Introduction

The Russian invasion of Ukraine may have come as a surprise to some foreign policy and military experts. Yet, that a state would carry out such an act of “naked aggression” should not come as a surprise to any who have engaged in even a cursory study of international politics.[1] While some scholars have noted that humans, thence states, have become less violent or that states have grown more inclined to cooperate over time, the historical record bears out a contradicting set of facts.[2] The fact is that the nature of human beings, and the nature of international politics, is such that there will always be bad actors. The result is that states, to ensure their own security and survival, must recognize this fact and prepare accordingly. A brief overview of liberal and neorealist international relations thought allows us to examine, in light of the war in Ukraine, select key assumptions of the liberal and neorealist international relations paradigms that have been challenged and validated, respectively.

The Risk of Validating Military Operational Lessons Learned Too Early

The Strategy Bridge second quarter call for submissions included an interesting set of observations from senior U.S. military leaders. These observations point to some of the potential biases career professionals can bring to the discussion and the risk of determining lessons to be learned while combat operations continue.

Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, General James McConville, repeated the maxim that amateurs study tactics and professionals study logistics; General Mark Kelly, Commander of Air Combat Command, pointed to a lack of air superiority as Russia’s problem; while General David Berger, Commandant of the Marine Corps, used the conflict to argue that ‘winning the reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance fight early on [is] critical.’[3]

Though each observation may be accurate on its own terms, each is also incomplete. These officers, like most, view the world through the lens they have developed over a career in their particular branch of service and career specialty. A bureaucratic model of politics suggests that “where you stand depends on where you sit.”[4] You see what you see, you study that which you see, and the evidence sought and found will tend to support predetermined notions.

What does this have to do with the assumptions made prior to and during this particular conflict in Ukraine? First, the quote about logistics is true to the point of being cliché. Second, it has been well-established that a lack of air superiority is problematic on the battlefield. Yet, when neither side dominates the air, other aspects of offense and defense come into the fore. Lastly, Sun Tzu could have made the same observation about reconnaissance thousands of years ago. These observations regarding the viewpoints of senior leaders are not meant to demean the intelligence of these leaders, but to suggest that our understanding of the unfolding situation is incomplete and simplistic. It is easy to armchair quarterback this conflict at the tactical level, but it is not over yet. While the military in particular may be able to glean early tactical lessons from both sides of this conflict, it is too early to draw operational and strategic lessons from this war. Much like correctly predicting when or where the next war will occur, accurately predicting the final results of this conflict is improbable—especially regarding potential enduring second- and third-order effects. Yet, valid expectations about war and peace, interstate relationships, and the future of conflict are possible. Tactics change with context, strategy less so. An assumption that the use of military force—even naked aggression—will continue to be a key aspect of international relations will endure.

There are several military and political assumptions regarding the war in Ukraine worthy of continued discussion. For example, Russia likely assumed the objectives of the invasion would be achieved quickly, and Ukraine would not be able to offer significant resistance. The West assumed that Russia would not continue an invasion if it faced stiff resistance. Some pundits may have assumed the war Russia launched was merely limited in nature, seeking to secure a route to a warm sea port or to protect ethnic Russians. Others assumed Russian aggression was to secure a key industrial and agricultural region of the former Soviet Union that Russia cannot afford to lose.[5] Another important assumption is that Putin would possibly back down in the face of near-universal condemnation of his actions.[6]

All of these assumptions are important, but too specific to the context to be useful in the examination of possible future events. What the situation does provide is additional evidence in the empirical record that assumptions central to liberal international relations theory are faulty. That international relations have moved beyond realpolitik and hard-nosed calculations based on relative power and position is incorrect. Even the Strategy Bridge call for papers provides some insight into what those assumptions might be, given the use of the term “Russia’s naked aggression,” indicating a moral element to the situation.[7] To quote a famous movie character, “Is there another kind?”[8]

A Notch for Neorealist Theory

A brief review of the primary assumptions of neorealist scholarship is necessary. First, interstate interactions take place within a system of anarchy. There is no power or authority higher than the state that is empowered to enforce international rules or to prevent one state from attacking or otherwise harming another. Second, because of the anarchical nature of the world, states must always be concerned about their own survival. This leads to a third crucial point—that states seek security as their primary interest. Liberal theory suggests that once state security is assured, the state can have myriad additional interests, which can lead to instances of cooperation, and possibly even enduring peace. In contrast, neorealist literature expects that cooperation through alliances is merely a byproduct of the quest for survival and security. Neorealism expects that in a world characterized by anarchy, cooperation only occurs when it benefits the security interests of a state.

