The recent announcement that U.S. Special Operations Command plans to acquire 75 aircraft for an armed overwatch program is an essential step to filling a capabilities gap that has existed for most of the war on terror due to the relatively high cost of existing armed overwatch platforms.
Armed overwatch provides air support to surface-based forces by having an aircraft that “can observe the situation from a defensible position and provide supporting fires if necessary.” But this essential need comes at a high cost. This has created both a capability gap in that partner nations cannot provide indigenous armed overwatch and a capacity gap in that there are not enough armed overwatch aircraft for U.S. special operations forces.
However, the wide variety of aircraft being considered for this role—ranging from small business jets, to crop dusters to military trainers—suggests that U.S. Special Operations Command has struggled to define its needs for its armed overwatch program. Rather than attempting to acquire one or two new types of airframes, an alternative solution involves retrofitting strike capability to aircraft already in service through the development and acquisition of a common launch system for air-launched loitering munitions that can easily be installed in several different types of aircraft for the armed overwatch role. Such a common launch system would allow SOCOM to operate a great number of aircraft types with precision strike capability, resulting in more effective covert operatives and better advising of partner forces.
What U.S. Special Operations Command Wants
In the 2021 budget request, U.S. Special Operations Command defined the Armed Overwatch program as having the principle role of “support[ing] operations and partner nations in the fight against terrorism.” As part of the contract request, the command described the desired aircraft as being able to operate in austere and permissive environments. In light of U.S. Special Operations Command’s Operating Concept, which seeks to counter an increasingly complex operating environment by improving partner relationships, the Armed Overwatch serves two main purposes:
To fill the air support gap that has existed for special operations forces (which contributed to the Tongo Tongo ambush of 2017), and
To provide air support and training for partner air forces.
Air Power’s Quiet Revolution: The Decreasing Cost of Precision Strike
A rapid evolution in aerial attack has taken place as a result of the proliferation of inexpensive off-the-shelf drones that can easily be modified into loitering munitions. This development allowed both state and non-state actors to achieve capabilities in aerial precision strike that only well-funded and well-trained militaries previously could achieve.
In 2016, the Islamic State’s burgeoning fleet of off-the-shelf and home-made drones (which often cost less than $1,500) disrupted the campaign to retake Mosul. Some of these drones were packed with explosives set to detonate when they flew into their targets. These suicide drones provided a sobering wake-up call for U.S. and partner forces, underscoring how widely air power and precision strike had spread. In conflicts since then—from the Philippines to Libya—small, armed, commercial-off-the-shelf drones have become increasingly common.
Defense contractors have also made their own versions of suicide drones, known as loitering munitions. These loitering munitions combine surveillance and attack capability in a single disposable vehicle that blurs the line between drones and missiles. One example is the AeroVironment Switchblade, of which 4,000 units have been purchased since it was introduced in 2009. It weighs 5kg and is designed to be man-portable and launched by a single soldier. Unfortunately, with only 10 minutes of endurance, it lacks the time-on-station capability to be an effective intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platform. Other similar platforms include the Raytheon Coyote and the UVision Hero series of drones, which range from anti-personnel to anti-tank roles.
More recent innovations, such as the Defendtex Drone-40, which can be launched from under-barrel 40mm grenade launchers, have further reduced the size and cost of loitering munitions. The price tag of guidance and control computers will continue to decline, making the use of these weapons even more affordable. These systems, in various states of complexity, have already widely proliferated around the world, reducing any concerns about technology transfer that occur with large precision-guided munitions. However, their battery and electric propulsion mean these munitions have short endurance and therefore do not provide effective surveillance. Fortunately, these problems can be avoided when the loitering munition is launched from an aircraft. The aircraft’s range allows the loitering munition to be deployed at distances unachievable by a ground-launched loitering munition of a similar class.
What U.S. Special Operations Command Needs: The Case for Loitering Munitions
A scaled-up version of a loitering munitions-enabled gunship already exists. In 2012, the United States Marine Corps modified some C-130 transports into aircraft with strike capability through the Hercules Airborne Weapons Kit commonly known as the Harvest HAWK. This program went from concept to combat in 18 months, cost approximately $10 million, and had a considerably higher launch total during its initial tour in Afghanistan than Harriers or A-10s. This precedent provides the proof of concept for a combat effective capability that is cheaper and faster to field than a new aircraft type.
