Policy

Beyond the Neutral Card: From Civil-Military Relations to Military Politics

Beyond the Neutral Card: From Civil-Military Relations to Military Politics

How should senior military officers in democratic states influence their domestic political environments? The flippant answer is that they should not: they should do as they’re told. The American civil-military relations literature, written largely in the shadow of Samuel P. Huntington’s myth of an apolitical military, has consistently downplayed the positive role officers play in politics, to such a degree that we have only a dim outline of what constitutes appropriate and effective political influence by officers Thus, in practice, we fear that too many officers find that their professional military education fails to prepare them for the realities of being a commander.

¿Dónde estamos? The United States Ignores the Global South at Its Own Risk

¿Dónde estamos? The United States Ignores the Global South at Its Own Risk

All too often countries outside of Europe, or wherever the military fight is currently happening, are absent from discussions of policy in Washington. The Global South especially is too rarely part of the national security conversation. Even among the major emerging economies, colloquially known as the BRICS, Brazil and South Africa often get left out of the discussion compared to their larger and/or more threatening counterparts in Russia, China and India.”

David or Goliath? How Thinking Like a Small Nation Can Help Counter China

David or Goliath? How Thinking Like a Small Nation Can Help Counter China

The continued posturing of the United States as the main geopolitical power represents a grave strategic misstep against the rising power of China. This posture overcommits resources to a narrow conception of warfare that then limits the availability of options. If, however, the U.S. were to strategize as a smaller, less wealthy nation, it may develop the strategic flexibility required to counter China.

Improving Foreign Policy Outcomes Requires Investment in Alternative Perspectives

Improving Foreign Policy Outcomes Requires Investment in Alternative Perspectives

Washington cannot afford a focus on unilateral U.S. perspectives, whether to prevent alienating potential partners or to forestall potential adversarial relations. When strategists center policy from a U.S. perspective, they ignore the real cultural risks that accompany those narrative frames. China is just as centered on their own conventional framing, with equally problematic results. Washington must counter Beijing’s growing influence across the instruments of national power without alienating potential allies and partners.

Unwelcome Surprises: How the Department of Defense Fails to Adequately Prepare for Climate Shocks

Unwelcome Surprises: How the Department of Defense Fails to Adequately Prepare for Climate Shocks

The U.S. risks being blindsided if the actual effects of climate change exceed projections and outpace its efforts to adapt, impacting readiness by degrading facilities and infrastructure while raising costs by forcing adaptation measures to be extended or re-constructed to a higher standard.

#Reviewing: Africa and Global Society: Marginality, Conditionality and Conjecture

#Reviewing: Africa and Global Society: Marginality, Conditionality and Conjecture

Wright’s “Africa in Global Society,” despite being twenty years old, contains a set of timeless lenses for viewing Africa in the contemporary era: Regionality, Continentality, New Issue solutions, and Democracy. When analyzed through this four-pillared framework, strategic and political engagement strategies may be more coherently framed and contextualized to facilitate the elusive whole-of-government approach.

It Was Grand, But Was it Strategy? Revisiting the Origins Story of Grand Strategy

It Was Grand, But Was it Strategy? Revisiting the Origins Story of Grand Strategy

We do need to accept that grand strategy has no definitive or stable meaning, and that the term does not describe activities which are defined by similarity of equivalence. Understandings of strategy were given coherence through their connection to the enduring nature of war. Grand strategy has no such anchor. Thus, the terminology of grand strategy is a relatively recent, Anglophone attempt to describe and explain the evolution of a much more long-term and varied set of activities, traditionally located in the realm of policy or statecraft. As such, to account for the myriad differences and changes that have characterised how polities have pursued security across time, we must move towards a more flexible approach.

#Reviewing Cult of the Irrelevant

#Reviewing Cult of the Irrelevant

Overall, Cult of the Irrelevant is a timely, well-researched, and thought-provoking book that is a worthy read for anyone interested in how to reform academia, improve policymaking, or both. Readers may not agree with all of Desch’s arguments, but they will be inspired to think more deeply about these issues.

