Earlier this year, The Strategy Bridge asked university and professional military education students to participate in our fifth annual writing contest by sending us their thoughts on strategy.
Now, we are pleased to present one of our third-place winners, from Laura Keenan, a recent graduate of the U.S. National War College in Washington, D.C.
In World War II, under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz, the United States conducted a military strategy of leapfrogging in the Pacific island countries. The leapfrogging approach allowed military forces to bypass heavily fortified islands to reach the Axis powers, preserving time, human capital, and supplies to pursue victory. Access to the geography of the Pacific island countries was necessary during World War II and now in the era of great power competition continues to be necessary for regional security.[1] As a result of the American sacrifice made during World War II, the Pacific island countries, a cluster of fourteen states and home to nine million people, share a profound legacy of appreciation, trust, and shared values with the U.S.[2] The Pacific island countries historically reflected the U.S. preference for diplomatic norms in the way of life and international organizations. Unfortunately, in recent years this congruence has become precarious. The catalyst for this shift can be tied to China actively exerting influence in Pacific island countries through development, economic aid, and security cooperation that endangers the relationship the U.S. shares with them.[3] Chinese diplomatic and economic engagement in the Pacific island countries threatens U.S. influence and values in the region and will become an existential threat to security if not addressed. The U.S. strategy can counter China's power projection in the Pacific island countries by maintaining the existing soft power presence in the region and amplifying the Biden administration's efforts to mitigate climate change. The U.S. can also capitalize on the emerging need for economic development by investing in vaccine diplomacy to fight against COVID-19 to reiterate the U.S. commitment as a partner of choice to the region.
Chinese Influence in the Pacific Island Countries
China's precedent of predatory economic statecraft, mainly seizing geographic assets when country debtors cannot pay debts, foreshadows what might result in the Pacific island countries.[4] Challenged by climate change and lacking prosperity, these island nations rely heavily on their geography and natural resources as elements of power. In the absence of other elements of power, the Chinese may influence the Pacific island countries to use their geography as collateral for financial lending in Belt and Road Initiative projects. Currently, six countries in the group are debtors to the Chinese.[5] China's ability to gain access to geographic assets such as on the island of Kiribati could shift China's sphere of influence to within mere hours from Hawaii. As the U.S. learned during the Cold War, Cuba's proximity to the U.S. during the Cuban Missile Crisis gave Russia a perilous advantage.
In addition to China shifting its borders, China can lease land in the Pacific island countries to house Chinese military bases and disrupt trade routes for others, including the U.S.[6] For example, the country of Vanuatu is suspected of engaging in talks with Chinese security officials about the possibility of a Chinese military base. The bases could offer China an advantage in refueling their ships as well as space operations.[7] Even in the absence of a formal military base, the Chinese might gain access that would allow the opportunity to engage in surveillance. The U.S. conducts ballistic missile testing and space surveillance from the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site in the region.[8]
Résidence Taina, the location in Tahiti the Chinese Embassy there refused to vacate (Anne-Marie Brady)
Beyond debt diplomacy, China and its citizens are engaging in economic colonization, investing heavily in the region and acquiring hotels, mines, fisheries, and even small islands.[9] Even if the Pacific island countries retain their sovereignty, their ability to withstand Chinese influence will be fraught with challenges. In an example from 2018, the Chinese government refused to vacate a private residence rented by the Chinese consulate in Tahiti. China claimed the house was the territory of the People's Republic of China and set the terms of the agreement going forward. The local government was unable to exert the necessary pressure to counter China.[10] Another example of how the Chinese can control the economies in the Pacific island countries to degrade their will and sovereignty is the weaponization of tourism. To pressure Palau to recognize Beijing instead of Taiwan, China banned travel to Palau, reducing tourists' inbound traffic by half and crippling parts of Palau’s economy.[11]
It is not apparent whether the financial connectedness creates a transactional relationship or whether, as China's economy and those of the Pacific island countries merge, the two regions are starting to share values. Concerningly, countries such as the Solomon Islands and Kiribati shifted diplomatic recognition with Taiwan to show their preference for China. The Pacific island countries are each afforded a vote in the UN despite not having a direct interest in many disputes. As Gregory Poling of the Center for Strategic and International Studies reflected, "With what is effectively a surplus of 'unused' votes, a market has been created where the service of voting at the UN is exchanged for monetary assistance."[12] In the interest of national security, the U.S. needs the Pacific island countries to remain free from Chinese economic colonization to prevent China from shifting its borders, building up Chinese military bases in the region, shifting its diplomatic recognition away from Taiwan, or exerting undue influence in key international bodies.
