When the term “great power competition” (GPC) appeared in the 2017 National Security Strategy, it served as a wakeup call to many in the U.S. defense establishment.[1] It signaled a sudden rhetorical shift which produced two positive developments. First, it prompted the military to embrace innovation with a newfound sense of urgency. Second, it helped to alert the American public to the strategic challenges presented by China’s newly aggressive foreign policy. But although its handy acronym is still alive and well in some sectors of government, “GPC” has fallen into disfavor, and for good reason. Among other things, the term “great power” seemed to rhetorically exclude many of America’s global partners. The term also suggested a military-centric approach to foreign policy when post-Cold War experience has shown a whole-of-government strategy is necessary for success.[2] As a result, some of the nation’s leadership have jettisoned GPC for the latest new-and-improved term: strategic competition.[3] Whatever its benefits, the shift to strategic competition does not definitively deliver U.S. strategic thinking from the liabilities of its predecessor.
Chinese President Xi Jinping shakes hands with then- Vice President Joe Biden inside the Great Hall of the People in Beijing December 4, 2013. (Lintao Zhang/Reuters)
Competition with China has united Americans from across the political spectrum as few other things today.
Adopting strategic competition, without repudiating GPC, risks creating a mere euphemism for the predecessor, undermining the significance of the change. Words matter. The semantic shift affirms that the U.S. sees its partners as integral to strategic success. However, the GPC concept stumbled on more than semantics. For example, France’s recent reaction to the announcement of the AUKUS security agreement indicates that a strategy based predominantly on competition may incur risk to U.S. interests.[4] By failing to include a cogent critique of GPC along with their minor rhetorical shift, doctrine writers are missing an opportunity to dispose of GPC’s deeper vices while retaining its virtues.[5]
Competition with China has united Americans from across the political spectrum as few other things today. While broad consensus confers political strength, it can also produce blind-spots. International relations are impossibly complex, and reducing the U.S.-China relationship to this single phrase oversimplifies strategy to the extent that it could be dangerous to long-term U.S. foreign policy.[6]
The reality of the situation is more complicated, and no one term will suffice to explain it. That was the conclusion of a 2018 RAND study, which found that although there are strong elements of competition in the U.S. relationship with China, the word fails to completely capture the relationship’s essence.[7] The RAND team found that two other C-words are necessary to understand the potential modes of U.S. relations with China: cooperation, in which the U.S. and China may meet mutual interests, such as pandemic prevention; and contestation, involving issue-specific disagreements, which need not contribute to an overall antagonistic posture.[8]
RAND’s first three C’s—competition, cooperation, and contestation—frame the U.S.-China relationship in inherently dyadic terms, counterinsurgency accounts for realities that dyad analysis ignores
The study also found that the task at hand for the U.S. “is not a generalized […] competition as much as it is a struggle to constrain two potential major power revisionists.”[9] Taking this analysis a step further, it becomes evident that a fourth facet of America’s strategic approach to China requires a fourth C-word: counterinsurgency.[10]
The U.S. must resist the urge to focus predominantly on China itself, and, in the manner of FM 3-24, give attention to the third parties that are caught up in the two states’ political struggle.
To be fair, the label of counterinsurgency, with all its connotative baggage, is potentially just as harmful as the now-disfavored GPC, in that it implies a higher level of violence than is desirable, evokes faintly colonial imagery, and may lead to inappropriate comparisons between China and terrorist groups. However, viewing the U.S.-China relationship through the lens of strategic counterinsurgency nevertheless offers a new, useful perspective. While RAND’s first three C’s—competition, cooperation, and contestation—frame the U.S.-China relationship in inherently dyadic terms, counterinsurgency accounts for realities that dyad analysis ignores, specifically where both countries reside within the larger international system. In today’s increasingly multipolar world, there is reason to question whether dyad analysis remains effective.[11] The U.S. must resist the urge to focus predominantly on China itself, and, in the manner of FM 3-24, give attention to the third parties that are caught up in the two states’ political struggle.[12]
The 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance promotes this more expansive view when it asserts that advancing U.S. national security “requires…[the U.S.] to lead and sustain a stable and open international system.”[13] The language reflects that the U.S. is no ordinary state pursuing its own narrow goals. It is also a leading participant in global governance. Viewed from this perspective, the so-called rivalry between the U.S. and China can be modeled not only as a set of foreign policy disputes between two states but also as an intramural rivalry between factions in a nascent global polity. The U.S. and its partners resemble a governing coalition attempting to generate order within the international community, while revisionist states such as China seek to replace that regime with one more favorable to their interests.[14]
With the intramural rivalry model in mind, U.S. grand strategy can benefit from the lessons of past insurgencies. For example, in the Chinese Civil War, the Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek focused primarily on defeating the Chinese Communists under Mao Tse-Tung. Mao readily recognized Chiang’s military advantages from the outset, but believed he could progress toward strategic victory by winning political support from the populace.[15] Mao’s focus on popular support was one of the contributing factors in the Communists’ ultimate success in mainland China.[16] Today, amid China’s efforts to force a U.S. withdrawal to its own geopolitical island, U.S. strategists should consider whether the key to strategic success lies away from the apparent centers of power.[17]
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is ultimately not the most important menace to U.S. strategic interests.
