From Kites to Cold War: The Evolution of Manned Airborne Reconnaissance. Tyler Morton. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2019.
For millennia, military commanders at all levels have sought to discover the enemy’s intentions, hoping to learn “what was over the next hill.” Seeking to avoid strategic or tactical surprise, spies, reconnaissance parties, and other means were used to discern the enemy’s intentions. Airpower provided a new way to undertake reconnaissance while breaking the bonds of gravity and soaring above the earth. In From Kites to Cold War: The Evolution of Manned Airborne Reconnaissance, U.S. Air Force Colonel Tyler Morton examines the development of manned aerial reconnaissance from its earliest beginnings through the end of the war in Vietnam.
The book is the published version of Morton’s doctoral dissertation from Air University. Extensively researched, this volume provides an excellent introduction into the origins and growth of manned airborne reconnaissance and the significant contributions this form of intelligence gathering made to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), particularly over a period of some two hundred years.
In his introduction, the author defends his decision to conclude his examination of the topic with the end of the Vietnam War on the grounds that “many of the records covering the time since Vietnam remain classified” and that “By the end of Vietnam the United States had developed the manned platforms in predominant use today.”[1] Nor, he adds, was it his intention to discuss unmanned systems in detail. However, his emphasis on the process by which manned aerial reconnaissance evolved gives the reader a vivid picture of the trials and challenges, both technical and political, that those committed to the progression of this significant means of expanding the strategic and tactical aspect of intelligence gathering were able to overcome.
Some may find the book’s title somewhat misleading, as the use of kites for manned reconnaissance is limited to two sentences. Morton notes the first use of kites in ancient China was to “…observe enemy positions and preparations for combat.”[2] He concludes, “Manned kite reconnaissance was precarious, however, and while several countries experimented with the practice until well into the twentieth century, the platform was not viable.”[3] A photo of a junior officer in the U.S. Army’s Signal Corps being sent aloft on what is identified as a “Perkins kite” concludes the examination of kite usage.[4] Some discussion of the vulnerabilities of kites and why they were unsuitable for military purposes might have been useful here, as well as later efforts to use kites as a means of conducting aerial reconnaissance.
"Employment of a Balloon at the Battle of Fleurus" by Fulgence Marion (Wikimedia)
From this point forward, Morton provides far more detail on the development of balloons and airplanes for aerial reconnaissance. The reader is guided through the evolution of balloons as, once the Montgolfier Brothers and others demonstrated their potential utility, military minds began speculating about their use for reconnaissance, intelligence gathering and communications. Even the Founding Fathers, including Benjamin Franklin, George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, began deliberating about the potential of balloons, including the possibility of military applications. The balloon made its first appearance above a battlefield at Mauberge in June of 1794, and from there, the primary mission of the balloon in wartime became airborne reconnaissance. Even so, the long period of peace in Europe following the Napoleonic Wars slowed the adaptation of balloons for military purposes, although Morton notes episodes such as the failed Danish attempt to use a dirigible balloon to bomb the British fleet blockading Copenhagen in 1807. Likewise, the American military was slow to recognize the potential of the balloon, using it for aerial reconnaissance only twice before the Civil War. However, the North and South made use of balloons for aerial reconnaissance as part of their respective intelligence efforts, and the Union was the first to place a telegraph in a balloon and use it to direct artillery fire—presaging future air missions in World War I.
The invention of the airplane revolutionized air reconnaissance. Morton describes the progress, missteps, competition, technical advances, strategic and tactical innovations of aerial reconnaissance in an engaging overview that both those with a casual interest in the subject and those with professional expertise can appreciate. World War I in particular proved the efficacy of airborne reconnaissance as trench warfare severely limited troop movements. The resulting intelligence gap provided the opportunity for airborne reconnaissance to prove its worth. In doing so, the use of the airplane as a critical component in intelligence gathering was assured.
However, progress in this area, as Morton shows, was neither easy nor accepted without controversy. The interwar years were a time when the European powers and the United States dealt with the uncertainties regarding how best to define the role of air power in general and the intelligence gathering capability in general. Adding to the challenges of determining the role of air power in a future war were cost/benefit concerns and political issues. Ironically, during this time, the importance of airborne reconnaissance was often overlooked as technological developments focused on other matters such as strategic bombing.