A Harvest Hawk equipped KC-130J at Camp Dwyer, Afghanistan (Cpl Samantha H. Arrington/Wikimedia)
Small loitering munitions have already been launched successfully from aircraft to overcome their range limitations. The United States Marine Corps undertook a series of tests in 2015 that launched a Switchblade from the back of a V-22 Osprey in both hover and forward flight. In addition, the U.S. Army is testing launching loitering munitions from helicopters. If U.S. Special Operations Command develops a common air-launched loitering munitions system, it could easily retrofit the system for use from aircraft that the command already operates. Many of these aircraft, including the Pilatus PC-12 (in service as the U-28) and the Beechcraft King Air 350 (in service as the MC-12), are already used for overwatch. Assuming a similar development pace as the Harvest Hawk, such a system could be ready in a year and a half.
Such a system would be more effective in providing armed overwatch due to an increased ability to operate covertly as compared to a traditional light-attack aircraft. The use of air-launched loitering munitions would also increase the effectiveness in training partner air forces due to a cost and deployment structure that would better serve their operations.
To illustrate what a loitering munitions-enabled gunship might look like and what its capabilities would be, we can examine the U-28 and the Switchblade loitering munition to find how they might be integrated in a hypothetical gunship referred to as the AU-28. The only difference between the U-28 and AU-28 is that the rear door of the AU-28 could open in flight to launch the munitions, which the manufacturer already has accomplished.
Weight is also not a significant issue. Due to the man-portable nature of small loitering munitions, they are often controlled by a handheld tablet not dissimilar in size and weight to an iPad or a Nintendo Switch. This means that the main weight consideration would be the loitering munitions themselves. Because the Switchblade munition weighs approximately 5 lbs and since the U-28 is an efficient aircraft with sufficient interior volume that only loses about one hour in flight endurance for every 300 pounds of payload, the AU-28 could easily carry 60 loitering munitions. On intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions where air support might be needed, the AU-28 could still carry as many as 20 loitering munitions with little loss of endurance. Depending on the mission need, a AU-28 could fly with or without loitering munitions, enabling the commander to choose between maximum time on station or ground attack ability.
Armed Overwatch
By necessity, special operations often require the element of surprise. As a result, the ability to blend in is critical. As Africa becomes increasingly connected to world-wide communications networks through both traditional internet and smartphone usage, it will become more difficult for recognizably military aircraft such as the Aero L-39 Albatross or Embraer A-29 Super Tucano to operate covertly, especially in regions where insurgent groups enjoy support from some of the population. In addition, the presence of foreign military aircraft can be especially sensitive for the host government thus further limiting their effectiveness.
U.S. Special Operations Command already has a fleet of civilian aircraft that could easily be modified to carry loitering munitions. As deployments for special operations forces increased during the Global War on Terror, several off-the-shelf civil aircraft were purchased and fitted with intelligence and surveillance gathering equipment to support special operations forces. Aircraft such as the Pilatus PC-12, PZL M-28 Skytruck, the De Havilland DHC-8, and the Beechcraft King Air 350 operated from unimproved airstrips, less conspicuous than the standard air force fleets of fighter jets and large transports.
An Afghan Air Force A-29 Super Tucano soars over Kabul, Afghanistan, Aug. 14, 2015. (SSgt Larry Reid/DVIDS/Wikimedia)
By increasing the types of aircraft with strike capability and by making those aircraft unrecognizable as military aircraft to the casual observer, an opponent’s ability to track the movements of these aircraft and gain actionable intelligence would be degraded. This is especially important outside of Afghanistan, where special operations forces are likely to be far more dispersed and operating in countries that do not have a large U.S. military presence.
