Alessandra Nisch
Putin’s Wars: Testing Boyd’s Strategy of ...

President Putin made three foundational assumptions in launching his war against Ukraine that should have been correct but were not. First, Putin assumed the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and easy fight. Second, he assumed the world would denounce the invasion but tacitly allow it. Third, Putin assumed the war would deter NATO expansion.

Putin’s Wars: Testing Boyd’s Strategy of Applied Friction

ISR

Partner—Proxy—Glitch: Vertical Coalitions and the Question of Sovereignty in Networks

Partner—Proxy—Glitch: Vertical Coalitions and the Question of Sovereignty in Networks

The conflict in Ukraine offers unexpected insight into a military construct that had previously been mostly theoretical. Ukrainian ground forces, fighting beneath an information domain dominated almost exclusively by American intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, while no U.S. forces fight in the conflict, is what military theorists and strategists in the 1990s described as a vertical coalition. They conceived it as the future of American warfare, during a brief period in which violent ground-based conflict among powerful states was believed, by some, to be vanishing from the world.

#Reviewing From Kites to Cold War

#Reviewing From Kites to Cold War

With meticulous source citations and an impressive bibliography, Morton has produced a succinct, yet informative examination of the evolution of manned aerial reconnaissance from its earliest beginnings to the conclusion of the Vietnam War. In his introduction, the author expresses his intention to not only offer an historical analysis of manned aerial reconnaissance but to fill a “considerable historiographical gap.” In this, he may well have succeeded.