“Africa and Global Society: Marginality, Conditionality and Conjecture.” Stephen Wright. In Africa in the Post-Cold War International System. Edited by Sola Akinrinade and Amadu Sesay. London; Washington: Pinter, 1998.
Political and strategic approaches to Africa have recently been parceled into bins based on interests: Great Power Competition, China and the Belt and Road Initiative, Russia and Wagner, and Violent Extremist Organizations, to name a few. But what is new is also old. As Stephen Wright pointed out in “Africa and Global Society: Marginality, Conditionality and Conjecture,” the characteristics of this pattern are connected, and manifest today as a symptom of Africa’s economic and political marginalization in the post-Cold War era.[1] In brief, the consequences of colonial extraction and then Cold War stratification were a result of short-term thinking—they must not be repeated. Great powers in particular must realize that to proceed with a second “Great Scramble—fueled in part by a delayed U.S. realization of the scope of Chinese entrenchment on the continent—is a myopic perspective.
Wright’s “Africa in Global Society,” despite being twenty years old, contains a set of timeless lenses for viewing Africa in the contemporary era: Regionality, Continentality, New Issue solutions, and Democracy. When analyzed through this four-pillared framework, strategic and political engagement strategies may be more coherently framed and contextualized to facilitate the elusive whole-of-government approach.
The Four Lenses: Regionality
According to Wright, regionality is both a lens for viewing African problems and a method of application. It encompasses a variety of techniques that include indigenous peacekeeping arrangements, non-aggression pacts, and a greater role for African regional organizations in providing political, developmental, and security cooperation within the continent.[2]
Regionality is best conceptualized through economics. Wright notes that African economics performed well in the 1960s and 1970s before Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) were introduced, and that it was really the second oil crisis in 1979 that undermined terms of trade and prevented economic recovery.[3] SAPs were looked to as a continental solution, but their conditionality only further weakened African economies, enhanced the power of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) like the World Bank and IMF, and weakened African state sovereignty.[4] Economists today have likewise noted that Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) have had a similar effect in the modern era, despite their attempts to expand intraregional trade. EPAs attempt to rationalize the overlapping memberships and unwieldy mandates of African regional economic organizations instead of allowing African states to develop them on their own.[5] These efforts are undermined by European fears of migration, which drive impatience and micromanagement.
Solutions for migration have likewise failed to allow for African resolutions.
It is against this EU approach that Regionality has been galvanized. As an example, civil society organizations associated with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) forced the EU to make concessions, eliminating quotas and tariffs for access to markets for various products such as beef, dairy, cereals, fruits, and vegetables.[6] In this case, this solution was not entirely successful, but it did provide a framework: regional solidarity provides a balance against overreach.[7]
Solutions for migration have likewise failed to allow for African resolutions. Spain’s bilateral agreements with West African countries and the EU’s creation of the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG), or FRONTEX, have not succeeded, and are reactive in nature.[8] The EU should instead incentivize and partner with ECOWAS in a manner that facilitates African solutions, because Spain’s problems will soon be the EU’s. The EU must realize that for the long term, African states must develop their own regional fixes. Wright forewarned of such a short-sighted and ad hoc approach, observing a pattern of European disinterest in Africa rooted in intra-European and Asian trade expansion following the Cold War.[9] The collapse of the Apartheid regime in South Africa also decreased European policy interests on the continent. To dictate European terms then stems from a desire for an easy solution to a low priority region. It may appear to address short term issues, but it delays the effects of the long-term migration crisis, one that will only be worsened through economic dependency on foreign entities.
Continentality
Wright highlights continentality again through an economic framework, pointing to the need for—but unlikely success of—the African Economic Community (AEC) or a Federation of African States.[10] Continentality in its most simple form is a mindset. It may be achieved first through the strengthening of regionality from the African perspective, and then through outside methods of universal appeal like humanitarian aid from non-African states.
