It is indicative of the current zeitgeist that Washington’s strategists quote Sun Tzu and sprinkle the ancient philosopher’s axioms in conversations and PowerPoints across town. For policymakers seeking to win without fighting with the People’s Republic of China or other competitors, they should also note the popular Chinese proverb that the best time to plant a tree was 20 years ago; the second-best time is now.
To sow the seeds that sprout the roots of victory far from a future battlefield, policymakers should embrace the methodical, indirect, and asymmetric approach to problem solving that historically characterized United States Special Operations Forces activities. The ability to operate with a small footprint and low-visibility, invest time and resources to foster interagency and foreign partnerships, develop deep cultural expertise, and rapidly adapt emerging technologies are vital in today’s environment—both to enhance deterrence and challenge adversaries’ coercion through gray-zone aggression.[1] By incorporating chapters of special operations’ past, today’s special operators can position themselves to provide outsized impact for the United States in the future.[2]
World War II Origins
Today’s special operations community traces its lineage to the Office of Strategic Services, an organization established in 1942 to conduct influence operations, intelligence collection, and subversion behind enemy lines to support U.S Armed Forces. The forerunners of today’s operators maximized disruption of the Axis war effort through a well-planned economy-of-force campaign that seized the initiative and targeted enemy morale via psychological warfare, support to resistance elements, and maritime demolition.[3]
War correspondents and personnel of the Office of Strategic Services, leaving from the Railhead, Camp Patrick Henry, Virginia, enroute overseas. (National Archives at College Park, Wikimedia Commons)
Then and now, special operators were high-quality, trained for purpose, and deployed to provide asymmetric advantages across all domains.[4] Today’s World War II predecessors pioneered population-centric approaches through unconventional warfare, building relationships among local populations to innovate and improvise with all available means.[5] With enabling support from special operators, motivated citizens determined to resist oppression used their everyday skills and social structures to sabotage Nazi occupation and retake their territory, allowing conventional forces to focus on other contested theatres while bolstering Allied morale.[6]
Persistent engagement enabled the United States to exert influence and relevance in contested territories amidst a maelstrom of propaganda meant to discourage resistance and accept capitulation. Allied special operators demonstrated skill in using information and narrative to shape emotions and inspire unified action.
At the most basic level, this non-traditional approach afforded a wider range of military options for decision makers, an attribute that special operators continue to bring to today’s challenges through their low-profile and partner-enabling focus.[7] Persistent engagement enabled the United States to exert influence and relevance in contested territories amidst a maelstrom of propaganda meant to discourage resistance and accept capitulation. Allied special operators demonstrated skill in using information and narrative to shape emotions and inspire unified action. Collectively, these represent small investments to help partners and allies prepare before conflict and maintain the will to resist, which raise the costs of coercive aggression and align U.S. military investments with foreign policy priorities in key regions.
Cold War Competition Force
It was clear following World War II, as the Iron Curtain redrew the political landscape and a long-term political struggle emerged, that special operations would remain essential in hostile environments. Recognizing the different dynamics between peacetime competition and declared war, parts of today’s special operations enterprise were created as a type of “competition force” to apply strategic reconnaissance and non-traditional partnerships as low-visibility ways to maintain access and understand the local environment.[8]
Special operators demonstrated value in working through committed partners as a supplement for traditional deterrence operations in the process.
The notion of a competition force emphasizes the role of special operators as a close-in force, engaging in the same terrain as its competitors to achieve discrete effects more nimbly than a conventional weapons platform. A steady diet of training and living side-by-side European partners and South Vietnam’s Civilian Irregular Defense Force in the 1950s and 1960s helped Army Special Forces gain invaluable cultural expertise, exquisite understanding of the operating environment, and build interpersonal rapport. Taken together, these benefits from the human environment represent what modern business leaders and strategists have termed “strategic empathy,” and provide the needed nuance for decision making amidst amorphous political conditions.[9] Special operators demonstrated value in working through committed partners as a supplement for traditional deterrence operations in the process. In the event of a crisis, these forces were postured to provide reliable facts from the ground; prepare for localized, guerrilla war; exemplify America’s commitment to its allies; and enable conventional forces entering into combat.