Scholars, policymakers, and military experts should not conflate the way the world works—as it is characterized by anarchy, survival, security—with the conduct or results of a specific conflict. The execution of combat operations and the results of those operations should not lead military and political experts to conclusions that naked aggression may be prevented by strong alliances among liberal democracies. Nor should potential military success in Ukraine create the false impression that at some future point other states will not act aggressively. The neorealist expectation that Russia felt threatened by NATO expansion, as posited by noted scholars George Kennan and John Mearsheimer, resulted in predictable behavior.[9] No matter how naked the aggression is deemed by others, how ill-informed the attack was, or ill-fated the Russian invasion might turn out to be, military failure in any instance cannot and should not influence thinking on how the world works in terms of the potential triggers for violent actions by state actors. That said, a brief examination of key liberal assumptions that have been challenged by this specific situation is in order.

Challenged liberal assumption #1: State survival and security are no longer the primary concern of the modern state. Cooperation between states is more economically sound. A neorealist would assume that Ukraine would beg to differ and wishes it could go back in time and make preparations for its own security.
Challenged liberal assumption #2: Modern alliances, unlike those of the past, are stable and reliable. The enduring NATO alliance purportedly provides evidence to support this assumption. However, the enduring nature of NATO is easier to explain. NATO survives because the threat endures.

The events that preceded the Russian aggression against Ukraine, both decades and immediately prior to the 2022 invasion, provide additional evidence in the long historical record of similar acts that are best explained by neorealist theories. The fact that the war continues as a quagmire for Russia while Western nations provide just enough aid for Ukraine to continue the fight also provides ammunition to support the predictions and conclusions of neorealism. It follows that some specific neorealist assumptions are supported by the events in Ukraine.

Validated neorealist assumption #1: A state’s interest in survival will outweigh international norms, alliances, and other cooperative measures when push comes to shove. The result of such interests may even result in acts others view as naked aggression.
Validated neorealist assumption #2: A state cannot rely on others to prevent aggression. Relying on others to come to your aid—after aggression—worked this time for Ukraine, but only because the West, and the U.S. specifically, have a direct interest in a weakened Russia. Alliances are but “temporary marriages of convenience.”[10]
Validated neorealist assumption #3: Security is a state’s prime directive. NATO’s interests are solidly based on insecurity that results from an anarchic international system. NATO endures because the need for the marriage persists. Russia remains the primary threat to Europe.
Validated neorealist assumptions #4: “We will... miss the Cold War.”[11] The bipolar system was theorized as being the most stable possible under anarchy. That has proven to be the case. While a supposed unipolar era after the Cold War ended was thought to be relatively peaceful, it was not. The world has witnessed since the end of the Cold War “a return to the multipolar distribution of power that characterized the European state system from its founding.”[12]

The United States seeks a weakened Russia—as neorealist thinking suggests. That is the strategic goal in supporting Ukraine. Evidence of this fact is found in the incremental approach to providing military and economic aid to Ukraine. The United States and the rest of the West has been doing just enough, just in time. A free and democratic Ukraine would merely be icing on the cake, regardless of how policymakers and the press sell that as the primary reason for Western support to Ukraine. The U.S. strategic goal of a weakened Russia confirms, as does Russia’s naked aggression in the first place, the assumptions of neorealist thought on international relations.

The inclusion of additional states into the NATO alliance came with the potential for predictable responses from Russia. In fact, the desired intent of including such nations into the alliance may have been to provoke the Russians into a foolish incursion—a bold claim, but not a unique one.[13] Given decades of neorealist thinking, and even Russia’s own use of reflexive control, it is not far-fetched to see the Russian invasion of Ukraine being purposefully triggered by the West in order to see Russia weakened militarily and isolated on the world stage. Russia had no recourse but to invade, despite potential misgivings about ultimate success. “Putin [had] been warning of this invasion, in one form or another, for 15 years.”[14]

Moreover, the inability of Ukraine to defend itself was well-known, possibly viewed by analysts as a “Gray Rhino”—an obvious and significant problem that was long-ignored.[15] The Russian invasion of Ukraine was probably one of the most inevitable and easily foreseen international political events in recent decades. The United States often does not predict accurately where and against whom the next major war will be fought, but there are some instances where conflict between less than peer competitors is predictable—even stated well in advance by the aggressor.[16] The West, and particularly the United States, would be wise to take such threats seriously. Neorealist conceptions of international relations will continue to offer clear insights into the triggers of conflict.

Conclusion

Vindication for the assumptions of neorealism does not equate to a jus ad bellum for Russia. Useful and accurate international relations theory should be morally agnostic. Putin will not succeed militarily in the face of the substantial Western support for Ukraine. That is less an assumption and more of a given, and it is the goal of the West. However, relying on alliances has always been a dangerous proposition—just ask the Melians.[17] If Russia were a lesser power, not a threat to European nations, and also a long-time rival of the United States, there is no guarantee that Ukraine would have the robust support it has received. Is the sovereignty of a non-democratic state less sacrosanct than that of a nominally democratic one? Defense of sovereignty against so-called naked aggression should apply universally, but it does not. States will continue to defend others only when it is in their own interests to do so.

