Alessandra Nisch
Putin’s Wars: Testing Boyd’s Strategy of ...

President Putin made three foundational assumptions in launching his war against Ukraine that should have been correct but were not. First, Putin assumed the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and easy fight. Second, he assumed the world would denounce the invasion but tacitly allow it. Third, Putin assumed the war would deter NATO expansion.

Putin’s Wars: Testing Boyd’s Strategy of Applied Friction

US-Russia Relations

What Happens If Great Powers Don’t Fight Great Wars?

What Happens If Great Powers Don’t Fight Great Wars?

The proper lesson for us today to draw from history is that conflict abhors a vacuum, and threats will take advantage of whatever domain is available. Certainly an argument should be made for increasing traditional lethality in the force, but must that come at the expense of other required capabilities? If we believe that wars are prevented in competition and that adversaries will use all available ways and means in conflict, then the Army must consider diverse solutions to deter and win in both Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) and non- LSCO Multi-Domain Operations

#Reviewing Backfire

#Reviewing Backfire

In a series of short, engaging, and clearly written chapters, Demarais breaks down why the U.S. found sanctions such an appealing policy instrument; how their widespread use in the 1990s and 2000s triggered changes and upheavals, as countries around the world coped with the issues of challenges of compliance; and, finally, how sanctions implementation has generally backfired, imposing costs on the U.S. and its allies while encouraging targeted states towards policies and strategies designed to insulate their governments and economies from U.S. pressure.

Hungry Like the Wolf: Territorial Conquest and Great Power Competition in the New World

Hungry Like the Wolf: Territorial Conquest and Great Power Competition in the New World

Russia and China could succeed in weakening American influence in its far abroad and security in its near abroad through reliance on tried-and-true hybrid war/grey zone tactics. These indirect maneuvers are cheaper and easier to orchestrate under the U.S.’s nose than direct military operations and have the asymmetric effect of maximizing the impact of a minimal investment, stretching the power and reach of weaker powers confronting more powerful rivals.

How the U.S. Can Recapture Escalation Control

How the U.S. Can Recapture Escalation Control

Escalation control was once firmly part of the U.S. strategic lexicon. The term fell into disuse because it was assumed U.S. unipolarity made it dominant in any post-Cold War political-military competition. But such assumptions are clearly incorrect today. Indeed, U.S. responses to rival nations’ efforts to dominate escalation narratives have tended to telegraph timidity rather than strength.

With Russia, it is Time to Restart Speaking Softly and Putting Away the Big Stick

With Russia, it is Time to Restart Speaking Softly and Putting Away the Big Stick

The United States should once again place greater emphasis on a concept known as soft power as a means to influence Russian perceptions towards a more pro-Western Democratic mindset. If the United States can successfully influence Russian perceptions through soft power, one might see a less corrupt and more democratic Russia, and perhaps a peaceful transition of power in the post-Putin future.

What Is NATO Good For?

What Is NATO Good For?

NATO is an instrument, one that has shown it can be adapted to different tasks and goals as the strategic setting changes. Those adaptations have not always been swift or graceful, yet the alliance’s endurance speaks to the fact that it eventually does meet its members’ needs. If NATO can reassert itself in the current environment as an engine of stability and not just a provider of military security it has a much stronger chance of persevering, even as its origins in the aftermath of World War II and the early years of the Cold War recede further into history.

Escaping the Idealism Trap

Escaping the Idealism Trap

Idealism has clearly failed to grant the United States a stronger standing in the world as it failed to accurately assess the scope and consequences of interventionism, and the strategic intent of rising powers. Great power competition and the international system’s inevitable transition to a multi-polar order calls on us to embrace the challenge with clarity. This challenge should motivate an honest reassessment of U.S. foreign policy tools and processes. Adjusting to facts and reevaluating means and methods is a sign of strength and resilience of this nation.