Current U.S. Influence in the Region
Since World War II, the U.S. and its allies, Australia and New Zealand, have enjoyed relative goodwill with the Pacific island countries. Many factors have contributed to this cooperative relationship (e.g., economic partnerships, military and security ties, democratic views, shared religion, and cultural and ethnic links). Moreover, the U.S. has a national interest in this region because of critical military access to ports, economic opportunity, and citizens in the Pacific island countries. Notably, the Marshall Islands hosts the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site, and the region provides over one-third of the world's tuna.[13] In addition, the U.S. maintains exclusive access to the airspace and territorial waters of the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and the Palau under the terms of the Compact of Free Association, which will expire in 2024.[14]
Despite close ties, the Pacific island countries do not have voting representation in the U.S. Congress, which poses a challenge in garnering congressional interest in the region. However, three U.S. territories—American Samoa, Guam, and Northern Mariana Island—have delegates in the House of Representatives. They represent the interests of their constituents and other member countries of the region. Key congressional allies include individual members and caucuses such as the Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus (CPAC) and the Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander Task Force. In addition, key members representing districts with large Asian Pacific diaspora populations or who have industry impacted by the Pacific island countries, such as former Senator Inouye of Hawaii, are active on issues affecting the region. Correspondingly, airline, fishing, and the tourism industries lobby for economic interests in the region.
As a critical partner in the region, the U.S. invests in capital and partnerships focusing on the human dimension, distinguishing itself from the Chinese who focus more on monetary infusion and infrastructure projects. For example, the U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of Interior, Department of Health and Human Services, U.S. Centers for Disease Control, Department of Education, and Department of Labor collectively have invested over $5.21 billion in assistance to the Pacific island countries.[15] In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Agency for International Development, State Department, Peace Corps, National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration, and religious ministries actively invest in the geography and community in the Pacific island countries.
Although most Pacific island countries do not have elected voting representation in the U.S. government, they have critical stakeholders in congress, industry, the media, faith-based organizations, and nonprofits with a vested interest in their sovereignty and well-being. As a result, the level of attention in recent decades from critical stakeholders remained relatively constant, albeit insignificant compared to the attention paid in other regions worldwide. China's recent involvement in the region is a reason for greater urgency from the U.S. to emphasize engaging with the Pacific island countries.
U.S. Strategic Approach in the Pacific Island Countries
The U.S. can further work toward supporting the Pacific island countries with two key objectives. The first is to promote economic growth, and the second is to mitigate the impact of climate change. Both improve the self-reliance of Pacific island countries and might reduce the influence of foreign intervention. Thus, as the U.S. recovers from the COVID-19 pandemic and the Biden administration moves forward on an aggressive climate change agenda, the U.S. is in a unique and advantageous position to reinvigorate the relationship with the Pacific island countries.
Vaccine Diplomacy
There is an adage attributed to Sir Winston Churchill: "Never waste a good crisis."[16] As the U.S. is a world leader on vaccination rates and works toward reopening its economy, the U.S. can share this momentum with the Pacific island countries via vaccine diplomacy. Vaccine diplomacy would accelerate the opening of the Pacific island countries’ economies by allowing tourism to return to the region. Tourism accounts for 20-30 percent of economic activity in some parts of the region. As the Pacific island countries responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by closing its borders, the tourism industry lost jobs and economic security.[17] They enjoyed relatively low rates of COVID-19 because they closed their borders. However, as borders open, the Pacific island countries offer few medical facilities, cannot provide supplemental oxygen, and its population is burdened with preexisting conditions such as obesity and diabetes that make them susceptible to COVID-19. In addition, due to the warm weather in the Pacific island countries and refrigeration capacity issues, vaccination distribution poses a logistical challenge.
