Alessandra Nisch
Putin’s Wars: Testing Boyd’s Strategy of ...

President Putin made three foundational assumptions in launching his war against Ukraine that should have been correct but were not. First, Putin assumed the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and easy fight. Second, he assumed the world would denounce the invasion but tacitly allow it. Third, Putin assumed the war would deter NATO expansion.

Putin’s Wars: Testing Boyd’s Strategy of Applied Friction

2Q23

History Points to the Most Probable Conclusion in Ukraine: Scorched Earth or Regime Change

History Points to the Most Probable Conclusion in Ukraine: Scorched Earth or Regime Change

Russia and Ukraine are locked in a war that has outlasted any realistic forecast. Why are these nations still engaged in a conflict that is so detrimental to both sides? Because these two countries have a shared history that includes scorched earth and the wilful destruction of personal property rather than forfeiture, the most likely outcome is either complete victory for one party, or regime change that brings the war to a rapid conclusion. Over a thousand years of invasions, occupation, and suffering have influenced the psyches of both the Ukrainians and Russians in ways that make only two outcomes likely.

Does Economic Deterrence Work? Understanding the West’s Assumptions About Keeping Russia in Check

Does Economic Deterrence Work? Understanding the West’s Assumptions About Keeping Russia in Check

In the lead-up to the February 24, 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Western nations threatened Russia with severe economic sanctions, export controls, and other punitive economic measures if it proceeded with an invasion. These threats were ignored. Over a year into the invasion, Russia’s economy and war-fighting capabilities are hurting. Punitive economic measures by the West have shut Russia out of the global economy and challenged its ability to profit from oil sales, import critical technology, and finance its war effort.

Intelligence Failures and Political Misjudgment in an Age of Ideological Change

Intelligence Failures and Political Misjudgment in an Age of Ideological Change

Faulty assumptions about the ideological realities on the ground, at both the popular- and elite-level, are not unique to the Russian case, but can be widely applied to current geopolitical concerns that attract the attention of U.S. policymakers, especially those which are hypothesized to potentially require future American military operations.

What Happens If Great Powers Don’t Fight Great Wars?

What Happens If Great Powers Don’t Fight Great Wars?

The proper lesson for us today to draw from history is that conflict abhors a vacuum, and threats will take advantage of whatever domain is available. Certainly an argument should be made for increasing traditional lethality in the force, but must that come at the expense of other required capabilities? If we believe that wars are prevented in competition and that adversaries will use all available ways and means in conflict, then the Army must consider diverse solutions to deter and win in both Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) and non- LSCO Multi-Domain Operations

Putin’s Wars: Testing Boyd’s Strategy of Applied Friction

Putin’s Wars: Testing Boyd’s Strategy of Applied Friction

President Putin made three foundational assumptions in launching his war against Ukraine that should have been correct but were not. First, Putin assumed the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and easy fight. Second, he assumed the world would denounce the invasion but tacitly allow it. Third, Putin assumed the war would deter NATO expansion.

The Ethics of Meaning Making in War: A Framework for Understanding Ukraine

The Ethics of Meaning Making in War: A Framework for Understanding Ukraine

Progress in Russia’s invasion of the sovereign territory of Ukraine is commonly measured in terms of land control. This metric does not paint the whole picture. The war has spilled over into the quasi-boundaryless digital realm where contests over the meaning and nature of the conflict rage. These conflagrations over issues of meaning are strategically significant; their outcome could mean the difference between winning in the court of public opinion, thereby obtaining much needed global support—or not.

Two Can Play That Game: Russia, the United States, and the Return of Great-Power Competition

Two Can Play That Game: Russia, the United States, and the Return of Great-Power Competition

It could be argued that analyzing great-power competition in the context of a war in which one competitor is not engaged militarily limits the ability to truly assess Russian-U.S. competitive actions. Yet, great-power competition is defined by both direct and indirect confrontation between nations.

Hype or Hoax: Are Russian Cyber Capabilities Robust Enough to Cripple Ukraine?

Hype or Hoax: Are Russian Cyber Capabilities Robust Enough to Cripple Ukraine?

First, by analyzing Russia’s past success in cyber and electronic warfare, this essay examines how Putin developed his assumption that Russian cyber operations would overwhelm Ukrainian cyber security measures. Second, it explores how these assumptions contributed to complacency and failure in the war in Ukraine. Finally, the essay discusses how Russia’s failures in Ukraine will shape the future of cyber and electronic warfare.

Strategic Echoes: Operation Unthinkable, Nuclear Weapons, and Ukraine

Strategic Echoes: Operation Unthinkable, Nuclear Weapons, and Ukraine

Those who advocate the continued arming of Ukraine should consider making the dual-track argument and approach this strategic conundrum by equaling the Russian pledge, signaling American willingness to deploy nuclear forces to Europe—just as in the Euromissile Crisis—should Putin go ahead with the mooted nuclear force deployment in Belorussia.

The U.S. and Russia: Competing Proxy Strategies in the Russo-Ukrainian War

The U.S. and Russia: Competing Proxy Strategies in the Russo-Ukrainian War

Russian and U.S. use of proxy strategies complement one another to fuel a war of attrition. Russia’s human wave response to expensive and limited U.S. firepower is not unreasonable, despite perhaps being quite cynical and fatalistic. Russia’s human wave proxy strategy both protects conventional Russian army forces by redirecting combat to disposable proxies and frees the conventional army to reinforce territorial and political gains along the Sea of Azov. Simultaneously, the U.S. proxy strategy is a logical response to an undersized and outgunned Ukrainian military. The Ukrainians fighting at distance with U.S. artillery, missiles, and rockets while using urban terrain to offset Russian strength makes complete sense. But the interaction of these two proxy strategies, both logical in their own right, fuels a devastating war of attrition, depletes weapon stockpiles, and generates significant numbers of casualties.

Partner—Proxy—Glitch: Vertical Coalitions and the Question of Sovereignty in Networks

Partner—Proxy—Glitch: Vertical Coalitions and the Question of Sovereignty in Networks

The conflict in Ukraine offers unexpected insight into a military construct that had previously been mostly theoretical. Ukrainian ground forces, fighting beneath an information domain dominated almost exclusively by American intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, while no U.S. forces fight in the conflict, is what military theorists and strategists in the 1990s described as a vertical coalition. They conceived it as the future of American warfare, during a brief period in which violent ground-based conflict among powerful states was believed, by some, to be vanishing from the world.

Neorealism Realized in Ukraine: Another Notch in the Post for Realpolitik

Neorealism Realized in Ukraine: Another Notch in the Post for Realpolitik

There will likely never be a grand theory of international politics. However, some models remain more useful than others. None will be able to predict the exact where and when of the next war, let alone the outcome of that conflict. The expectations of neorealism, however, provide a parsimonious model with which to examine events and identify the most important variables which determine the causes, or triggers, of cooperation and conflict. Identification of such triggers can go far in informing foreign policy responses to prevent or mitigate conditions that lead to war.

2Q23 Ukraine 1 Year On: The State of Our Assumptions

2Q23 Ukraine 1 Year On: The State of Our Assumptions

To mark the passing of a year since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent return of high intensity conflict to Europe, we wanted to look to the recent past instead of to an unknown future. We asked: How then should we reflect on this experience? What happened to our previously held assumptions in the wake of Russia's aggression? Which assumptions were challenged; which were validated?