Earlier this year, The Strategy Bridge asked university and professional military education students to participate in our fifth annual writing contest by sending us their thoughts on strategy.

Now, we are pleased to present the one of our third-place winners, from Michael Brodka, currently a student at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C.

Climate change is a crisis multiplier that will likely accelerate in magnitude over the next three decades, with far-reaching implications for the geostrategic environment that will intensify conflict drivers and threaten stability in fragile regions. Environmental changes such as water scarcity, extreme weather patterns, and shrinking Arctic ice caps pose significant security challenges for the United States. These consequences of climate change will likely exacerbate instability by causing shifts in economic bases, resource competition, and food insecurity. The U.S. cannot afford strategic indifference amidst these conditions. It must regenerate from its strategic atrophy to prepare for climate-induced variables lest it quickly becomes outpaced by its rivals. Therefore, U.S. strategy must focus on three specific areas: (1) competing in the Arctic to protect the U.S. homeland and economic resources, (2) mitigating destabilizing effects of climate migration in regions of interest, and (3) diversifying rare earth supply chains to secure sustainment of green energy and defense technology.

Russia and China are positioning themselves advantageously in the Arctic to control thawing sea lanes and strengthen military positions within the U.S. homeland’s proximity. At the same time, Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) are weaponizing water, causing instability and forced migrations in regions containing U.S. interests.[1] Moreover, as nations commit to net-zero carbon emissions by 2050, as outlined in the Paris Climate Agreement, the demand for rare earth elements (REEs) will intensify, leading to resource competition and economic coercion by China, which controls the global market.[2,3]

The United States. must invest in a strategy that addresses both the direct effects of the changing geographic landscape and the devastating indirect effects its rivals can harness. Climate change is unpredictable and carries a wide range of implications for national security. Consequently, U.S. strategy must be innovative and pliant, embracing a whole-of-government approach that invests in sustainable options. To remain competitive to 2050, the U.S. must pursue these options through multilateral partnerships to counter climate-induced security threats.

Arctic: The New Strategic Frontier

The Arctic—3 million square miles of eternal frost, where, as German writer Rudolf Erich Raspe described, words spoken in the winter cannot be heard until they thaw out the following summer—is warming.[4] The Arctic landscape is undergoing rapid changes, with temperatures increasing twice as fast as the rest of the globe, leading to a decline in year-round sea ice at a rate of nearly 13 percent per decade.[5] The decreasing ice and thawing permafrost have strategic implications for the Arctic states of Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States. China, a self-proclaimed “near-Arctic state,” also has strategic security and economic-related interests in the region.[6]

*Arctic Ocean Territorial Claims and Sea Routes.(CSIS)[7]*

According to the U.S. Geological Survey, “The Arctic is estimated to harbor over 90 billion barrels of oil reserves, 30 percent of the world’s untapped natural gas, and around one trillion dollars’ worth of rare earth minerals.”[8] Thawing ice has also opened trans-Arctic shipping routes, including the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the Northwest Passage (NWP). The Northern Sea Route, for example, decreases transit time from Europe to Asia by nearly 40 percent, causing substantial future socioeconomic impacts on global shipping.[9] Moreover, as the Arctic strategic security buffer erodes for the U.S., competitors could gain access through emerging avenues to the homeland. Russia and China, the two great power rivals for the U.S., are quickly moving to positions of advantage in the Arctic to exploit growing economic and security opportunities. U.S. strategy must counter Russia’s Arctic military buildup and China’s gray zone activities in several Arctic states to secure its own economic and security interests.

Russia’s Furious Return to the Arctic

The Arctic is a vital source of economic stability for Russia. The Arctic accounts for more than 20 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), along with approximately 75 percent of its oil and 95 percent of its natural gas reserves.[10] An increase in GDP as the Arctic thaws and the Northern Sea Route becomes navigable for more prolonged periods is a driving factor for increased activity in the Arctic. Russia’s ability to exploit natural resources, newly opened fishing grounds, and expanded shipping lanes are strategic priorities it is moving to secure.