The U.S. can wield diplomatic and economic instruments of power to accelerate access to the vaccine for the Pacific island countries and achieve a relatively quick win in enabling them to open their borders for tourism within the following year. In addition to donating to Covax, an international effort backed by the World Health Organization to distribute the vaccine globally, the U.S. government can work with private partners such as Pfizer, Moderna, and Johnson & Johnson to procure and send excess U.S. vaccines to the Pacific island countries.[18] As the U.S. starts to reach saturation on distributing the vaccine in the U.S., it will benefit American pharmaceutical companies to find overseas markets to absorb excess vaccine supplies. In terms of bipartisan support, elected leaders with Pfizer, Moderna, and Johnson & Johnson footprints in their district should be likely champions of this initiative. Vaccine diplomacy will enable the Pacific island countries to open their borders, creating an opportunity for tourism to return safely.
The U.S. must not hesitate to engage in vaccine diplomacy. With the most effective vaccines emanating from the U.S., this is a crucial opportunity to increase confidence and prestige in American science and innovation while offering goodwill to our allies and partners. It would also help anchor the U.S. as a global health leader. COVID-19 is a collective experience for the world, and the U.S. can establish leadership in addressing the ramifications of such a pandemic.
The U.S. competitive advantage over the Chinese is our soft power in the region due to people-to-people relationships. Historically, the U.S. sends aid, but organizations such as the Peace Corps, U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Army National Guard via the State Partnership Program create long-lasting personal and professional relationships with the constituents of the Pacific island countries. These three organizations can work together for a coordinated effort to mitigate health infrastructure and logistical distribution challenges in the region. The U.S. State Department must wield the information instrument of power to convey its active participation as a solid economic, public health, and diplomatic partner.
Deputy Prime Minister Honorable Manasseh Maelanga about to receive his jab of the Chinese-made Sinopharm vaccine as Prime Minister Honorable Sogavare and China’s Ambassador to Solomon Islands H.E. Li Ming congratulates him. (Government of the Solomon Islands)
In the absence of American vaccine diplomacy, the Pacific island countries will understandably welcome support from China. Despite not having vaccinated their entire population, China is already sharing its vaccines with the Solomon Islands as part of a "Health Silk Road" initiative.[19] In a symbolic gesture, the Deputy Prime Minister of Solomon Islands received the first vaccine from China in anticipation of 50,000 more doses arriving. Li Ming, China's ambassador to the Solomon Islands, said, "That proves China and Solomon Islands are genuine friends and trustworthy partners."[20] Although the safety and concern of the people of the Pacific island countries are the foremost concern, it is naïve to think China's intentions are purely altruistic; instead it is a strategic move to build soft power. Early reporting from South America indicates China is using the vaccine access to extort countries to switch their diplomatic allegiance away from Taiwan in exchange for vaccine access.[21] The Biden administration has a diminishing window of opportunity to get a head start or even keep pace with China on inoculating the world against COVID-19, and the Pacific island countries are an excellent part of the world to prioritize.
Climate Change Diplomacy
The Biden administration appointed John Kerry as Special Presidential Envoy for Climate and rejoined the Paris Agreement within the administration's first hundred days. These two significant actions contrast with the previous administration's denial of climate change and showcase the common beliefs the U.S. shares with the Pacific island countries. As a result, the U.S. can amplify its recent diplomatic and multilateral efforts to emphasize a narrative of concern with the them.