Rwandan soldiers in Mozambique (ISS Africa)
…the international community must orient its approach through African sovereignty to achieve mutual benefit–a necessity for African state development–that will contribute to better indigenous management of economies, migration, and conflict.
Mixed results for the continental approach can be found in the case of the African Union, which holds the institutional capacity to manage peace and security operations through its Peace and Security Council (PSC), but often only achieves partial successes, contingent on the unreliable financial goodwill of Western countries.[11] A good example can be found in the recent interventions in northern Mozambique. First, the Rwandan military, then affiliates of the South African Development Community’s (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) traveled to the country to aid the fight against violent extremists. But there was little coordination between the two groups, or with the PSC for that matter—which does not appear to have hampered the success of the regional intervention. Regardless, this situation has frequently led to significant logistical and political confusion for all parties involved.[12]
In a similar vein, the relationships between African states and IFIs have resulted in significant monetary investment at the expense of self-aggrandizing IMF and World bank interventions which have induced economic malaise.[13] Continentality is ultimately two-sided. According to Wright, the international community must orient its approach through African sovereignty to achieve mutual benefit–a necessity for African state development–that will contribute to better indigenous management of economies, migration, and conflict.
“New Issue” Solutions
New issue solutions, according to Wright, provide a venue for strengthening continentality because of their universal appeal. Though briefly discussed in his work, these new issues include, but are not limited to AIDS, gender equality, illegal drug trades, and environmental concerns. The success of the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for HIV/AIDS (PEPFAR) under both the Bush and Obama administrations, among other similar programs, also continues to provide opportunities to facilitate good governance, and even incentivize regionality on the continent.[14]
USAID efforts in Ethiopia's Tigray region (USAID)
Aid, however, also poses problems. It is often appropriated by single states or regimes and mishandled. Aligning aid through regional organizations can increase accountability while incentivizing and legitimizing African approaches. Pundits often highlight the bipartisan nature of humanitarian support by the U.S.—despite the ambiguity of overarching U.S. African policies—and note that it still provides quantifiable support towards improving long-term instability on the continent.[15]
Stronger regional organizations may be the answer to continentality, and both organizations like the SADC and AU may, at their respective levels, hold the keys both to economic success and security. Keeping selfish actors like Russia accountable, who through the likes of Wagner puppeteer host nation administrations to maximize opportunities and profits, is only feasible through mutual African accountability and collaborative negotiations that strengthen African agency.[16]
Democracy and Security
Wright’s final area of focus is democracy, saying that “without democracy, African states cannot expect to fare much better in the new millennium than in the last decade of the current one.”[17] It is often noted that the game of democracy is taking place against the backdrop of security on the continent, namely the competing security interests of the U.S. and China.[18]
Wright notes that historic U.S. engagement in Africa earned a “dismal balance sheet,” and observes the political tendency of “cynical disengagement” that arguably exists today. He incorrectly assumed, however, that U.S. disinterest would increase indigenous solutions in the post-Cold War era.[19] Instead, China seized the opportunity. The Chinese march across Africa has been driven by its own domestic necessity: rapid economic growth and a growing middle class.[20] Its two-pronged approach in many cases has both endeared it to its hosts and generated considerable controversy. In Africa, China’s Belt and Road initiative comprises Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) and loans provided by Chinese banks, governments, and contractors (more than $86 billion between 2000-2014), but they carry shadows of exploited resources and unreasonable debt loads.[21]
AMISOM Ethiopian National Defense Forces Contingent Deploys in Kismayo (AMISOM)
U.S. equities appear to increasingly resemble mere responses to those of China, in the form of preventative security partnerships, largely focused on counter-terrorism.[22] In the age of Covid-19, Chinese overtures have increasingly been touted as health-focused. President Xi Jinping recently pledged 1 billion vaccines to Africa in November of 2021.[23] The pandemic seems to have provided a welcome relief in the public affairs front for China. Increased international attention on Chinese business dealings, exploitive negotiations, and lack of transparency have proved overwhelmingly negative during the age of Covid. The recent outcry over the imminent seizure of Uganda’s Entebbe airport over a defaulted loan has been derided by Chinese and Ugandan authorities alike as false, but details of the deal, and Uganda’s failed renegotiations, remain closed to the public.[24] In a similar vein, U.S. saber-rattling has begun in response to intelligence reports of Chinese negotiations over the construction of an Atlantic naval base in Equatorial Guinea, a country who joined the Belt and Road initiative at the height of the pandemic in April of 2019.[25] These positive Sino-African relations via the BRI have also raised the specter of pro-Chinese African votes in the UN, which have only further stressed American policy makers already obsessed with security since 9/11.[26] These relationships are not new by any means. Wright noted that the Chinese have been active on the continent since the 1950’s as an ideological competitor to the then U.S.S.R.[27] Then, and now, African states have been drawn into global superpower relationships, often closely aligning themselves with external powers in economic policy and military agreements to supplement their overall development, a slow and challenging process since independence.
