevant. Especially in the case of ISIS, they believe that if they make life solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short enough, a given population will accept even draconian masters in exchange for peace and stability.

U.S. Strategy for al Qaeda and ISIS: It’s Groundhog Day

U.S. Strategy for al Qaeda and ISIS: It’s Groundhog Day

The current situation in Syria reminds us again that we are failing in our post-9/11 wars. We have accomplished neither the strategic objectives set forth by the Bush administration nor those of the Obama administration. Both administrations have had notable successes and achieved periodic tactical and operational progress, but neither created sustained strategic success...We must reset our thinking.

#Reviewing Ajit Maan: Narrative and Counterterrorism in the Digital Age

#Reviewing Ajit Maan: Narrative and Counterterrorism in the Digital Age

“We are the alternative metaphor,” writes Ajit Maan. Considering the care that Daesh puts into its own narrative construction, therefore, one wonders whether the most strategic thing that the United States can do right now on the international stage is to get its own story straight.