The appointment of John Kerry as the Special Presidential Envoy for Climate is an example of how the U.S. can embody world leadership on climate action. With a climate czar, the U.S. can showcase its creative willingness to rally like-minded countries to collectively tackle climate issues, as evidenced in the April 2021 World Leaders to Leaders Summit on Climate.[22] Even in the absence of measurable progress on climate change, the willingness of the U.S. to recognize and prioritize climate change will be psychologically comforting and symbolic to the Pacific island countries. It is also essential that the U.S. restores faith in its ability to act as a stable and predictable partner. The exit of the U.S. from the Paris Agreement was a concern of the Pacific island countries, and success with respect to U.S. relations with them will be affected by whether the U.S. maintains participation and adheres to the standards prescribed.
Threats From the Strategy
During the Cold War, Russia paid little attention to the Pacific island countries, and U.S. interest in the region was unmatched. In the context of great power competition, China is eager to build up allies and partners in the region and is opportunistically keen to engage with the neglected or underserved Pacific island countries. Stable and prosperous Pacific island countries will understand more than they do today of their strategic importance to China and the U.S. They might become covetous in their financial expectations of the U.S. The more resources and wealth the Pacific island countries receive from the U.S. and China, the greater the risk that they will become more transactional in their relationships with the U.S. In the absence of economic and military power and prestige, the main strength of the Pacific island countries is their geography and the value of exclusive economic zones, military bases, and fishing.
Tommy Remengesau Jr., former President of Palau (ABC Radio)
Now that the Pacific island countries have economic attention from the U.S., its allies, and China, the Pacific island countries can leverage greater strength in their bargaining for essential agreements. For instance, the Pacific island countries can negotiate to adjust the Compacts of Free Association (COFA) that are due for renewal in 2023 and 2024. The Compacts of Free Association give exclusive rights to base troops on Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands.[23] The former President of Palau, Tommy Remengesau Jr., made statements to the U.S. explaining that Palau's allegiance is documented; however, Palau lacks airports and a fully functioning maritime port. According to Remengesau, Palau's relationship with the U.S. costs them valuable tourism from China, and his remarks indicate he views the cost of the U.S.-Palau relationship as more expensive, and he would like the U.S. to provide more infrastructure contributions as compensation.[24] This explicitness foreshadows future behavior if the U.S. and China continue to invest more in the Pacific island countries.
The strategy is not significantly different from previous approaches in Pacific island countries, and this is by design. This strategy intends not to disrupt the region significantly or create rapid transformation; instead, it maintains a steady presence to enable the Pacific island countries to resist Chinese economic colonization. In the past, U.S. investment and attention there were relatively constant, albeit insignificant compared to the attention paid in other regions worldwide. This strategy capitalizes on the enthusiasm for emerging issues with the current administration and Democratic congress, such as climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic. Success will be to increase funding and resources enough to make a noticeable difference to the people and leadership of the Pacific island countries but not to shift the investment precedence in the region. Thus, the strategy might create incremental investment mitigating pushback from elected leaders who feel resources need to be conserved or invested elsewhere globally.
Alternative Perspectives
If the U.S. deprioritized its involvement or ceased its investment altogether in the Pacific island countries, this would send a message to China, the Pacific island countries, and U.S. regional allies such as Australia, Japan, and New Zealand. The burden-sharing of the economic and humanitarian support between these four allies fostered a historical legacy of partnership in the region. If the U.S. opted out of the region entirely, this could impact our relationship with other emerging partners such as Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. In the absence of support, U.S. allies might find even more ways to cooperate with China in the Pacific island countries, creating more of a quagmire than the U.S. is in today.
Climate change deniers could argue that the U.S. approach to improving the islands' resilience against climate change is unnecessary and a more significant impact would be through social programs investment. Nonetheless, the people of the Pacific island countries believe climate change is real, and that perception is their reality. As a trusted partner, the U.S. is showing cultural awareness and empathy. Even if the U.S. were to provide more funding for social programs but deny climate change, it might have an even more significant adverse effect because the climate change narrative is considered personal for the constituents of the Pacific island countries.
Strategic Leadership
This strategy should not be difficult to implement. Since transition between the Trump and Biden administrations, there is clear and actionable domestic support for dealing with climate change. However, the effects of climate change will take years to assess correctly. Patience and courageous leadership will be needed to stay committed to climate change policy despite economic pressure from industry or a change in the executive branch. Consistency is essential in the region.