In June 2020, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an executive order elevating the Northern Fleet, giving it the status of a military district effective January 2021. This move prioritized Arctic defense, and along with the reopening of 50 Soviet-era bases north of the Arctic Circle, highlights the strategic importance Russia places on the region.[11] Incidentally, long-term investment in nuclear strike capability and strategic deterrence, made more accessible with melting Arctic ice, remains at the forefront of Russian modernization plans. Part of its modernization includes the fourth generation Borei-A-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), capable of carrying 16 Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) that recently entered service with the Northern Fleet in June 2020.[12]

Russia has resurrected its Soviet era “bastion concept,” an echeloned defense using multi-domain capabilities to protect its ballistic missile submarines and ensure second-strike nuclear capability.[13] The Northern Fleet integrates anti-access/area denial (A2/AD), ballistic missile defense, and surface-to-air missiles at bases along the Northern Sea Route. It also regularly patrols Arctic waters with aircraft and surface vessels with hypersonic missiles and long-range artillery in support. These bastions will likely expand from their defensive mission to a power projection role as shipping lanes thaw to extend Russia’s influence in the Northern Sea Route and economic exclusion zones in the greater Arctic.[14] Bastion strategic power projection with anti-access/area denial may deter or severely limit the U.S. and its allies from conducting freedom of navigation operations and merchant vessel transit. The potential denial of U.S. shipping through the Northern Sea Route is most concerning because it would likely force merchant vessels to use the Suez Canal, leading to potential profit loss and decreased maritime commerce competitiveness.

Gray Zone Activities in White Out Conditions

On May 2, 2013, the weather station in the desolate town of Grimsstadir in northeast Iceland measured the lowest May temperature in the country’s history—a brisk -36.4 degrees Fahrenheit.[15] The region also regularly experiences high winds and several feet of snow, causing whiteout conditions throughout the winter and spring. Most would not envision sub-arctic conditions conducive to outdoor sports. However, just a few months earlier, Huang Nubo, a former official in the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Propaganda Department, now a property developer in Beijing, attempted to buy land in Grimsstadir to build a luxury hotel and eco-golf course. Residents were suspicious of the motives to build a high-end resort in a place so isolated that “you can almost hear ghosts dancing in the snow.”[16] A few years later, in 2016, the Chinese mining firm General Nice Group attempted to buy a defunct U.S. naval base in Greenland and tried to build at least two airports in the country.[17] These attempts at procuring infrastructure have become standard practice for the Chinese throughout the Arctic. Whether economic, research-based, or military-related, Chinese Arctic infrastructure procurement for dual-use is one of many gray zone activities currently being undertaken by Beijing.

China made its Arctic ambitions known in its 2018 Arctic Strategy, where it called itself a near-Arctic state. This proclamation came a year after Russia and China agreed to establish a Polar Silk Road to expand cooperation in trade, high-speed rail construction, and manufacturing.[18] Additionally, Beijing has emphasized its desire to “work with all parties” along the Northwest and Northeast Passage.[19] For example, in 2017 Finland became the first Nordic country to join the Polar Silk Road initiative. China then solidified its Arctic ambitions when it specifically mentioned developing a “blue economic passage” to promote trade “to Europe via the Arctic Ocean.”[20] These measures provide China access to the rare earth elements, oil, gas, and other untapped resources in the Arctic and give it reasons to militarize the Arctic to protect its economic interests.

Beijing’s military buildup in the South China Sea (SCS) and its use of maritime militia in fishing vessels to protect its shipping is likely to occur similarly in the Arctic. Moreover, China continues to invest in research stations throughout Nordic states and Russia, which provides basing options for strategic forces and unmanned aerial vehicles. Beijing has perfected gray zone activities, and as a report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies notes, “Significant elements of China’s military presence in the Arctic will come under the guise of its scientific and economic presence.”[21] The U.S. cannot afford to ignore China’s growing Arctic presence and must learn from its inaction in the South China Sea to counter China’s aggression.

The Great Climate Migration

The physical impacts of climate change are likely to become the fastest-growing driver of involuntary mass migration and displacement globally by 2050, especially along the equatorial belt in Central America and Africa.[22] These areas are experiencing rapid population growth but also declining food supplies, water scarcity, and little access to healthcare. Current trends show that migration generally occurs within national borders and flows from rural areas to larger cities.[23] The influx of poor, unemployed people into urban areas stresses infrastructure, law enforcement capacity, and local governance, leading to security and health crises. As those cities become uninhabitable, migrations will cross country borders towards those in temperate climates, creating legal dilemmas for countries with climate refugees at their borders.

