Great power competition in the Indo-Pacific has been an evolving determinant in Australian foreign policy over the past decade and many have argued that a choice needed to be made between the U.S. and China. To date, Australia has enjoyed the benefit of a hedging strategy that embraces the economic prosperity of a close trading relationship with China while maintaining a close security alliance with the U.S. This strategy has been tested recently and the tension between values and interests requires focused attention. If there was previously any doubt on where that pendulum would swing, it is now firmly answered in the announcement of AUKUS, an Australian, U.K. and U.S. security partnership. Initially the status of the commitment was ambiguous, was it another treaty, pact or renewed alliance? Terminology aside, what is resoundingly clear is that this trilateral security partnership is the most significant capability announcement in Australian defence policy history. A primary commitment under the AUKUS agreement is to deliver nuclear-powered submarines to Australia through the shared technology of the U.S. and U.K.
While the capabilities that AUKUS will provide represent a fundamental paradigm shift, the true meaning in this announcement is the long-term strategic commitment and pragmatic approach to offshore balancing in the Indo-Pacific.
This essay asserts that the real significance and true value of AUKUS is in the message its signatories send rather than the capability it will deliver. While the capabilities that AUKUS will provide represent a fundamental paradigm shift, the true meaning in this announcement is the long-term strategic commitment and pragmatic approach to offshore balancing in the Indo-Pacific. The rise of China and inevitable conflict stemming from an emerging power is commonly compared to Thucydides’ account of the rivalry between Athens and Sparta.[1] The principles and motives on which this is founded—fear, honour and interest—provide the framework to unpack the significance of AUKUS.
Fear: Strategic Competition and Great Power Rivalry
The AUKUS partnership directly addresses the growing fear of unchecked Chinese ambition and belligerence in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, the significance of the U.S. and U.K. sponsoring a like-minded middle power with nuclear and other emerging technologies achieves a new threshold of offshore balancing not seen since the Cold War. In fact, one can draw similarities between the emergence of NATO, to the AUKUS announcement and the first in-person Quad Summit occurring in the same week. Certainly, the perception from Beijing is that the Cold War zero-sum mentality of creating specific alliances to isolate China from Asia is comparable to the containment strategies of Russia in Europe.[2] In this sense, the Western powers’ use of coalitions and defence arrangements to provide offshore balancing against a regional hegemon is a classical move in great power rivalry.[3] These events signal a shift in geostrategic priorities from the West, further amplified by the withdrawal from Afghanistan and the release of the European Union’s Indo-Pacific Strategy.
Although there are no absolutes in international relations and nothing is forever, AUKUS provides a defining moment in Australia’s commitment to great power competition in the region.
The significance of AUKUS has no immediate benefit to capability, but the underlying message and how the three nations delivered it provide meaningful insight into the purpose of the partnership and future implications. The capability that nuclear propulsion provides Australia will not be realised for almost two decades, and while the collaboration of emerging technologies such as AI, cyber security and quantum communications are significant, it is the strategic commitment that the partnership symbolises that provides the real insight. In fact, AUKUS offers a reduced capability in that Australia is now without a formal contract for submarines in the immediate future. The nature of sharing such technologies and commitment required by all parties is touted as a perpetually binding contract described by the Australian Prime Minister as a “forever partnership.”[4] The significance is heightened by the rarity of such privileged arrangements, with the last one occurring between the U.S. and U.K. in 1958.[5] Although there are no absolutes in international relations and nothing is forever, AUKUS provides a defining moment in Australia’s commitment to great power competition in the region.
The pragmatism and diplomacy shown by all three leaders of AUKUS demonstrates a marked turning point in contemporary international relations and highlights the level of strategic risk willing to be accepted to restore balance to the region.
Just as defining is the context and circumstances of the AUKUS announcement. AUKUS was a surprise both domestically and amongst other close allies, not to mention Australia reneging on a $90 billion contract with France for diesel-electric submarines.[6] The impact of the announcement and delivery of the underlying message was so important that France was not privy to the decision until the night before. This seemingly deliberate diplomatic calculation resulted in the recall of the French Ambassadors from America and Australia, illustrating just how much value France placed on the impact of the announcement by the AUKUS members. The diplomatic fallout of the cancelled French contract only serves to reinforce the importance of the message and emphasis on strategic realism, with the Australian Prime Minister responding that, although a difficult decision, he would not apologise for making decisions in the national security interest.[7] The pragmatism and diplomacy shown by all three leaders of AUKUS demonstrates a marked turning point in contemporary international relations and highlights the level of strategic risk willing to be accepted to restore balance to the region.
U.S. President Joe Biden unveils the AUKUS security initiative in the East Room of the White House in Washington, D.C., on September 15 2021, with Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson. (EPA)
Honour: The Clash of Cultures and National Pride
The management of alliances, diplomacy and statecraft is crucial to bridging the differences in cultures and ideologies, as well as aligning common interests and values. Although the current international system provides more opportunities to save face and resolve differences than in the Peloponnesian War, the concept of honour as a human condition is inextricably linked to the nature of war.[8] The Indo-Pacific provides an arena in which the contest of cultures is being played out and the Anglosphere sponsorship of nuclear technology in the region has raised the stakes. In contrast, the more immediate and tangible outcome of Australia’s privileged access to future technologies is less controversial. Instead, it is the nature of the nuclear agreement and strategic commitment that has hurt the national pride, agency and prestige of other cultures.
…the inherent and latent power of an AUKUS partnership is more valuable than the capability it may provide.
