President Putin made three foundational assumptions in launching his war against Ukraine that should have been correct but were not. First, Putin assumed the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and easy fight. Second, he assumed the world would denounce the invasion but tacitly allow it. Third, Putin assumed the war would deter NATO expansion.
The Pacific island countries, a cluster of fourteen states and home to nine million people, share a profound legacy of appreciation, trust, and shared values with the U.S. The Pacific island countries historically reflected the U.S. preference for diplomatic norms in the way of life and international organizations. Unfortunately, in recent years this congruence has become precarious. The catalyst for this shift can be tied to China actively exerting influence in Pacific island countries through development, economic aid, and security cooperation that endangers the relationship the U.S. shares with them. Chinese diplomatic and economic engagement in the Pacific island countries threatensU.S. influence and values in the region and will become an existential threat to security if not addressed. The U.S. strategy can counter China's power projection in the Pacific island countries by maintaining the existing soft power presence in the region and amplifying the Biden administration's efforts to mitigate climate change. The U.S. can also capitalize on the emerging need for economic development by investing in vaccine diplomacy to fight against COVID-19 to reiterate the U.S. commitment as a partner of choice to the region.
Climate change is rapidly reshaping the world despite international efforts to curb the warming trend. At its current pace, climate change will dramatically reshape the landscape by 2050, causing more than a billion people to compete for resources in affected regions. Moreover, the melting of Arctic ice caps will open new maritime routes nearly year-round, shifting global shipping to less secure zones. As fragile regions become unstable and climate change exacerbates conflict drivers, the U.S. must not remain strategically flexible but should prepare for certain variables. Of these variables, three stand out as most concerning for U.S. security and require shifts in strategy: Arctic ice loss, human displacement, and rare earth supplies.
Because of the urgency of addressing climate change, U.S. foreign policy should be re-oriented around climate change. This can be accomplished by linking climate change to national security, especially within the executive branch, pursuing a comprehensive international climate strategy, and addressing the U.S.'s own contributions to climate change, both domestically and abroad.
We live in an era of great geopolitical change. From the way groups compete to the diffusion of power among state and non-state actors, the upcoming geopolitical shifts will bear little resemblance to those of the past. Many people have studied how artificial intelligence, global markets, social media, and hypersonic weapons will affect the way states compete in the future. Another major factor in future geopolitical competition, especially between the reigning hegemonic power of the U.S. and rising regional ambition of China, will be climate change.
Given grand strategy’s concern with advancing overall interests, typically in the context of a significant threat, there is a pressing need for articulating a new sensibility about grand strategy that deals seriously with the climate threat. In particular, as I show in this essay, this new sensibility must account for the possibility of new actors having the capacity as well as the interest to act in a grand strategic fashion and to do so in a way that challenges the conventional wisdom about the centralized, coordinated nature of grand strategic action.
Climate change caused by human activity is settled science. Implications for the future of public health, the economy, and the global order of states are recognized as a real concern around the world. The European Union is strong, but NATO is not. Mid-East turmoil has compromised oil production there. The United States global hegemony is over. Complete energy independence from the rest of the world has resulted in an isolationist stance wherein the US has withdrawn from NATO as well as her other international obligations. The US remains a seeming world power with respectable military and diplomatic influence, but only grudgingly and apparently by force of reputational versus relational power. This is the scene, but not the story, and the focus is not America.