Adverse climate conditions magnify the socioeconomic disparities that have driven membership in violent extremist organizations and criminal insurgencies in sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central America. Additionally, climate-induced migrations stress already delicate social and political tensions within communities competing for food and water. These conditions provide nefarious state and non-state actors with opportunities to exploit climate change for their interests. For example, as Dr. Marcus D. King, Professor of International Affairs at George Washington University, explains, “Full-on water weaponization is already occurring among subnational organizations in the Middle East and North Africa. They are overtly using water to kill, injure, or coerce their opponents.”[24]

Recognizing the Environment as a Persecuting Agent

As parts of the globe become uninhabitable as early as 2100, forcing mass migrations north, the European Union and the U.S. must prepare for displaced persons at their borders.[25] Currently, international law does not recognize climate migrants as refugees. According to the UN’s 1951 Refugee Convention, migrants who possess a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion” are granted refugee status.[26] Those affected by climate change and forced to leave their homes do not qualify, because the Convention does not recognize the environment as a persecuting agent.

Currently, there are no legally binding agreements obliging countries to support the estimated “21.5 million people who flee their homes as a result of sudden onset weather hazards every year.”[27,28] If governments decide to harden their borders and not address the growing climate migrations, those stuck waiting for refugee status are susceptible to disease, gang-related violence, and starvation. Moreover, they will strain local services, intensify environmental degradation, and stress economies, causing increased security concerns with no viable solution.

The World Bank estimates that the regions of Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and Southeast Asia will generate just over 143 million climate migrants by 2050.[29] Of those, the report estimates as many as 17 million will come from Latin America, migrating north into southern Mexico, and eventually the U.S. The U.S. is unprepared for the influx of migrant caravans that are likely to increase exponentially in the coming decades. In 2019, the U.S. border city of El Paso, TX, experienced massed crowds at its ports of entry, peaking at more than 4,000 a day.[30] The influx of migrants stressed human services in the city beyond their capacity. Climate migration will duplicate El Paso’s experience at other ports of entry on the U.S.-Mexico border, taxing already overcrowded migrant holding facilities while the federal government determines refugees’ fate.[31]

The Weaponization of Water

The water is drying up. Herders within the Sahel region of Africa drive their livestock along ancestral migration routes searching for watering holes long since evaporated. Their search for water often leads them through pastoral lands and into conflict with local farmers, many times ending in violence. Climate change has exacerbated the water stress in arid and semi-arid regions, and projections indicate it will worsen. According to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), “By 2025, 1.8 billion people will be living in countries or regions with absolute water scarcity.”[32]

*Projected Global Water Scarcity Risk. (World Resources Institute)[33]*

Several recent cases of water weaponization in the Middle East and Africa give a glimpse of what the future of water-stressed regions may become. In 2014, the Islamic State diverted rivers in Iraq’s Diyala Province to cut off the advancing Iraqi Army. In Raqqa, Syria, the Islamic State taxed water access to fund the caliphate and weapons procurement. However, the most shocking water-related actions, and perhaps most indicative of future water conflict, occurred in Somalia in 2014. The terrorist group al-Shabaab cut off government-held cities from their water sources. Compounded by a severe drought, associated famine, and limited access for humanitarian aid groups, al-Shabaab’s water weaponization resulted in the deaths of more than 250,000 people and hundreds of thousands of displaced persons.[34]

As water becomes scarcer, especially in more impoverished, less stable regions, violent extremist organizations and other non-state actors will likely use water to coerce the population, leading to violence and mass migration. Sub-Saharan Africa is expected to add another 1.3 billion people by 2050 alone, causing additional stress to the current food shortage and shrinking water supply.[35] The instability caused by weaponizing water and resulting conflict will threaten U.S. interests with important trading partners such as Nigeria and South Africa. The ensuing mass climate migration will also threaten the security of the European Union, the likely end goal for many African climate refugees escaping conflict. Without a plan, both the U.S. and EU potentially face a humanitarian disaster made more dangerous by violent extremist organizations.