Insurgencies are often a symptom of deep societal problems.[18] In such cases, the focus of a counterinsurgency campaign is not to snuff out the insurgents but rather to bolster a “government’s legitimacy in the eyes of the contested population.”[19] By focusing on competition—that is, on how to counteract China’s every move—the U.S. will overlook the most essential task of the moment, which is to convince the other nations of the world that the U.S.-supported system remains the superior model for meeting their needs. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is ultimately not the most important menace to U.S. strategic interests.[20] The true menace is the possibility that present and potential U.S. partners will become alienated to its cause. Engaging in the bellicose language of competition may promote this alienation, and will undermine any strategy that seeks to strengthen the current world order.
There are no universal solutions for investing countries into partnership with the U.S. that would suit every individual state.
Auspiciously, the 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance embraces a U.S. strategy beyond dyadic competition. Rather than advocating direct confrontation, it stresses the need to rebuild the credibility of the U.S.-supported system and to strengthen international partners in the face of China’s pressures.[21] These bear some resemblance to the familiar missions of nation-building and foreign internal defense, but now at an international scale, and within a polity in which the U.S. is itself a member.
As in counterinsurgency, a key to progress will be addressing the needs of the contested populations. There are no universal solutions for investing countries into partnership with the U.S. that would suit every individual state. However, the U.S. could begin simply by conveying to prospective partners a positive effort to meet their needs rather than approaching them as mere instruments in a self-interested strategy of competition.[22]
Strategists should not be tempted to merely replace the old slogan with a new one. Strategic counterinsurgency also has its limitations when used alone. Most notably, the term suggests an antagonistic posture that is not necessary in all cases. The CCP’s political efforts span a spectrum, ranging from clearly illicit activity, such as its South China Sea actions, to entirely legitimate activity, such as pursuing overseas infrastructure projects to reduce unemployment.[23] Strategic counterinsurgency will work best against China’s asymmetric, coercive threats to other states, but it is not an appropriate response to the balance of China’s activities.
The CCP’s less dangerous efforts within the global community, which are nonetheless contrary to U.S. or coalition interests, require a fifth mode of U.S. strategy: canvassing. Like contestation in the dyadic model, canvassing offers a method for pursuing U.S. interests within the international community without unnecessarily contributing to a sense of antagonism toward China. In addition, whereas strategic counterinsurgency implies a reactive posture, canvassing allows for retaking the initiative in strengthening the U.S.-supported global order, and for pursuing goals which are self-justifying, freeing the U.S. from defining its policies merely in relation to its perceived adversaries.
The military can help to win strategic counterinsurgency by crafting operations that nest within the political goals of the whole-of-government mission, but it risks catastrophe if deterrence fails.
More importantly, despite addressing the risk of alienating partners, strategic counterinsurgency does not eliminate the risk of high-end conflict. Thus it would be inappropriate to swear off competition altogether, especially within the military instrument of power. The military can help to win strategic counterinsurgency by crafting operations that nest within the political goals of the whole-of-government mission, but it risks catastrophe if deterrence fails. However, even deterrence should be valued not only for its effect on preventing interstate violence, but also for the bond of solidarity it forms with cooperating nations.