Applied to today’s long-term contest, the role of special operators as military diplomats helps to preserve U.S. credibility with vulnerable allies and partners. Special operations forces’ global networks and non-kinetic capabilities can reassure allies and create challenges for competitors without detracting from the joint force’s overall readiness or lethality. This is especially true today, when indirect approaches that lay the groundwork for solutions from interagency or international partners—for example, in the financial realm with the Department of Treasury—could yield substantial effects in today’s interconnected landscape. The use of special operations deployments represents an asymmetric application of military power to preserve American influence and enhance its legitimacy as others seek to erode America’s strengths.
Operation Eagle Claw and Its Aftermath
Operation Eagle Claw, the failed operation in April 1980 to recover American hostages at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, was a sobering wakeup call which demonstrated that even with enormous talent across special operators in the different military branches, shortcomings in special operations equipment, techniques, and interoperability could doom high-risk missions.[10] Even with a highly effective toolset, the proverbial tip of the spear needed guidance and oversight to remain prepared, fully optimized, adequately prioritized by the military branches, and aligned with political objectives.
Operation Eagle Claw-Tabas, 25 April 1980. ( Wikimedia)
It took an act of Congress to right the ship. Senators Sam Nunn and William Cohen were visionaries by prescribing solutions for the U.S. military to address indirect aggression and build unity across the different uniformed services by creating U.S. Special Operations Command and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations & Low-Intensity Conflict—anticipating that the country would face more asymmetric threats.[11] The senators understood that the enemy also gets a vote in challenging the United States, and that military planners could not occupy themselves only with the unambiguous, head-on military contests preferable for them.
The setbacks of the 1980s and the reforms later that decade set the stage for special operators in the 1990s to gain valuable experience operating in gray-zone environments in the Balkans.[12] Special operators were relied upon to deliver discrete non-kinetic effects via psychological operations and civil affairs alongside NATO allies while avoiding escalation into conflict. These experiences demonstrated the special operators’ ability to operate subtly and with a small footprint in politically sensitive environments alongside interagency partners to support broader political objectives. Unfortunately, their exploits were overshadowed by the tragic loss of operators in Somalia, which reduced policymaker willingness to invest in conflicts with blurred front lines.[13]
The War on Terror
The events of September 11, 2001 and the ensuing War on Terror caused a relentless tempo for the special operations enterprise to execute a mission that was not its sole focus. However, the pivot shows how special operators can become whatever the nation needs them to be. Special operators were in Afghanistan as part of Task Force Dagger by October 2001, and building off longstanding relationships forged over years working alongside Afghan resistance in the 1980s, special operators and intelligence counterparts joined forces to overthrow a hostile government before winter.[14] Their unconventional warfare campaign exemplified the outsized strategic impact that special operations forces could provide in an economy-of-force effort with less financial, materiel, and personnel costs than a conventional force would encounter—a model that Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines used as the preponderance of resources flowed to forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.[15]
As special operators doubled down on kinetically targeting terrorists, recruitment and selection emphasized lethal direct action at the expense of other skillsets and competencies applicable for competition with state actors.