Critical Mineral Supply Chains

The first step to mitigating climate change and its security challenges is reaching zero-net carbon emissions by 2050, an international goal established in the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement. To do so requires massive global investment in green technologies, which will escalate requirements for non-carbon-emitting sources of electricity and energy storage. A recent World Bank report projects increases in demand “up to nearly 500 percent for certain minerals, especially those concentrated in energy storage technologies, such as lithium, graphite, and cobalt.”[36]

Green energy technologies rely heavily on components constructed of a range of minerals that primarily reside near the bottom of the periodic table of elements. These 17 rare earth elements exist in deposits globally, with 75 percent concentrated in the Indo-Pacific region; however, contrary to what their name implies, rare earth elements are not rare, just complicated to extract and expensive to refine.[37]

To keep atmospheric temperatures below a 2-degree Celsius increase, investment in green technology will drive global rare earth element demand to an estimated 3.1 billion tons annually by 2050. Furthermore, estimates predict demand will rise to 3.5 billion tons annually to prevent global warming from exceeding 2 degrees Celsius.[38] The U.S. defense industry amplifies rare earth element demand far beyond global green energy, which further complicates strategic implications. For instance, the U.S. requires about 940 pounds of REEs to produce an F-35 strike fighter, 5200 pounds for each Aegis destroyer, and nearly 9200 pounds for a Virginia-class submarine.[39] As demand surges, supply chain security becomes an increasingly crucial strategic issue for the U.S. as China controls approximately 85 percent of global supply of rare earth elements.[40]

*Projected Annual Demand for Rare Earth Minerals to 2050 Depending on Climate Scenario. (World Bank)[41]*

The Dirty Cost of Clean Energy

In The Rare Metals War, author Guillaume Pitron notes that dirty metals are necessary for a cleaner world.[42] On the surface, Pitron’s assertion seems to be hyperbole, but in reality rare earth element extraction and refinement add significantly to greenhouse gas emissions and ground pollution. Production is also expensive. The United States was the leader in global rare earth element production between the 1960s and 1980s when costs were more permissive. “Since then,” a recent Congressional Research Service report asserts, “production has shifted almost entirely to China due to lower labor costs and lower environmental standards.”[43] China increased its production by more than 450% between 1990 and 2000, undercutting the U.S. market and flooding the global supply chain with cheaper rare earth components.[44] China’s state-controlled economy accomplished that growth by covering the losses incurred by corporations involved in rare earths mining and refinement, giving it a strategic edge over producers in capitalist economies that cannot afford the loss in profits.

China’s massive increase in production has given it a near-monopoly over the $1.15 billion global market for rare earth elements.[45] In 2019, Chinese facilities produced 100,000 more tons of rare earth elements than the U.S., their nearest competitor by volume. The dominance displayed by China was foreshadowed in 1992, Deng Xiaoping said, “While the Middle East has oil, China dominates rare earth.”[46] That dominance has enabled China to unilaterally disrupt global supply chains and economically coerce dependent states.

In 2018, the U.S. Department of the Interior named 35 minerals—including all 17 rare earth elements—critical to national security.[47] The U.S. considers these elements critical because their supply chains are vulnerable to disruption, and they serve an essential function in manufacturing green energy products and defense system components. Considering those positions, the Chinese dominance of rare earth elements does not bode well for the U.S. military and its partners or for global climate change mitigation. The U.S. cannot afford to be at the mercy of China’s competitive manufacturing sector. It must explore options to diversify supply chains, expand mining capacity, and pursue recycling opportunities.

Geoeconomic Rivalry and Supply Chain Coercion

Maintaining the status quo of rare earth element supply chains is untenable. China accounts for approximately 46 percent of global rare earth element exports, which it can leverage against its geoeconomic rivals.[48] An example of this occurred in 2010, when Japan’s reliance on Chinese rare earth elements was exposed. China briefly restricted rare earth exports during a bilateral dispute that disrupted several key industries and forced Japan to consider rare earth element alternatives. In 2020, amidst trade tensions, China imposed sanctions on American defense companies following the proposal of a $1.8 billion arms deal with Taiwan.[49] China also mulled cutting off exports of rare earth elements to cripple F-35 production. Those actions put the U.S. in a similar dilemma as Japan and influenced President Joe Biden’s February 2021 executive order to explore supply chain alternatives.

As global warming continues and the demand for rare earth elements increases, the U.S. must insulate itself from Chinese supply chain coercion. Great power competition is likely to intensify, making rare earth element supply chains enticing targets. Chinese President Xi Jinping will likely continue his attempts to enhance economic dependence on China to “develop powerful retaliation and deterrence capabilities against supply cut-offs by foreign parties.”[50] The U.S. cannot allow that to occur. A robust constellation of allies and partners is necessary to mitigate climate change and ensure security; actions to undermine those efforts are detrimental to the wellbeing of global citizens. For the U.S. to meet its zero-net carbon emissions goal by 2050 and continue its military technological superiority, it must enact a long-term, multilateral, and sustainable strategy for rare earth elements.