The foregoing discussion merely sets a foundation for U.S. strategy. As others have written, competition is not truly a strategy but a frame of mind from which to begin crafting strategy.[24] The same could be said of the other four Cs. However, since frames of mind can color one’s decision-making processes, it is important not to entirely ignore them. U.S. strategists must employ a balanced mixture of, at least, five different frames of mind when crafting foreign policy: competition, contestation, cooperation, counterinsurgency, and canvassing. Because the U.S.’s competitive activities have been and will continue to be enabled by its alliances and partnerships, its strategists should give at least as much attention to the final two as they have to the first.
Andrew Mueller is an officer in the United States Navy. He recently earned a Master of Military Studies from United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, where he was a Lt Gen Victor H. Krulak Scholar in the Krulak Center for Innovation and Creativity. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect those of the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
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Header Image: Low Angle Photo, 2019 (David Watkins).
Notes:
[1] Elbridge A. Colby and A. Wess Mitchell, “The Age of Great-Power Competition,” Foreign Affairs 99, no. 1 (January/February 2020), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-12-10/age-great-power-competition.
[2] Michael J. Mazarr, “This Is Not a Great-Power Competition,” Foreign Affairs, May 29, 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-05-29/not-great-power-competition.
[3] For example, Strategic Competition Act of 2021, S.1169, 117th Congress (2021), https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/1169/text.
[4] Reuters, “France sees "crisis" over submarine cancellation - Le Drian,” Reuters, September 18, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/france-sees-crisis-over-submarine-cancellation-le-drian-2021-09-18/.
[5] Other criticisms are found in Daniel H. Nexon, “Against Great Power Competition,” Foreign Affairs, February 15, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-02-15/against-great-power-competition.
[6] Matej Kandrík, “The Case Against the Concept of Great Power Competition,” The Strategy Bridge, June 30, 2021, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2021/6/30/the-case-against-the-concept-of-great-power-competition.
[7] Michael J. Mazarr, et al., Understanding the Emerging Era of International Competition: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2019), 36. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2700/RR2726/RAND_RR2726.pdf.
[8] Ibid., 4.
[9] Ibid., 17.
[10] Inspired by Dan Straub, “Littoral Combat Ships for Maritime COIN,” Proceedings, January 2021, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/january/littoral-combat-ships-maritime-coin; and Max Boot, “America Still Needs Counterinsurgency,” Foreign Affairs, June 2, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2021-06-02/america-still-needs-counterinsurgency.
[11] Mazarr, “This Is Not a Great-Power Competition.”; Mazarr, et al., Understanding the Emerging Era, 27.
[12] Headquarters, Department of the Army, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies. FM 3-24/ MCWP 3-33.5 (Washington, DC: June 2, 2014), 1-2. https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/fm3_24.pdf.
[13] The White House, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (Washington, DC, 2021), 9. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.
[14] In a limited fashion. Some writers have argued that China supports many aspects of the current world order. Alastair Iaian Johnston, “China in a World of Orders: Rethinking Compliance and Challenge in Beijing,” International Security 44, no. 2 (October 2019): 57.
[15] Ian Frederick William Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-insurgencies:
Guerrillas and Their Opponents Since 1750 (New York: Routledge, 2001), 74.
[16] Mao Tse-Tung, Mind the Living Conditions of the Masses and Attend to the Methods of Work (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1953), 1. http://lib-lespaul.library.mun.ca/PDFs/radical/MaoTseTung.pdf.
[17]Referring to China’s apparent bid for a regional “sphere of influence,” Andrew Scobell, Something Old, Something New: Continuity and Change in China’s Foreign Policy (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2020), https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-09/Scobell_Testimony.pdf; and Mackinder’s inclusion of North America in the “insular crescent.” Halford J. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” Reprinted in The Geographical Journal 170, no. 4 (December 2004): 312.
[18] United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-24: Counterinsurgency. April 25, 2018. II-5. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_24pa.pdf.
[19] Ibid., I-2.
[20] Mazarr, “This Is Not a Great-Power Competition.”
[21] The White House, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, 20.
[22] See Daniel Nexon’s comment in Council on Foreign Relations, “Should U.S. Foreign Policy Focus on Great-Power Competition?,” Foreign Affairs, October 13, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ask-the-experts/2020-10-13/should-us-foreign-policy-focus-great-power-competition.
[23] For U.S. and Chinese perspectives on these subjects, Andrew Scobell, “Perception and Misperception in US-China Relations” Political Science Quarterly 135, no. 4 (Winter 2020), 651; Ibid., 655.
[24] Daniel H. Nexon, “Against Great Power Competition.”