War Isn't Precise or Predictable — It's Barbaric, Chaotic, and Ugly

War Isn't Precise or Predictable — It's Barbaric, Chaotic, and Ugly

Democracy will always benefit from the requirement to persuade the public––to gain consensus on, and legitimacy for, the use of force in order to defend or pursue national interests. If this opportunity is ceded for fear of being unconvincing, or in fear of explaining the ugliness it will entail, then a society will find itself bereft of clarity in the political objective and therefore unable to craft strategy appropriate to the task at hand. Furthermore, the failure to have these discussions leaves the populace underprepared for the brutality and sacrifice that war may require.

American Discontent: Unhappy Military Outcomes of the Post-Second World War Era

American Discontent: Unhappy Military Outcomes of the Post-Second World War Era

The dramatic title of a 2015 magazine article in The Atlantic by Dominic Tierney, “Why has America Stopped Winning Wars?,” underscored a portrayal of the final military deaths in Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq as both remarkable and poignant. A better question and the focus here is: Why do U.S. military outcomes after 1945 so often fail to achieve the policy objectives for which they are begun?

Studying, Thinking, and Practicing National Security

Studying, Thinking, and Practicing National Security

Word of mouth - which is essentially reputation infused with action – is a key component to success, or at least influence, in the policy world. Personal reputation creates job opportunities; organizational reputation prompts demand for services and insight. The latter aspect comes into play for the Clements Center for National Security at the University of Texas at Austin, which runs a week-long Summer Seminar in History and Statecraft at an offsite location in the mountains of Colorado. The renown of the seminar is broadly noted by numerous experts across several disciplines that relate to national security policy - and came to me via the recommendations of some very accomplished friends.

Micromanaging the Micromanagers? Congressionally-driven National Security Council Reform

Micromanaging the Micromanagers? Congressionally-driven National Security Council Reform

As Congress marches toward major defense reforms in the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, one area receiving increasing attention is the National Security Council (NSC). The narrative surrounding President Obama’s NSC has been shaped by biting criticisms of micromanagement in the operations of the Departments of Defense and State and indecision on major national security issues. As some have noted, the NSC has long been the preferred punching bag for foreign policy spectators over the last half century. However, the chorus of criticism has seemed to peak more recently, manifesting in proposed legislation.

Keen for a Strategy? George Kennan's Realism Is Alive and Well

Keen for a Strategy? George Kennan's Realism Is Alive and Well

...the contemporary strategic environment is undergoing a profound transition in its polarity. Obama has been placed under serious pressure to form a grand strategy that allows the U.S. to manipulate events with at will. However, a look to Kennan’s writings reveals a sense of déjà vu when reflecting on Obama’s policies.

Blood or Treasure

Europe will pay the cost for hosting refugees — but what currency will they pay it in?

The official total for Middle Eastern and African migrants to Europe so far this year is over 227,000 and the actual number is likely higher. Whether European governments count them as migrants or refugees is irrelevant — they are people, they have fled their homes, and they are seeking a better life in Europe. Given the state of their native countries, it is likely they will stay in Europe — and others will continue to follow — for the foreseeable future.

Europe has at best a mixed track record when it comes to welcoming and integrating Islamic immigrants into their societies.

Some European countries have come to that pragmatic realization — Germany comes to mind — while others like Hungary and Denmark have taken the opposite tack and paid for anti-immigration billboards in Syria and Lebanon aimed at the native population. Setting aside the ludicrous idea that people fleeing their homes ahead of ISIS’ bloodthirsty shock-troops or Assad’s barrel-bomb-dropping helicopters would be deterred by a billboard warning them to stay in place, Denmark and Hungary’s approach to primarily Islamic migrants is not just morally dubious — it is also dangerous.

To understand why, it is necessary to understand two things: first, the historical problems European countries have had integrating Muslim immigrants and secondly, the roots of contemporary Islamic extremism.