Where Do We Go Now?

Climate change is accelerating. Future changes to the physical and human landscapes present unique challenges that the U.S. must prepare for now. Contested Arctic sea lanes, climate-induced mass migrations, and conflict over dwindling resources are some of the many issues that affect global security to 2050. The U.S. must be forward-thinking and adaptable to deal with the varied threats climate change presents. Most challenges will occur below the threshold of war in the gray zone. These competitive interactions by state and non-state actors that fall between the conventional conflict and peace duality are outside the large-scale combat operations paradigm the U.S. military currently trains for.[51] The U.S. must become adept at operating in the gray zone, while also working within international bodies to address climate-related security issues. The following three strategy recommendations address the challenges presented in this paper and provide options for U.S. policymakers.

A Free and Open Arctic

According to the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Arctic Strategic Outlook, “The resurgence of nation-state competition has coincided with dramatic changes in the physical environment of the Arctic, which has elevated the Arctic’s prominence as a strategically competitive space.”[52] Therefore, the U.S. cannot afford inaction. Chinese attempts to impede U.S. access to the Arctic, similarly tried in the South China Sea, must be deterred. A Free and Open Arctic strategy that involves multilateral partnerships with Arctic states through established forums such as the Arctic Council and the Arctic Coast Guard Forum provides opportunities for dialogue and operational cooperation. These forums and other future coalitions should focus on shared interests such as freedom of passage, search and rescue, commerce, Arctic communications, research, and environmental issues.

To address the numerous challenges posed to U.S. strategy in the Arctic, Washington must invest in U.S. Coast Guard capabilities to compete in the Arctic gray zone. According to the U.S. Coast Guard Commandant, Admiral Karl Schultz, “The U.S. Coast Guard is uniquely qualified and deeply experienced operating in ambiguous environments that require a flexible blend of diplomatic, information, military, and law enforcement tools.”[53] Current initiatives, such as the Polar Security Cutter (PSC) program and the addition of three future Arctic Security Cutters (ASC), are force multipliers that help address regional partners’ needs and deter further gray-zone aggression. Satellite upgrades such as the Enhanced Polar System offer continuous, secure, and jam-resistant Arctic communications. Advancements in unmanned aircraft systems and unmanned surface vessels could provide an integrated sensor network for surveillance, environmental testing, and search and rescue in remote areas.

The opening of Arctic sea lanes for more prolonged periods could shift up to a third of international shipping from transiting the South China Sea and Suez Canal to the Northern Sea Route.[54] The U.S. must learn from China’s encroachment in the South China Sea to foster existing relationships with Arctic states, including Russia, to safeguard U.S. commerce through a Free and Open Arctic strategy. The U.S. Coast Guard provides the means to accomplish this strategic goal through strong partnerships and trust with allies and competitors. The U.S. Coast Guard and Russian Border Guard, through the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, enjoy a “history of practical cooperation and mutual respect for established international rules and national sovereignty.”[55] The U.S. must leverage the Coast Guard’s influence to build further cooperation in the Arctic with Russia, which controls the Northern Sea Route through its Northern Fleet. The U.S. cannot risk Russia and China denying access to the Northern Sea Route, which could be catastrophic for shipping and geoeconomic competition.

Legal Recourse for Victims of Climate-Induced Displacement

The absence of international refugee status for climate migrants is a human rights travesty. In this absence of international law, the U.S. must prepare domestic legal recourse. The U.S. is experiencing the initial effects of mass migration to its southern border, and its response has been ill-prepared. Border security initiatives aimed at keeping illicit activities out have done little to address the growing humanitarian issues. However, the Biden administration’s recent change to the treatment of unaccompanied children is a starting point. By installing Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) personnel in shelters, the administration eased the burden on the Border Patrol and placed migrants with professionals trained in providing essential human services. As more climate migrants arrive at the U.S. border, the need for a whole-of-government response intensifies.