The strategy is multi-pronged but does allow for quick wins such as vaccine diplomacy in the region, which will attract congressional allies who have a large diaspora from the Pacific island countries or a large pharmaceutical footprint in their district. As Churchill encouraged, "Never waste a good crisis." The current COVID-19 pandemic is an opportunity for bipartisan members to find common ground to work together, even if they would not be likely allies for the strategy. Although it would be ideal if the whole strategy is adopted, interest in one objective over another is an opportunity to bridge members together. Quick wins like vaccine diplomacy might be easy to persuade and spur congressional champions, other issues such as climate change might be more controversial. Fortunately for the strategy, the current Biden administration is publicly supportive of addressing climate change with the appointment of Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry. With his extensive contacts in the Department of State, congress, and multilateral organizations, Kerry can amplify the urgency of addressing climate change in the Pacific island countries domestically and within multilateral organizations. Particularly on climate change, the strategy will be most successful by working with global and national leaders and government agencies committed to the issue. Due to bipartisanship polarization on the issue of climate change, it is prudent not to invest significant time or energy trying to persuade those committed to their convictions against climate change. Instead, it will be wise to focus on those leaders within congress and industry change agents to maximize the forward momentum on the issue.
With a climate czar, the U.S. can showcase its creative willingness to rally like-minded countries to collectively tackle climate issues, as evidenced in the April 2021 World Leaders to Leaders Summit on Climate.[25] Even in the absence of measurable progress on climate change, the U.S. willingness to recognize and prioritize climate change will be psychologically comforting and symbolic to the Pacific island countries.
Henry Kissinger is credited with the phrase, "America has no permanent friends or enemies, only interests."[26] As generations age and the memories of the U.S. military's intervention against the Japanese in World War II fades, U.S. leadership must be more careful in assuming that the loyalty among Pacific island countries is unfaltering. For decades, the U.S. had the clear advantage of being one of the few regional partners, as Russia almost entirely ignored the region during the Cold War. However, with current Chinese attention, the U.S. must realize the dynamics have shifted in great power competition. The leadership of the Pacific island countries can compare between actors interested in the region. The U.S. cannot underestimate the importance of the Pacific island countries as more influential partners in the Indo-Pacific command attention. In the famous Aesop fable, "The Lion and the Mouse," the tiny mouse saves the lion, and the lesson echoes today that little friends may prove to be great friends, and it is hard to predict who might be helpful in the future.[27]
Illustration from “The Lion and the Mouse” (Milo Winter)
This administration must be realistic, and part of the strategy is deciding what not to do. Although there is a tremendous need for the Pacific island countries, leadership must pragmatically assess the region with national security globally and unforeseen domestic challenges such as COVID-19 and civil unrest. Leadership needs to invest in the region without sacrificing resources for other competing priorities and account for the capacity and capability of the Pacific island countries to absorb support. Projects must reflect what the Pacific island countries desire and what they can maintain in the future. The U.S. does not want to overwhelm our partners' capacity with our generosity.
Lastly, the strategy is not significantly different from previous approaches. The strategy is not intended to disrupt the region significantly or create rapid transformation; instead, it builds on a steady presence to enable the Pacific island countries to resist Chinese economic colonization. In the past, U.S. investment and attention in the region were relatively constant, albeit insignificant compared to the attention paid in other regions worldwide. This strategy capitalizes on the enthusiasm for emerging issues with the current administration and Democratic congress, such as climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic. Success will be to increase funding and resources enough to make a noticeable difference to the people and leadership of the Pacific island countries but not to shift the precedent in the region.
Conclusion
The U.S. is a Pacific nation with a history of sacrifice on many Pacific islands. Over the last seventy years, the U.S. has invested heavily in the region, underwriting security and empowering citizens of the Pacific island countries to trade and travel freely. We are invested in the Pacific island countries through our shared interests, values, history, and goals and cannot let that investment and partnership atrophy. Enduring the effects of climate change and lacking few elements of power other than geography and natural resources, the region relies on international partners for monetary support and goodwill initiatives.