Europe has at best a mixed track record when it comes to welcoming and integrating Islamic immigrants into their societies. Even when generally progressive Western European states like France and the United Kingdom allow displaced people to stay, a lack of economic opportunity, pronounced cultural differences, a lack of birthright citizenship, and a time lag between arrival and granting of “indefinite leave to remain” status often combine to make immigrants feel less like welcomed refugees and more like trespassers. The rise of nativist parties on the right ranging from France’s National Front to the United Kingdom’s UKIP does not help. The European right — much like its American counterpart — misses no opportunity to tell migrants they are neither welcomed nor wanted. Is it any wonder that many migrants to the West ultimately end up in enclaves rife with unemployment, crime, and violence?

This situation would be bad enough, but it is made far worse by growing radicalism in the Muslim world.

This cultural isolation, real or perceived, leads to self segregation on the part of migrants and their families and a population of disaffected, disenfranchised, and often unemployed youth. Many in this younger population can only barely remember — if at all — their native countries, and still others may have actually been born in Europe. Still, though, they are strangers where they live.

This situation would be bad enough, but it is made far worse by growing radicalism in the Muslim world.

There are a variety of causes put forward to explain the meteoric rise — over the course of a single generation — of radical interpretations of Islamic law and history. Bernard Lewis in What Went Wrong? sees it as another in a string of Muslim responses to Western military and economic hegemony. Ali Allawi in The Crisis of Islamic Civilization sees the Wahabi Salfism of Al Qaeda as the unfortunate response to capitalism and secularism and calls for a more esoteric Sufi response instead. Still others in both the Middle East and West see the popularity of groups like ISIS in Syria, Libya, Egypt and Iraq as a response to corrupt, inefficient governments that marginalize large swaths of the population.

Whatever the reason, the fact is, Muslim youth today are more vulnerable to the lure of jihadi extremists than they have in the past. This is particularly true for Sunnis, who have ISIS and Al Qaeda to look to, but the Shia Hezbollah has an international following as well.

So what is Europe to do with the the fact that Muslim youth often feel adrift and unwelcome in their adoptive European homes and the unfortunate trend of rising radicalism?

This is where Europe must decide how it will pay the bill for the refugees — in treasure or blood.

This will not be cheap nor easy given the state of budget and unemployment across the continent.

Europe can make the expensive decision now to welcome migrants with open arms and open checkbooks by upgrading their refugee centers, increasing school programs aimed at migrant children, creating or improving social programs with an eye towards cultural integration, and providing job training to their newest source of labor. This will not be cheap nor easy given the state of budget and unemployment across the continent. National and party leaderswill have to lead their constituencies to the idea that, while fiscally difficult, spending money to welcome the migrants with the idea of integration and permanent settlement is better than the alternative.

And that alternative is to continue down the current path — the path that tries to discourage immigration, that paints people fleeing violence and famine as “economic migrants” rather than refugees, and that only reluctantly integrates — if at all — those that do manage to gain permanent or semi-permanent residence. This approach may be cheaper in the short term, but saving treasure now will result in a blood payment later. Failure to successfully integrate this current wave of migration will result in a group of youth in Europe singularly susceptible to jihadi charms — culturally isolated in an alien land, with little opportunity, and nursing resentment for the very land they live in.

Spending money now will save Europe the pain and expense of another Charlie Hebdo attack, more TGV gunmen, and 7/7 bombings.

Pay now, or pay later.


Header photo: Syrian refugees strike in front of Budapest Keleti railway station. Refugee crisis. Budapest, Hungary, Central Europe, 3 September 2015. Photo Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.


David Dixon is a former active duty Armor officer who now serves in the South Carolina Army National Guard. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US Army, The South Carolina National Guard, the DoD, or the U.S. Government.


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To Escalate or Not to Escalate?

To Escalate or Not to Escalate?

Understanding presidential decisions for and against increased force in ongoing conflicts is a significant and important endeavor. The implications include the impact on future decisions to commit troops in the first place—such as in Syria. National security decision making also affects civil-military relations, as well as the balance between executive and congressional powers. Finally, as escalation and de-escalation involves either mission creep or the need to adjust policy aims by taking an appetite suppressant, understanding its dynamics will illuminate leader perceptions, the difference between wartime realities and prewar expectations, and the impact on the U.S. debt and the American public.