The next step involves offering means of legal protection by invoking provisions for special migration categories such as disaster displacement. That option already exists in Mexico, where “qualifying for the humanitarian visa requires that the person’s life is in danger due to a disaster or that they are a victim of a disaster.”[56] Reforming immigration policy may not be overly popular, but the U.S. must consider revisions to address climate migrants. As climate-induced displacement in Central America increases, large refugee camps springing up along the U.S.-Mexico border become more likely, leading to increased security risks and a potential humanitarian crisis at the doorstep of the U.S..

To combat water weaponization, U.S. strategy in Africa should follow a dual military and humanitarian assistance track. U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), must be resourced to respond to the rise in violent extremist organizations and localized conflict on the continent that threaten U.S. interests. Additionally, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) should lead sustainable and resilient water infrastructure development. Though water scarcity and its weaponization are security concerns, there are solutions. A UN report notes that “the average level of unaccounted-for water is about 50 percent in urban areas, and as much as 70 percent of the water used for irrigation is lost and not used by plants.”[57] This inefficient use of water is due to poor infrastructure and an issue USAID can partner with the UN to remedy, providing precious resources to water-poor regions. More access to water reduces opportunities for violent extremist organizations to weaponize it and mitigates resource-driven regional conflict.

Ensuring Secure and Reliable Supplies of Rare Earth Elements

The U.S. cannot achieve net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 without green energy. However, green energy technology requires massive amounts of rare earth elements, which brings with it concerns about securing supply. The U.S. should reopen critical mines, increase refinement capacity, and provide rare earth element companies with government subsidies and tax incentives to offset losses and decrease reliance on Chinese exports. Furthermore, the U.S. sits atop an reserve of more than 2.7 million tons of rare earth elements, and Canada possesses another 15 million, one of the world’s largest.[58] North America, through self-sufficiency and production partnerships, “can reduce some of the vulnerabilities that come from import dependence while bringing the economic gains of emerging industries to the American people.”[59]

*A view of the MP Materials rare earth open-pit mine in Mountain Pass, California, January 30, 2020. (VoA)*

Developing rare earth elements supply chain diversification with like-minded partners would harden the U.S. against economic coercion through rare earth elements and provide several alternative import options. Japan and the Republic of Korea, close U.S. allies and important technology trade partners, have also taken steps to diversify their supply chains. The U.S. should take advantage of these partnerships to trade rare earth elements in exchange for semiconductors, lithium-metal batteries, and other related technologies. Additionally, the U.S. should invest in India’s underdeveloped rare earth element industry, a move advantageous to each and to other partners in the Indo-Pacific and Europe. With a rare earth element reserve of nearly 7 million tons, India could become the next large producer with adequate infrastructure growth.[60]

Finally, any long-term strategy for rare earth elements must also contain plans to reduce consumption, improve the efficiency of the resource, and emphasize recycling. The U.S. Department of Energy assesses that “recycling rare-earth-containing products would provide a steady, domestic source of rare earths to manufacturers while also reducing waste.”[61] Recycling also decreases the prohibitive costs of refining raw rare earth elements while reducing the harmful environmental effects of mining. By becoming self-reliant, diversifying supply chains, and enhancing recycling capability, the U.S. mitigates Chinese economic retaliation and provides itself with much-needed green energy resources.

Conclusion

Climate change is rapidly reshaping the world despite international efforts to curb the warming trend. At its current pace, climate change will dramatically reshape the landscape by 2050, causing more than a billion people to compete for resources in affected regions. Moreover, the melting of Arctic ice caps will open new maritime routes nearly year-round, shifting global shipping to less secure zones. As fragile regions become unstable and climate change exacerbates conflict drivers, the U.S. must not remain strategically flexible but should prepare for certain variables. Of these variables, three stand out as most concerning for U.S. security and require shifts in strategy: Arctic ice loss, human displacement, and rare earth supplies.

The U.S. must set conditions to compete in the Arctic to protect its maritime commerce, economic exclusion zones, and the U.S. homeland. As climate change amplifies water scarcity and other factors that induce climate migration, the U.S. should reconsider its immigration policy and create options to mitigate the destabilization of regions of interest. Finally, to reach clean, renewable energy goals to reduce the effects of climate change and maintain economic competitiveness, the U.S. must secure and diversify its rare earth element supply chains. If U.S. strategy does not consider these variables amidst climate change, it risks near-existential threats it cannot address ad hoc. The threefold dangers of geoeconomic relapse, armed aggression in the Arctic, and mass refugees on the border require considerable planning and resources to address. U.S. strategy cannot be myopic. It must emerge from atrophy to compete in all domains—air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace—in a climate change-induced, crisis multiplied environment.