Over the next 20 years, U.S. Special Operations Forces transformed into the world’s premier direct action counterterrorism force and galvanized interagency support towards a common purpose. These forces were the vanguard of the nation’s counterterrorism successes and shouldered tremendous sacrifices in blood and treasure. Although their constant pressure reduced terrorism to a manageable threat, the 20-year pursuit may have inadvertently caused many to overlook the wide range of special operations missions that represent special operators’ future value proposition.[16]
San Diego, CA, United States. 2 February 2021 Naval Special Warfare Group ONE (Petty Officer 1st Class Paolo Bayas/U.S. Navy)
Pressures from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq caused special operators to make changes inimical to their traditions as the wars continued.[17] The introduction of conventional forces to fight an unconventional war shortly after the Taliban regime fell was essentially an attempt to provide a quantitative solution to a qualitative problem, and special operators increasingly specialized in the highest risk operations that conventional forces could not undertake.[18] This emphasis caused the quiet professional to become a visible figure conducting direct action and kicking down doors on the silver screen.[19] These changes pigeonholed military formations that specialized in subtle, indirect, and asymmetric action to provide immediate gratification through measurable figures while overlooking strategic impact.[20]
…special operators became subject to a narrative that direct action was their sole role, and some believed they adopted a culture which supported that assertion.
As special operators doubled down on kinetically targeting terrorists, recruitment and selection emphasized lethal direct action at the expense of other skillsets and competencies applicable for competition with state actors. Psychological operations, civil affairs, and more subtle aspects of unconventional warfare and support to resistance—missions that traditionally distinguished the role of special operators to understand and shape the environment—were at risk of neglect due to misunderstanding their purpose.[21] By conflating these missions as supporting acts to now-unpopular missions such as counterinsurgency or stabilization, special operators became subject to a narrative that direct action was their sole role, and some believed they adopted a culture which supported that assertion.[22]
The convergence of these trends with the growing attention to strategic competition presents opportunities for the special operations community to rediscover its historic strengths and breathe new life into them. Doing so would refocus all special operations units to demonstrate how their specialized skills keep opponents unbalanced both inside and outside of conflict.[23] To be effective, special operators must emphasize their proven ability to work seamlessly across cultures, with foreign partners as well as within embassy settings.[24] By building trust across government, it will be easier to generate buy-in for pivoting to a strategic landscape where special operators remain in high demand even as counterterrorism requirements decrease and the military is not the lead U.S. organization.
Past as Prologue?
What does the future hold? If Mark Twain was correct, history never repeats, but it often rhymes. It stands to reason that as global conditions point to steady competition, the United States will need a force capable of understanding local conditions, building relationships with an array of partners, combating disinformation through truthful narratives, fostering resilience, raising costs of aggression, and selectively imposing costs through a variety of creative means. The solution to today’s challenges cannot only be material or technological in nature—there is no deus ex machina for human-centric competition. Special operations forces could fill the void as a competitive force once more, and campaign to provide outsized benefits in support of the nation’s priorities. A winning posture requires an irregular element that conventional forces alone are unsuited to provide.[25]
Past examples demonstrate that indirect and asymmetric strategies associated with irregular warfare provide significant value in steady-state campaigning where the struggle for influence and perceptions of legitimacy occurs below the threshold of war.[26] Special operations forces instinctively “think globally, act locally” and work with local actors on shared challenges, which indirectly provides an outsized return on investment towards achieving strategic policy objectives. The proficiency that special operators have in conducting irregular warfare offers opportunities for conventional forces to rethink influence activities in their own steady-state campaigning to maintain a position of continued advantage.[27]
This time, inspiration should come from the past and incorporate innovations from today’s recent experiences, adapt for emerging domains including cyber and space, and tailor an approach for the contests looming over the horizon.
Adapting and transforming for today’s challenges requires special operations forces to embrace their problem solving tradition through indirect approaches to uncover game-changing advantages. This time, inspiration should come from the past and incorporate innovations from today’s recent experiences, adapt for emerging domains including cyber and space, and tailor an approach for the contests looming over the horizon. The result may look less like an incremental evolution of the past 20 years. Instead, these changes portend a counter-revolution that brings special operations back to basics by combining the best of today’s tactical ingenuity with a strategic focus evident in special operators’ past deployments.[28] By looking to the past and infusing present-day innovations, U.S. Special Operations Forces can remain the indispensable provider of asymmetric advantages far from the battlefield to grow America's roots of victory.