China is infusing support into the Pacific island countries via Belt and Road Initiatives, mainly infrastructure, revealing China's desire to influence its security posture in the South Pacific. China, like the U.S., recognizes the strategic geographic value of the region and is actively investing in the region. This is a threat to the U.S. influence and values in the region. Currently, the Pacific island countries may view China's involvement in the region via a different lens than the U.S., viewing Chinese involvement more as a short-term opportunity and less with the long-term threat from China. Nonetheless, this U.S. strategy will mitigate the long-term threat China poses in the region.
Based on the vulnerability of the Pacific island countries and their historical preference to work with the U.S., it is wise for U.S. policymakers to use diplomatic and economic instruments of power as carrots instead of sticks. Even though the U.S. might be investing differently and arguably less than the Chinese, who offer large construction projects in the region, the U.S. provides economic support while building personal relationships. In the mindset of offering economic carrots instead of sticks, there is a cultural appreciation and value associated with our support's human element that is difficult to measure. Moreover, U.S. presence and economic and diplomatic support send a crucial public message, thus wielding the informational instrument of power that the U.S. brand is collaborative and cooperative. In a proactive great power competition strategy, maintaining U.S. influence in the Pacific is an investment in the U.S. security future.
Laura Keenan is a lieutenant colonel in the District of Columbia Army National Guard. She is a recent graduate of the National War College. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Department of the Army, or Department of Defense, the U.S. Government, or of any organization the author is affiliated with, including the Army National Guard, the National War College.
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Header Image: South Pacific Islands (Shutterstock)
Notes:
[1] Leonard Howard Dofflemyer, “An Appraisal of the Military Leadership of General Douglas MacArthur” (dissertation, 1966), https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2613&context=uop_etds.
[2] Thomas Lum and Bruce Vaughn, “The Pacific Islands: Policy Issues,” The Congressional Research Service § (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44753.pdf.,1.
[3] “U.S. Policy In the Pacific: The Struggle to Maintain Influence,” Hearing before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on Foreign Affairs§ (2016), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-114hhrg20532/html/CHRG-114hhrg20532.htm.
[4] Maria Abi-habib, “How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port,” The New York Times (The New York Times, June 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka-port.html.
[5] Jonathan Pryke, “China Is Not Conducting Debt Trap Diplomacy in the Pacific-At Least Not Yet,” East-West Center, March 14, 2020, https://www.eastwestcenter.org/news-center/east-west-wire/china-not-conducting-debt-trap-diplomacy-in-the-pacific%E2%80%94-least-not-yet#:~:text=Six%20Pacific%20governments%20are%20currently,Vanuatu%E2%80%94%20are%20particularly%20heavily%20indebted.
[6] Julia Hollingsworth and Natalie Leung, “Why China Is Challenging AU.S.tralia for Influence over the Pacific Islands,” July 22, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/22/asia/china-aU.S.tralia-pacific-investment-intl-hnk/index.html.
[7] “Vanuatu Denies It Will Host China Military Base,” BBC News (BBC, April 10, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-aU.S.tralia-43707975.
[8] Ethan Meick, Michelle Ker, and Han May Chan, “China's Engagement in the Pacific Islands: Implications for the U.S.,” U.S. - China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 14, 2018, https://www.U.S.cc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China-Pacific%20Islands%20Staff%20Report.pdf.
[9] Michael Cole, “Chinese Tuhao Leads Tour to Buy Fiji Islands,” Mingtiandi, June 10, 2015, https://www.mingtiandi.com/real-estate/outbound-investment/chinese-entrepreneur-with-30-islands-leading-group-buy-tour-of-the-pacific/.
[10] Anne-Marie Brady , “Trouble in Paradise: A Chinese Occupation in Tahiti,” The Diplomat (for The Diplomat, April 22, 2018), https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/trouble-in-paradise-a-chinese-occupation-in-tahiti/.