Michael Brodka is a U.S. Army military intelligence officer who possesses more than 13 years of defense and international security experience. He is a researcher for the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, where he writes on threat networks and East Asia security issues. Michael holds an MPS degree from George Washington University and is currently pursuing an MPS degree at Georgetown University. The views expressed are the author’s and do not necessarily represent the official position of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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Header Image: Arctic sea ice photographed in 2011 during NASA's ICESCAPE mission. (Kathryn Hansen/NASA)

Notes:

[1] Marcus D. King, "Dying for a Drink," American Scientist 107, no. 5 (Sep. 2019): 296-301, accessed May 23, 2021, https://www.americanscientist.org/article/dying-for-a-drink

[2] United Nations, “The Paris Agreement,” accessed May 24, 2021 https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/ english_paris_agreement.pdf

[3] Jane Nakano, “The Geopolitics of Critical Minerals Supply Chains,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 11, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/geopolitics-critical-minerals-supply-chains

[4] Martin Sandler, Resolute: The Epic Search for the Northwest Passage and John Franklin, and the Discovery of the Queen's Ghost Ship (New Yprk, NY: Sterling, 2010), 1.

[5] “Arctic Sea Ice Minimum,” NASA Global Climate Change: Vital Signs, January 15, 2020, https://climate.nasa.gov/ vital-signs/arctic-sea-ice/.

[6] “China’s Arctic Policy,” The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, January 2018, http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm

[7] Rebecca Hersman, Eric Brewer, and Maxwell Simon, “Strategic Stability and Competition in the Arctic,” January 6, 2021, CSIS, https://www.csis.org/analysis/deep-dive-debrief-strategic-stability-and-competition-arctic.

[8] Donald L. Gautier et al., “Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas in the Arctic,” Science 324, no. 5931 (2008), 1175, accessed May 30, 2021, https://science.sciencemag.org/content/324/5931/1175.full

[9] Miaojia Liu and Jacob Kronbak, “The Potential Economic Viability of Using the Northern Sea Route as an Alternative Route Between Asia and Europe,” Journal of Transport Geography 18, no. 3 (2010), 444, accessed May 30, 2021, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2009.08.004

[10] Michael Lambert, “Russia’s Arctic Ambitions Held Back by Economic Troubles,” Center for International Maritime Security, February 28, 2018, https://cimsec.org/russias-arctic-ambitions-held-back-economic-troubles/

[11] Rebecca Hersman, Eric Brewer, and Maxwell Simon, “Strategic Stability and Competition in the Arctic,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 6, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/deep-dive-debrief-strategic-stability-and-competition-arctic

[12] Katarzyna Zysk, “Russia’s Military Build‐Up in the Arctic: To What End?” CNA, September 1, 2020, https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/IOP-2020-U-027998-Final.pdf

[13] Jan S. Breemer, “The Soviet Navy's SSBN bastions: Why Explanations Matter,” The RUSI Journal 134, no. 4 (2008), 34, accessed May 31, 2021, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071848908445400

[14] Rebecca Hersman, Eric Brewer, and Maxwell Simon, “Strategic Stability and Competition in the Arctic,” 4.

[15] “A New Absolute Minimum Temperature Record,” Icelandic Meteorological Office, May 2, 2013, https://en.vedur.is/about-imo/news/nr/2691

[16] Andrew Higigns, “Teeing Off at Edge of the Arctic? A Chinese Plan Baffles Iceland,” The New York Times, March 22, 2013, accessed May 30, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/23/world/europe/iceland-baffled-by-chinese-plan-for-golf-resort.html

[17] Rush Doshi, Alexis Dale-Huang, and Gaoqi Zhang, “Northern Expedition: China’s Arctic Activities and Ambitions,” The Brookings Institute, April 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/ FP_20210412_china_arctic.pdf

[18] “China, Russia Agree to Jointly Build ‘Ice Silk Road,’” Xinhua, July 4, 2017, http:// www.xinhuanet.com/english/ 2017-07/04/c_136417241.htm.

[19] Liu Jin, “The Arctic White Paper and the Development of China’s Position towards the Arctic,” China Institute of International Studies, July 9, 2018, http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/ESEARCHPROJECTS/Articles/202007/ t20200715_3590.html

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