Kevin Bilms is a career Department of Defense civilian serving in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and a Non-Resident Fellow of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, a joint forum between the United States Military Academy’s Modern War Institute and Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict. The author wishes to thank the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) for its continued efforts to inform thinking on special operations and related strategic and operational challenges. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect those of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
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Header Image: SSG Alvin J. Rouly taught a Vietnamese Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) trainee how to use a M79 grenade launcher. Camp Trai Trung Sup, Republic of Vietnam, 1967. (U.S. Army Signal Corps Photographer)
Notes:
[1] Bilms, Kevin. “Gray is Here to Stay: Principles from the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance on Competing in the Gray Zone.” Modern War Institute. U.S. Military Academy. March 25, 2021. https://mwi.usma.edu/gray-is-here-to-stay-principles-from-the-interim-national-security-strategic-guidance-on-competing-in-the-gray-zone/.
[2] For a wealth of additional information on the history of Special Operations Forces, including case studies, lessons learned, and potential recommendations, please visit the United States Special Operations Command Library, maintained by the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU).
[3] de Wit, Daniel. “Fake News for the Resistance: The OSS and the Nexus of Psychological Warfare and Resistance Operations in World War II.” Journal of Advanced Military Studies. Vol. 12, No. 1 (Spring 2021). USMCU Press. https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/2_de%20Wit.pdf#page=2.
[4] Paraphrased from the SOF Truths. https://www.socom.mil/about/sof-truths. Accessed September 15, 2021.
[5] U.S. Special Operations Command. “Operating in the Human Domain.” Version 1.0. August 3, 2015. https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/SOF-OHD-Concept-V1.0-3-Aug-15.pdf.
[6] Schwartz, George. “Unconventional Warfare: Think Outside the G-Base.” Small Wars Journal. June 8, 2019. https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/unconventional-warfare-think-outside-g-base. The best example of propaganda promoting resistance, and resistance increasing morale, comes from John Steinbeck’s The Moon is Down.
[7] Costa, Christopher and Bilms, Kevin. “Look at Great Power Competition through a Special Operations Lens.” Defense One. June 18, 2020. https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/06/putting-special-operations-lens-great-power-competition/166241/.
[8] Brands, Hal and Nichols, Tim. “Cost Imposition in the Contact Layer: Special Operations Forces and Great Power Rivalry.” American Enterprise Institute. July 6, 2021. https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Cost-Imposition-in-the-Contact-Layer.pdf.
[9] Seibt, Kristofer. “Beyond Strategic Empathy.” The Strategy Bridge. October 29, 2020. https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2020/10/29/beyond-strategic-empathy.
[10] Correll, Diana Stancy. “40 Years Later: How the Iran Hostage Crisis Shaped the Future of Special Operations.” Military Times. November 4, 2019. https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2019/11/04/40-years-later-how-the-iran-hostage-crisis-shaped-the-future-of-special-operations/. Faratus, Matt. “Operation Eagle Claw, 41 Years Later.” Coffee or Die. April 24, 2021. https://coffeeordie.com/operation-eagle-claw-mike-vining/.
[11] Thornton, David. “How Setbacks and DoD Reform Led to the Creation of SOCOM.” Federal News Network. April 6, 2018. https://federalnewsnetwork.com/all-news/2018/04/how-setbacks-and-dod-reform-led-to-the-creation-of-socom/.
[12] “A Conversation with Colonel (R) Chris Costa – SOF Working with the Intelligence Community.” Think JSOU. August 31, 2021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aMNZddvh8S4.
[13] “Bosnia-Herzegovina: The U.S. Army’s Role in Peace Enforcement Operations, 1995-2004.” U.S. Army. CMH Pub 70-97-1. https://history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-97-1/cmhPub_70-97-1.pdf#page=12.
[14] “Operation Enduring Freedom: October 2001-March 2002.” U.S. Army. CMH Pub 70-83-1. https://history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-83/cmhPub_70-83.pdf.