[11] Farah Master, “Empty Hotels, Idle Boats: What Happens When a Pacific Island Upsets China,” Reuters (Thomson Reuters, AugU.S.t 19, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/U.S.-pacific-china-palau-insight/empty-hotels-idle-boats-what-happens-when-a-pacific-island-upsets-china-idU.S.KBN1L4036.
[12] “The Pacific's New Market: Trading Aid for Votes,” The Pacific's New Market: Trading Aid for Votes | Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 17, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacifics-new-market-trading-aid-votes.
[13] “U.S. Policy In the Pacific: The Struggle to Maintain Influence,” Hearing before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on Foreign Affairs§ (2016), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-114hhrg20532/html/CHRG-114hhrg20532.htm.
[14] Colin Packham and Jonathan Barrett, “U.S. Seeks to Renew Pacific Islands Security Pact to Foil China,” Reuters (Thomson Reuters, AugU.S.t 5, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/U.S.-micronesia-U.S.a-pompeo/u-s-seeks-to-renew-pacific-islands-security-pact-to-foil-china-idU.S.KCN1UV0UV.
[15] “U.S. Government's COVID-19 Response in the Pacific Islands: Pacific Islands,” U.S. Agency for International Development, September 15, 2020, https://www.U.S.aid.gov/pacific-islands/covid-19-response.
[16] John Mutter, “Opportunity From Crisis,” Foreign Affairs, March 22, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-04-18/opportunity-crisis.
[17] “Pacific Islands Threatened by COVID-19,” International Monetary Fund, May 27, 2020, https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/05/27/na-05272020-pacific-islands-threatened-by-covid-19.
[18] “COVAX,” World Health Organization (World Health Organization), accessed April 25, 2021, https://www.who.int/initiatives/act-accelerator/covax.
[19] Yanzhong Huang, “Vaccine Diplomacy Is Paying Off for China,” Foreign Affairs, April 8, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-03-11/vaccine-diplomacy-paying-china.
[20] Evan Wasuka and Liam Fox, “'It Does Put Pressure on AU.S.tralia': Chinese Vaccine Launches in the Pacific,” ABC News (ABC News, May 21, 2021), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-05-21/pacific-nations-to-roll-out-chinese-made-covid-19-vaccinations/100151672.
[21] “Taiwan to Help Allies Buy Vaccines, but Not from China,” Reuters (Thomson Reuters, March 24, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/bU.S.iness/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/taiwan-help-allies-buy-vaccines-not-china-2021-03-24/.
[22] “President Biden Invites 40 World Leaders to Leaders Summit on Climate,” The White HoU.S.e (The U.S. Government, March 26, 2021), https://www.whitehoU.S.e.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/26/president-biden-invites-40-world-leaders-to-leaders-summit-on-climate/.
[23] “Sunk Coast Fallacy: How Island Nations Should Approach Climate Diplomacy,” Council on Foreign Relations, AugU.S.t 7, 2021, https://www.cfr.org/blog/sunk-coast-fallacy-how-island-nations-should-approach-climate-diplomacy.
[24] Tommy Remengesau , “Pacific Defense Pact Renewal Vital to the U.S. amid Rising Tension with China,” TheHill, May 17, 2019, https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/444291-pacific-defense-pact-renewal-vital-to-the-U.S.-amid-rising.
[25] “President Biden Invites 40 World Leaders to Leaders Summit on Climate,” The White HoU.S.e (The U.S. Government, March 26, 2021), https://www.whitehoU.S.e.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/26/president-biden-invites-40-world-leaders-to-leaders-summit-on-climate/.
[26] Salvatore Babones, “Trump Has Alienated Allies - but Has Them Acting in America's Interest (And Their Own),” FB, AugU.S.t 6, 2020, https://foreignpolicy-com.nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/2020/08/06/trump-foreign-policy-accomplishments/.
[27] “The Lion & the Mouse,” Library of Congress Aesop Fables, accessed May 24, 2021, http://read.gov/aesop/007.html.