Australia

Three Critical Defense Reallocations for U.S. Strategic Competition with China

Three Critical Defense Reallocations for U.S. Strategic Competition with China

To meet the challenge of rising Chinese power, the Department of Defense should implement three central allocations. The first is a service reallocation. The Department of Defense must reduce the size of the active-duty Army to fund the Navy’s shipbuilding program, which is critical to meeting the challenge of the growing People’s Liberation Army Navy. The second is a regional reallocation, the Department of Defense must shift military and naval resources from the Middle East to the Indopacific. The third reallocation is from the technical to the cognitive.

Fear, Honour, and AUKUS in the Indo-Pacific

Fear, Honour, and AUKUS in the Indo-Pacific

To date, Australia has enjoyed the benefit of a hedging strategy that embraces the economic prosperity of a close trading relationship with China while maintaining a close security alliance with the U.S. This strategy has been tested recently and the tension between values and interests requires focused attention. If there was previously any doubt on where that pendulum would swing, it is now firmly answered in the announcement of AUKUS, an Australian, U.K. and U.S. security partnership.

What Comes After COVID-19? Political Psychology, Strategic Outcomes, and Options for the Asia-Pacific “Quad-Plus"

What Comes After COVID-19? Political Psychology, Strategic Outcomes, and Options for the Asia-Pacific “Quad-Plus"

The novel coronavirus pandemic has built the foundation for an unexpected pax epidemica between the U.S. and China. The pandemic has inflicted significant damages on all the great and middle powers to the extent that none would be in a position to win a war anytime in the near future. Most importantly, policymakers’ pessimistic considerations about their own country’s military capabilities and readiness for war would make them risk-averse and unwilling to undertake any major military campaign, therefore calling off the risk of interstate war altogether.

#Reviewing Rebalancing U.S. Forces: Basing and Forward Presence in the Asia-Pacific

#Reviewing Rebalancing U.S. Forces: Basing and Forward Presence in the Asia-Pacific

Rebalancing U.S. Forces: Basing and Forward Presence in the Asia-Pacific is an essential introduction to U.S. basing in the Pacific for defense and intelligence analysts, military planners, and strategists, and is recommended reading for students of security studies.

The Delineation of Militarisation in Antarctica

The Delineation of Militarisation in Antarctica

Antarctica currently remains demilitarised. Should a nation with a satellite capability in Antarctica use their system for weapon guidance, counter space or signal intelligence resulting in a direct military effect, the region would subsequently become militarised. Despite the best intentions, the current status quo within Antarctica does not necessarily translate to continued demilitarisation in the region.

What Arms Trade Data Say About Where the “Quad” Stands

What Arms Trade Data Say About Where the “Quad” Stands

The rise of China and the challenge that China poses to the United States is the defining trend around which American strategists orient their thinking about Asia. In Canberra, Delhi, and Tokyo, national security policymakers view China as the foremost national security threat facing their nation. This shared focus on China underpins the idea of the “quad,” a proposed security partnership between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, which would represent a democratic bloc against Chinese hegemony in Asia.

Political Warfare as Grand Strategy

Political Warfare as Grand Strategy

Australia is faced with many strategic challenges. On one hand there is the rise of non-state actors, such as Islamist extremists, who aim to overhaul the Westphalian international system. Without the rule book of western nations, they combine conventional and unconventional military tactics ignoring the distinction of soldier and civilian. These non-state actors, enabled by the networked age, combine propaganda, conventional military tactics and guerrilla asymmetry, along with financial and governance structures. Whether it is Hezbollah, the Taleban, or Daesh, they utilise the entire spectrum of warfare and multiple methods to achieve their desired political ends.