To mark the passing of a year since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent return of high intensity conflict to Europe, we wanted to look to the recent past instead of to an unknown future. We asked: How then should we reflect on this experience? What happened to our previously held assumptions in the wake of Russia's aggression? Which assumptions were challenged; which were validated?
Looking to the past instead of the future has a few distinct conceptual advantages. First, the desire to collect lessons learned often drives analysis to the tactical or, at best, operational level where information is more granular and events and actions are easier to measure or quantify. Second, these analyses look to apply lessons in preparation for the next conflict—though we cannot know how, when, or where it will take place. Militaries are notoriously bad at predicting future conflicts and this is likely even more true in the middle of a conflict.
Our community approached this question from a number of different perspectives. Taken together these perspectives offer a well-rounded understanding of the nature of the assumptions that were in play prior to the conflict and how they shape the state of the conflict today.
Beginning with the issue of grand strategy, Brent Lawniczak questions many of the assumptions of liberal international relations to offer a neorealist perspective as a better alternative for understanding the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Among a number of neorealist assumptions he sees validated, for example, he views alliances as existing primarily for survival and self-interest.
Next, Zac Rogers highlights how Ukraine has brought into play the unexpected costs of vertical coalitions. This idea came into prominence in the 1990s in light of US technological ascendency. Partners would be expected to provide the bulk of ground forces while the US would contribute more exquisite capabilities such as airpower. Ukraine has now challenged that model, Rogers argues. For example, the extent to which the kill chain has been spread horizontally through numerous nations creates legitimate targets outside Ukraine, thus resulting in the significant expansion of risk, thus greatly amplifying the costs to the US of these coalitions.
Amos Fox provides an important perspective to how we can next understand the war in Ukraine as undergirded by the dynamics of proxy war. The firepower that the US provides to Ukraine results in Russia’s response to protect its conventional army by using human wave tactics made possible by drawing on prisoners and Wagner mercenaries. Taken together, the two proxy approaches result in costly attrition because each proxy’s strategies “feed off” the other’s.
Rowan Wise then addresses the nuclear spectre. Framing his article within the long history of Russia relations with the West, he stresses how the Soviet Union’s development of a nuclear arsenal changed that relationship considerably. Borrowing from Clausewitz, Wise asks the reader to consider what political objectives the U.S. might be seeking and how those might be problematic in light of Russia’s nuclear weapons.
Shifting from nuclear weapons, Jon Beto examines why Russia’s seemingly vaunted cyber and electronic capabilities did not seem to be as effective as anticipated. Beto explores Putin’s problematic assumption regarding Russian superiority and how this created complacency because "it's what you know for sure that just ain't so" that will get you in trouble.
Similarly, Joshua Ratta looks at Russian problems in hybrid warfare given some pre-2022 thinking that Russia had “perfected” this form of warfare. What this view failed to see, is that Russia’s 2014 success in Ukraine owed much to the “opportune conglomeration of fortuitous circumstances and opponent weaknesses in Russian targeted areas.” The U.S. has also demonstrated that it is better at hybrid warfare than some initially thought. Although hybrid warfare proved to be overhyped, it will continue to be used by both Russia and the US as they engage in strategic competition.
Even more amorphous than hybrid warfare, yet equally powerful, is the battle for meaning occurring in the digital sphere. Nathan White argues observers too often measure progress in this conflict in terms of the geographical progression of the conflict on a map when the battlespace in the digital realm—such as public opinion, for example—could be an even more critical realm.
Mariya Omelicheva picks up on similar themes, suggesting “mainstream perspectives on war ascribe an outsized importance to the tangible aspects of conflict and underplay the role of intangibles as useful guides for understanding the sources and outcomes of war.” Because war is as much shaped by the larger society that enables it as it is by its combatants, it is essential to understand the national identity of one’s opponent to understand that war’s character. To understand Russia’s war in Ukraine, one must above all understand Russian identity.
Our series then pivots back to Clausewitz’s notion of friction. Alessandra Nisch urges the U.S. to draw on John Boyd’s injunction to operationalize friction. Nisch reveals how much friction ultimately benefited Ukraine. Due to externally applied friction in Ukraine such as the quick imposition of economic sanctions, Putin’s primary assumptions—“that the invasion of Ukraine would be quick and easily accomplished, that the world would denounce but not stop it, and that it would sufficiently deter NATO expansion”—all crumbled under the imposition of external friction from U.S. and NATO partners.
In a similar sphere, Nathan Colvin uses the war in Ukraine to challenge U.S. assumptions about the likelihood of large-scale combat operations. He argues this conflict demonstrates that the “costs of modern conventional war are so high it is difficult to justify its use.” While the U.S. should continue to focus on large-scale combat operations, the primary reason is to deter conventional war since it is highly unlikely to occur. The challenge for the U.S., however, comes in balancing that investment with developing the ability to engage in non-large-scale combat operations, which is essential to enabling deterrence by denial.
Should deterrence fail, Julian Waller then explores how problematic Russian assumptions can be useful for the U.S. in light of potential engagement with either Iran or China. In both of these cases, the most important lesson the U.S. can glean is regarding “ideological realities on the ground” of both elites and the population at large. Russia’s faults in Ukraine represented more than a simply intelligence failure but also highly-flawed “sociopolitical assumptions.”
Jerry Garzon explores both deterrence and flawed assumptions in his analysis of whether economic deterrence works or not. Prior to invading Ukraine, Russia made several reasonable but ultimately flawed assumptions, one of which was that it would not be subject to crippling economic measures given past historical precedent. Thus the U.S. did not offer a credible economic deterrent. And, while not necessarily showing a noticeable impact, quickly-imposed economic measures may prove just as significant as what is occurring on the battlefield.
Finally, Robert Umholtz ruminates on possible outcomes to the conflict. Contextualizing this conflict within a long legacy of invasions, scorched earth policies, and popular insurgencies reveals that both sides will pay any cost to win. He predicts that diplomacy will not bring the two nations to any sort of compromise, with neither side being content to cede the ultimate prize: Crimea.
We hope you get as much from reading these essays as we did!
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Header Image: Operation in Eastern Ukraine, 2022 (Ministry of Defense of Ukraine).
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