Partner Forces Training
Training, equipping, and advising partner forces is a critical part of foreign internal defense and security assistance missions. However, the maintenance and operations challenges encountered by the Afghan Air Force suggests that giving a new type of aircraft to partner nations and training their forces on it can pose unexpected challenges and is no guarantee of increased combat effectiveness. An October 2019 report from the Government Accountability Office noted the percentage of maintenance performed locally by the Afghan Air Force fell by 20% from April of 2018 to September of 2019. Even worse, by September of 2019, the Afghan Air Force was conducting only 20% of maintenance on A-29s—meaning the continued readiness and flight capability of the A-29 wholly depends on either direct military support or significant financial support from the United States. However, the Afghan Air Force was conducting 80% of maintenance of the MI-17 helicopter. Loitering munitions are inherently airframe agnostic, meaning that they can be launched from any fixed or rotary wing aircraft with adequate capacity to store them. Therefore, it is far easier to train a few individuals to operate loitering munitions than the entire air crew and maintenance chain necessary to operate a new aircraft type.
The same Government Accountability Office report noted Afghan joint terminal attack controllers had only coordinated 7.5% of A-29 airstrikes. While joint terminal attack controllers are critical to U.S. airpower, the operational complexity of their use makes implementation in less developed countries problematic. Having an aircraft that depends on ground-based joint terminal attack controllers is likely not feasible for partner nations in the long term. Air launched loitering munitions do not require a joint terminal attack controller because they are able to fly over the battlespace at low levels for several minutes, giving the operator adequate situational awareness to safely and effectively target the munition on their own.
The small size of partner nations’ air forces poses another problem for using light-attack aircraft as a training tool. For instance, the Nigerian Air Force currently has a light-attack fleet of twelve Dassault/Dornier Alpha Jets that will be complemented with twelve A-29 Super Tucanos in the coming six years. Optimistically assuming an 80% readiness rate, this means that the Nigerian Air Force—one of the best equipped and funded partner air forces—will have a maximum of twenty fixed-wing light-attack aircraft. For most other partner air forces, the equipment situation is far worse.
Meanwhile, its neighbor to the north, Niger, has only eleven fixed-wing aircraft of all types in its air force. Of these, nine aircraft spread among six types could feasibly serve an attack role. This demonstrates one of the problems partner air forces face. In addition to small size, partner nations often lack fleet commonality, creating a challenge for training and mission readiness. The adoption of a common loitering munitions system would enable a partner airman trained in loitering munitions to be effective in any fleet aircraft that could launch them, which would reduce the training burden on a partner air force. In addition, because loitering munitions like the Switchblade were designed to be used by ground troops, they offer a high degree of automation, which leads to a training timetable in the U.S. Army of less than one week for personnel with no previous aviation experience. Finally, the precision offered by loitering munitions and their in-built surveillance capability means a joint terminal attack controller is unnecessary, further reducing the cost of training and the complexity of operations. All of these facts make air-launched loitering munitions the best options for partner air forces.
Ten years ago, basing traditional light-attack aircraft in a partner country may have been a viable policy option for the U.S., as no other countries were providing significant amounts of military aid and training. In the years since, however, China has made significant efforts to expand its military partnerships in Africa as part of its Belt and Road Initiative. Aircraft, and especially unmanned systems, are a key component in the Chinese strategy.
As a result of this competition for security assistance, the United States military no longer has unfettered access to bases and partnerships with nations—regardless of their importance in the Global War on Terror. If the United States wants to maintain its counter-terrorism mission and bases in partner countries while maintaining an economy of force, it needs to provide products and training that improve the host nation’s counter-terror capability.
Conclusion
The rapid changes in aerial attack caused by loitering munitions pose a challenge to U.S. Special Operations Command as it embarks upon an acquisition program to provide armed overwatch for the next twenty to thirty years. The development of a common air-launched system for loitering munitions would give U.S. Special Operations Command increased flexibility in the key areas of covert light attack capability, partner forces training, and security assistance competition.
Vincent Wroble is a graduate of the University of Colorado Boulder in political science and works as a research assistant at the university's Technology, Cybersecurity, and Policy Program. He has published an article titled, “Make Drones More Resilient” on small drones for the Marine Corps in the December 2019 edition of USNI's Proceedings.
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