[15] Maxwell, David. “Lessons from the Philippines: Irregular Warfare in Action.” Modern War Institute. U.S. Military Academy. October 7, 2021. https://mwi.usma.edu/lessons-from-the-philippines-irregular-warfare-in-action/.
[16] Myers, Meghann. “Special Operations Has an Entitlement Problem. Here’s How They Intend to Fix It.” Military Times. January 28, 2020. https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2020/01/28/special-operations-has-an-entitlement-problem-heres-how-they-intend-to-fix-it/.
[17] Jackson, Colin and Long, Austin. “The Fifth Service: The Rise of Special Operations Command.” Routledge Press. New York. 2009. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203878651-14/fifth-service-rise-special-operations-command-colin-jackson-austin-long.
[18] Rothstein, Hy S. “Less is More: The Problematic Future of Irregular Warfare in an Era of Collapsing States.” Third World Quarterly (Vol. 28, No. 2). Taylor & Francis, Ltd. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4017700?seq=1.
[19] Bilms, Kevin. “What’s In a Name? Reimagining Irregular Warfare Activities for Competition.” War on the Rocks. January 15, 2021. https://warontherocks.com/2021/01/whats-in-a-name-reimagining-irregular-warfare-activities-for-competition/.
[20] Livieratos, Cole. “The Subprime Strategy Crisis: Failed Strategic Assessment in Afghanistan.” War on the Rocks. September 15, 2021. https://warontherocks.com/2021/09/the-subprime-strategy-crisis-failed-strategic-assessment-in-afghanistan/.
[21] Brennan, John et. al. “The Turmoil of Identity Crisis: Special Forces Organizational Culture.” War Room, U.S. Army War College. August 4, 2020. https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/podcasts/sfcom-culture/. Raza, Assad A. “Great Power Competition: The Fight for Weak States.” Small Wars Journal. January 30, 2019. https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/great-power-competition-fight-weak-states.
[22] Barno, David and Bensahel, Nora. “How to Fix U.S. Special Operations Forces.” War on the Rocks. February 25, 2020. https://warontherocks.com/2020/02/how-to-fix-u-s-special-operations-forces/.
[23] Trevithick, Joseph. “The Army is Training Specialized Companies of Green Berets to Crack ‘Hard Targets.’” The Drive. December 2, 2020. https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/37923/the-army-is-training-specialized-companies-of-green-berets-to-crack-hard-targets.
[24] Wilbur, Carter. “Strengthening the Relationship Between Embassies and U.S. Special Operations Forces.” American Diplomacy. February 2020. https://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/2020/02/strengthening-the-relationship-between-embassies-and-u-s-special-operations-forces-part-1-the-current-environment/.
[25] Robinson, Eric. “The Missing, Irregular Half of Great Power Competition. Modern War Institute. U.S. Military Academy. September 8, 2020. https://mwi.usma.edu/the-missing-irregular-half-of-great-power-competition/.
[26] Bilms, Kevin. “Better Understanding Irregular Warfare in Competition.” Military Times. January 1, 2021. https://www.militarytimes.com/opinion/commentary/2021/01/01/better-understanding-irregular-warfare-in-competition/.
[27] de la Parra Gehlen, Erika and Smith Frank L. “Advantage at Sea Requires Rethinking Influence.” War on the Rocks. March 5, 2021. https://warontherocks.com/2021/03/advantage-at-sea-requires-rethinking-influence/.
[28] Mitchell, Mark; Griffiths, Zachary; and Livieratos, Cole. “America’s Special Operators Will Be Adrift without Better Civilian Oversight.” War on the Rocks. February 18, 2020. https://warontherocks.com/2020/02/americas-special-operators-will-be-adrift-without-better-civilian-oversight/. Miller, Chris and Livermore, Doug. “Special Forces Needs to Go Back to Basics to Win Against China and Russia.” Task & Purpose. July 14, 2021. https://taskandpurpose.com/analysis/army-special-forces-back-to-basics-oped/.