Even with seemingly close allies with shared values, the nature of AUKUS is conflicted. The “stab in the back” and emotive language from France highlights the fallout from the trilateral partnership.[9] France has considerable history, territory and maritime claims in the region. Australia recognises this influence and considers France a close partner with shared interests and defence agreements. France’s umbrage is less about a lost defence contract and more to do with the indignation of being treated as an outsider to a privileged partnership. The exclusivity of this partnership and the perceived insult to national pride are the causes of France’s emotive response, which is in stark contrast to the pragmatic approach of the members of AUKUS. It should also be noted that France has nuclear submarines that Australia could have considered, but the inherent and latent power of an AUKUS partnership is more valuable than the capability it may provide.
…the honour and agency at stake is not just a bipolar contest between China and the U.S., but a nonlinear system where real or perceived injustices may have a disproportionate effect across the region and the world.
There has also been a cautious response from countries within the Indo-Pacific who are understandably surprised by recent developments. Some nations that share the view that China’s rise and assertiveness is contrary to regional interests have expressed concerns about AUKUS, including Indonesia, whose Foreign Minister warns against “a continuing arms race and power projection in the region.”[10] In part, this is because of the lack of consultation and sense of exclusion. Even amongst the revered ANZUS alliance, New Zealand has made its views on nuclear power very clear and will not permit such Australian submarines in its territorial waters. Therefore, the honour and agency at stake is not just a bipolar contest between China and the U.S., but a nonlinear system where real or perceived injustices may have a disproportionate effect across the region and the world.
Interests: Free and Open Indo-Pacific
The key insight that AUKUS provides is the level of strategic commitment and risk that like-minded partners are willing to accept for a free and open Indo-Pacific. These interests form the basis of many historical forums and multilateral agreements, but have now manifested to a statement of intent that signals significant potential. The combination of AUKUS and the Quad Summit signify a new threshold of strategic commitment that aligns interests and values with a shared sense of purpose towards an emerging threat. These partnerships stand out from previous pivots to the Pacific and offset strategies by the manner and timing in which they have been announced. The escalation of China’s wolf warrior diplomacy and economic coercion has precipitated a multilateral response that signals the resolve of traditional allies to accept strategic risk to achieve a free and open Indo-Pacific.
The message of this strategic commitment of like-minded nations and their resolve is the true value of the partnership.
The nexus between these economic and security interests have always been a source of tension in the Indo-Pacific, with Australia historically able to hedge prosperity with the East and security with the West. However, the impact of a global pandemic on most nations’ domestic priorities, the implications of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and perceptions of an America First strategy have necessitated the containment of China’s offensive realism and ambitions in the Indo-Pacific.[11] In terms of capability, AUKUS provides some immediate effect to achieve this by sharing innovative technologies focused on countering anti-access/area-denial threats, regional deterrence, and maintaining freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. Furthermore, in the same week as the Quad Summit and AUKUS announcement the Australia-U.S. Ministerial Consultations released a joint statement confirming more U.S. presence and cooperation in Australia. In particular, enhancing U.S. Force Posture Initiatives that will see a “combined logistics, sustainment, and maintenance enterprise to support high-end warfighting and combined military operations in the region.”[12] The sequencing and stage management of all these events, not to mention the presence of a U.K. Carrier Group in the South China Sea, supports a clear assertion of a more pragmatic approach to Western interests in the Indo-Pacific.
Conclusion
In the same way that the mere presence of a submarine creates a profound effect on its operating environment, AUKUS achieves its most meaningful contribution to the Indo-Pacific without needing to deliver a single capability. The message of this strategic commitment of like-minded nations and their resolve is the true value of the partnership. Thucydides’ tryptic of fear, honour and interest provides thoughtful reflection into the motives of great powers and how the underlying themes of AUKUS generate a useful lens in which to view this behaviour. The fear of great power competition is contextualised in the strategic risk, latent power and resolve that AUKUS signifies. Pragmatic international relations and realism are now in favour over risk to reputation, honour and agency. Furthermore, the conflation of interests and values can no longer be conveniently viewed in isolation and the interdependence of nations, and the international system is now more transparent. The final insight into the shifting sands of great power competition in the Indo-Pacific is that Australia’s ambition for middle-power diplomacy has evolved to becoming a regional power with real agency.
Joe Wheatley is an Officer in the Australian Army. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect those of the Australian Government or the Defence Force.
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Header Image: PCU Virginia (SSN 774), Norfolk, Virginia, 2004. (US Navy).
[1] Richard Strassler, The Landmark Thucydides: Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War (New York: Touchstone Books, 1998), 16.
[2] Zhao Lijian, “Foreign Ministry Regular Press Conference,” accessed September 22, 2021, http://au.china-embassy.org/eng/fyrth/t1908814.htm.
[3] John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: WW Norton & Company, 2001, 141.
[4] Scott Morrison, “AUKUS Press Conference,” filmed September 16, 2021 in Canberra ACT, https://www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-canberra-act-24.
[5] Greg Sheridan, “Xi Jinping is the Real Creator of AUKUS and the Quad Unity,” The Australian Newspaper, 25 September, 2021, 16.
[6] Eglantine Staunton, “AUKUS: France’s strategic outcry,” The Lowy Institute, accessed September 25, 2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/aukus-france-s-strategic-outcry.
[7] Scott Morrison, “AUKUS Press Conference.”
[8] Colin Gray, The Future of Strategy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015), 100.
[9] Staunton, “AUKUS: France’s strategic outcry.”
[10] Natalie Sambhi, “Australia’s nuclear submarines and AUKUS: the view from Jakarta,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, September 20, 2021, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australias-nuclear-submarines-and-aukus-the-view-from-jakarta/.
[11] Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 4.
[12] Australian Foreign Minister, “Australia-U.S. Ministerial Consultations Joint Statement”, accessed September 25, 2021, https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-release/australia-us-ministerial-consultations-joint-statement-unbreakable-alliance-peace-and-prosperity.