This instance of cooperation and conflict in world affairs will not resolve the dispute between ontological world views. There will likely never be a grand theory of international politics. However, some models remain more useful than others. None will be able to predict the exact where and when of the next war, let alone the outcome of that conflict. The expectations of neorealism, however, provide a parsimonious model with which to examine events and identify the most important variables which determine the causes, or triggers, of cooperation and conflict. Identification of such triggers can go far in informing foreign policy responses to prevent or mitigate conditions that lead to war.

Brent Lawniczak is a retired Marine aviator and currently serves as assistant Professor of Military and Security Studies at the U.S. Air Force Air Command and Staff College. He is the author of the book Confronting the Myth of Soft Power in U.S. Foreign Policy. This essay reflects his own views and not necessarily those of the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

The Strategy Bridge is read, respected, and referenced across the worldwide national security community—in conversation, education, and professional and academic discourse.

Thank you for being a part of The Strategy Bridge community. Together, we can #BuildTheBridge.

Header Image: Russian Tank, Ukraine, 2022 (Dmitry Bukhantsov).

Notes:

[1] “2Q23 Call for Strategy Bridge Submissions,” The Strategy Bridge, February 13, 2023, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2023/2/13/2q23-call-for-strategy-bridge-submissions.

[2] Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2011); Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton University Press, 2005).

[3] “2Q23 Call for Strategy Bridge Submissions.”

[4] Rufus E. Miles, “The Origin and Meaning of Miles’ Law,” Public Administration Review 38, no. 5 (1978): 399–403, https://doi.org/10.2307/975497.

[5] Keith Gessen, “Was It Inevitable? A Short History of Russia’s War on Ukraine,” The Guardian, March 11, 2022, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/11/was-it-inevitable-a-short-history-of-russias-war-on-ukraine.

[6] Joseph R. House, “Remarks by President Biden Providing an Update on Russia and Ukraine,” The White House, February 15, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/02/15/remarks-by-president-biden-providing-an-update-on-russia-and-ukraine/; U.S. Department of State, “United States Department of State Press Briefing,” United States Department of State, April 10, 2023, https://www.state.gov/?post_type=state_briefing&%3Bp=92333; United Nations, “General Assembly Resolution Demands End to Russian Offensive in Ukraine,” UN News, March 2, 2022, https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1113152.

[7] “2Q23 Call for Strategy Bridge Submissions,” (italics added).

[8] A Few Good Men (1992) - IMDb, 1992, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0104257/characters/nm0000197.

[9] Matt Johnson, “Mearsheimer: Rigor or Reaction?,” Quillette, February 15, 2023, https://quillette.com/2023/02/15/mearsheimer-rigor-or-reaction/; Ted Galen Carpenter, “The U.S. and NATO Helped Trigger the Ukraine War,” CATO Institute, March 7, 2022, https://www.cato.org/commentary/us-nato-helped-trigger-ukraine-war-its-not-siding-putin-admit-it.

[10] Johnson.

[11] Johnson.

[12] Johnson.

[13] Robert H. Wade, “Why the US and Nato Have Long Wanted Russia to Attack Ukraine,” Long School of Economics and Political Science (blog), March 30, 2022, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2022/03/30/why-the-us-and-nato-have-long-wanted-russia-to-attack-ukraine/; James Emery, “NATO’s Checkmate: Baiting Ukraine To Provoke Russia To Invade,” Eurasia Review, March 22, 2022, https://www.eurasiareview.com/22032022-natos-checkmate-baiting-ukraine-to-provoke-russia-to-invade-oped/.

[14] Gessen, “Was It Inevitable?”

[15] Michele Wucker, The Gray Rhino: How to Recognize and Act on the Obvious Dangers We Ignore (Macmillan, 2016).

[16] Besiki Luka Kutateladze, “Why the Ukrainian Invasion Was Predictable: ‘It’s Time the World Finally Learns a Lesson on Russia,’” FIU News, March 2, 2022, https://news.fiu.edu/2022/why-the-ukrainian-invasion-was-predictable-its-time-the-world-finally-learns-a-lesson-on-russia; Christian Alexander Alvarado, “Russian Invasion of Ukraine ‘Predictable and Avoidable,’ UA Expert Says,” The Daily Wildcat, February 24, 2022, https://www.wildcat.arizona.edu/article/2022/02/n-ukraine-reax; Nomaan Merchant, “US Intel Predicted Russia’s Invasion Plans. Did It Matter?,” AP NEWS, February 25, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-vladimir-putin-business-europe-8acc2106b95554429e93dfee5e253743.

[17] Robert B. Strassler, ed., The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War (New York, NY: Free Press, 1996), 351–57.