President Putin made three foundational assumptions in launching his war against Ukraine that should have been correct but were not. First, Putin assumed the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and easy fight. Second, he assumed the world would denounce the invasion but tacitly allow it. Third, Putin assumed the war would deter NATO expansion.
The line between celebrating heritage and creating a fully-rounded history can be a fine one in many institutional histories. Appreciating this tendency, Royal Air Force-insider John Shields reassesses the 1982 Falklands Conflict, seeking to explode multiple myths while also providing a better assessment of the air campaign by focusing on the operational rather than the tactical level of war.
Russia and China could succeed in weakening American influence in its far abroad and security in its near abroad through reliance on tried-and-true hybrid war/grey zone tactics. These indirect maneuvers are cheaper and easier to orchestrate under the U.S.’s nose than direct military operations and have the asymmetric effect of maximizing the impact of a minimal investment, stretching the power and reach of weaker powers confronting more powerful rivals.
Due to the overwhelming emphasis on extremist organizations claiming religious motivation, it is too easy for groups such as the Conspiracy to get lost in the background. Allowing this might prove to be a costly mistake. Last month’s G20 summit in Hamburg and the CCF prisoner solidarity riots in Athens serve as a reminder of what these anarchist collectives are capable. The United States would be remiss to place such a destructive force on the backburner.
