Great Power Competition

What Happens If Great Powers Don’t Fight Great Wars?

What Happens If Great Powers Don’t Fight Great Wars?

The proper lesson for us today to draw from history is that conflict abhors a vacuum, and threats will take advantage of whatever domain is available. Certainly an argument should be made for increasing traditional lethality in the force, but must that come at the expense of other required capabilities? If we believe that wars are prevented in competition and that adversaries will use all available ways and means in conflict, then the Army must consider diverse solutions to deter and win in both Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) and non- LSCO Multi-Domain Operations

Two Can Play That Game: Russia, the United States, and the Return of Great-Power Competition

Two Can Play That Game: Russia, the United States, and the Return of Great-Power Competition

It could be argued that analyzing great-power competition in the context of a war in which one competitor is not engaged militarily limits the ability to truly assess Russian-U.S. competitive actions. Yet, great-power competition is defined by both direct and indirect confrontation between nations.

#Reviewing War Transformed

#Reviewing War Transformed

The character of war is rapidly changing. The increasing availability of evolving technology confounds previous frameworks for military operations. Socioeconomic factors and demographic shifts complicate manpower and force generation models for national defense. Ubiquitous connectivity links individuals to global audiences, expanding the reach of influence activities. And a renewed emphasis on strategic competition enhances the scope of military action below the threshold of violence. This is the world that Mick Ryan explores in War Transformed: The Future of Twenty-First-Century Great Power Competition and Conflict.

Past as Prelude? Envisioning the Future of Special Operations

Past as Prelude? Envisioning the Future of Special Operations

It stands to reason that as global conditions point to steady competition, the United States will need a force capable of understanding local conditions, building relationships with an array of partners, combating disinformation through truthful narratives, fostering resilience, raising costs of aggression, and selectively imposing costs through a variety of creative means. The solution to today’s challenges cannot only be material or technological in nature—there is no deus ex machina for human-centric competition. Special operations forces could fill the void as a competitive force once more, and campaign to provide outsized benefits in support of the nation’s priorities.

The “Strategic Counterinsurgency” Model: Escaping a One-Dimensional Strategic Worldview

The “Strategic Counterinsurgency” Model: Escaping a One-Dimensional Strategic Worldview

When the term “great power competition” (GPC) appeared in the 2017 National Security Strategy, it served as a wakeup call to many in the U.S. defense establishment. It signaled a sudden rhetorical shift which produced two positive developments. First, it prompted the military to embrace innovation with a newfound sense of urgency. Second, it helped to alert the American public to the strategic challenges presented by China’s newly aggressive foreign policy. But although its handy acronym is still alive and well in some sectors of government, “GPC” has fallen into disfavor, and for good reason.

The Lion and the Mouse: The Need for Greater U.S. Focus in The Pacific Islands

The Lion and the Mouse: The Need for Greater U.S. Focus in The Pacific Islands

The Pacific island countries, a cluster of fourteen states and home to nine million people, share a profound legacy of appreciation, trust, and shared values with the U.S. The Pacific island countries historically reflected the U.S. preference for diplomatic norms in the way of life and international organizations. Unfortunately, in recent years this congruence has become precarious. The catalyst for this shift can be tied to China actively exerting influence in Pacific island countries through development, economic aid, and security cooperation that endangers the relationship the U.S. shares with them. Chinese diplomatic and economic engagement in the Pacific island countries threatensU.S. influence and values in the region and will become an existential threat to security if not addressed. The U.S. strategy can counter China's power projection in the Pacific island countries by maintaining the existing soft power presence in the region and amplifying the Biden administration's efforts to mitigate climate change. The U.S. can also capitalize on the emerging need for economic development by investing in vaccine diplomacy to fight against COVID-19 to reiterate the U.S. commitment as a partner of choice to the region.

The White Elephant in the Room: Antarctica in Modern Geopolitics

The White Elephant in the Room: Antarctica in Modern Geopolitics

Antarctica’s isolation may have set the stage for a hard pivot in global interest. Discarding these holdover assumptions will be important to recalibrate our understanding of the region’s strategic relevance. Without reform to the Antarctic Treaty system, and great powers assuming collective responsibility, Antarctica could even become a potential catalyst for outright conflict.

The Next National Security Strategy and National Resilience Through Education

The Next National Security Strategy and National Resilience Through Education

If the United States is serious about competition in a global, informationalized arena against other aspiring great powers, a better-informed and engaged populace capable of thinking critically about the veracity of information it encounters daily should strengthen America’s intrinsic informational and economic strengths. A better-educated and informed public is a cognitively armed population, better able to participate in the processes of government, drive civic outcomes, and thwart disinformation while also producing innovative products and solutions.