Meanwhile, other technological advances such as radar created new opportunities for the use of aircraft in reconnaissance missions. The development of radar and improvements in radio communications called for an expansion of intelligence gathering requirements. Now, alongside imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT) increased in importance, and Morton explains the process of building SIGINT capabilities on both sides during the Second World War clearly and effectively. Ultimately, the Allies prevailed and, by the end of the conflict, Great Britain and the United States “…had developed airborne COMINT, ELINT and IMINT collection capabilities that set the foundation for future manned airborne reconnaissance.”[5]Morton goes on to emphasize the importance of photoreconnaissance alongside signals intelligence advances. “The confidence in IMINT had grown so significantly that no major operations were planned in the latter half of the war without detailed airborne photoreconnaissance providing planners with a look at the terrain.”[6] Morton argues that these capabilities gave the Allies a “…distinct decision advantage that undoubtedly contributed to their victory.”[7]
In the book’s final two chapters, Morton discusses the role of airborne reconnaissance from two perspectives. Both focus on the advancement of U.S. capabilities as concerns about the emergence of the Soviet Union as a potential adversary increased after World War II. In chapter five, the focus is on the development of platforms that would provide the means necessary to “…conduct strategic air warfare.”[8] Of primary importance was gathering intelligence on Soviet targets. This led to the modification of existing bombers and fighter aircraft at first, and then, the construction of “…purpose-built imagery aircraft.”[9] Ultimately, these efforts resulted in the development and deployment of the U-2 and SR-71 imagery collection platforms. Along with the advances in imagery aircraft, similar improvements were made in ELINT and COMINT collection. Morton credits manned aircraft reconnaissance assets with providing the intelligence necessary to ensure that the U.S. and its allies “…held a decision advantage over their adversaries.”[10]
SR-71 Blackbird (Judson Brohmer/USAF Photo)
Chapter six examines the role of airborne reconnaissance and intelligence collection in conducting tactical air warfare. Especially interesting was the increasing use of linguists in order to help American airmen understand enemy tactics and to enhance situational awareness. These capabilities grew and improved to the point that, by late in the Vietnam War, American fighter pilots benefited from an operation designated Project Teaball, which communicated imminent threat warnings within seconds of receiving them. As a result, a kill ratio that was slightly in favor of the North Vietnamese Air Force was dramatically reversed. Morton concludes that Project Teaball “…epitomized nearly everything airmen envisioned and worked so hard to achieve; it enabled them to be a critical part of the decision loop and not simply outsiders feeding into it.”[11]
In his conclusion, Morton does briefly address the potential for both manned and unmanned reconnaissance air platforms. He cautions against an over-reliance on unmanned aircraft for reconnaissance and intelligence collection purposes. Instead, he contends the current and future “multidomain environment” will require a combination of manned and unmanned assets in the “airborne reconnaissance inventory” as the most effective means of gathering intelligence in the foreseeable future.[12]
With meticulous source citations and an impressive bibliography, Morton has produced a succinct, yet informative examination of the evolution of manned aerial reconnaissance from its earliest beginnings to the conclusion of the Vietnam War. In his introduction, the author expresses his intention to not only offer an historical analysis of manned aerial reconnaissance but to fill a “considerable historiographical gap.”[13] In this, he may well have succeeded. Besides serving as a source in itself, the book’s twenty-four-page bibliography will provide current and future scholars of this subject an excellent resource with which to guide their own research and suggest potential topics that can continue to fill the gap he refers to. At the same time, laymen and professionals, not only in the military but in the intelligence community and other areas, will find much to consider as they absorb the narrative and the author’s conclusions.
There are important lessons to think about here. Morton clearly shows the benefit of applying lessons learned, although the process could often be contentious, not only during wartime but afterwards as well. While the author eloquently describes the technical advances that took place in manned aerial reconnaissance, it is the response, both strategically and tactically, to the demands of acquiring the intelligence needed to allow military forces to defeat an enemy in battle, as well as maintaining a decisive advantage over potential foes, that stands out as one reads the narrative.
Gregory Moore is the Director of the Center for Intelligence Studies at Notre Dame College.
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Header Image: U-2 Dragon Lady (Lockheed Martin)
Notes:
[1] Tyler Morton, From Kites to Cold War: The Evolution of Manned Airborne Reconnaissance. (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2019): 9.
[2] Ibid., 11.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid., 13.
[5] Ibid., 152
[6] Ibid., 153.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid., 180.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid., 181.
[11] Ibid., 206.
[12] Ibid., 209.
[13] Ibid., 8.