Holding governments accountable to these tenets matches democratic initiatives sought by the U.S. and many African countries—though the pandemic has hampered these efforts.
Nevertheless, both China and the U.S. have shared security concerns: the Chinese to facilitate their economic interactions with African nations, and the U.S. to build capacity against Islamic terrorism across the continent, particularly as France continues to decrease its presence in West Africa.[28]. China appears to recognize this fact. Its growing security concerns might suggest a counter-U.S. strategy on the continent, but its contribution to six U.N. peacekeeping missions as of 2017 and counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden were arguably net positives.[29]
States hold varying degrees of democratic motivations both on and off the continent, but Wright is correct to point out that “it is difficult to see how the critical questions and challenges concerning Africa’s future can be tackled without the active participation of all its citizens.”[30] The major non-African states on the continent, the U.S. and China, must understand that African governments hold the ultimate key to security, and their stability comes from the rule of law, electorate participation, civil society, and regional accountability. According to a recent AfroBarometer Poll, 69 percent of Africans prefer democracy to any other kind of governance, but there is a significant “democratic disappointment gap.”[31]
The Democratic Disappointment Gap (Afrobarometer)
Holding governments accountable to these tenets matches democratic initiatives sought by the U.S. and many African countries—though the pandemic has hampered these efforts. Either way, good governance and the resulting stability ensures the viability of long-term investments for all parties, China included.
A Way Forward With the Framework
Instead of short-term, reactive approaches to Africa, the new pattern of relationships with Africa must be cooperative, and those relationships must be redirected toward long-term ends. Wright’s conclusions are just as applicable today as they were when written. Democracy, human rights, a free press, accountable government, trade union rights, and all of the new issues are best facilitated through a new cooperative continentalism, buttressed by regional solutions.[32] The challenge at hand is twofold. First, the U.S. must temper its mantra of Great Power Competition, in case this “slogan masquerading as a strategy” drags it and China—who also persistently threatens hostilities—into an avoidable conflict[33] This conflict would undoubtedly degrade the global economy and further entrench negative democratic trends and autocracy on the continent, which would only exacerbate migration pressures on NATO’s southern flank–a situation similar to U.S.-U.S.S.R. engagement in Africa during the Cold War.
The prospects for peace appear increasingly difficult amongst the trending patterns of relationships on the continent, but they are not yet insurmountable.
Second, and perhaps most importantly, African citizens and civil society organizations must rise to the occasion. There is much work ahead to reclaim gains lost to opportunistic leaders who have illicitly carved out political space during Covid-19. The prospects for peace appear increasingly difficult amongst the trending patterns of relationships on the continent, but they are not yet insurmountable. A unified continentality must be used and regionality must be incentivized, principally in the economic and security spheres.
Wright’s four-pronged focus offers a path forward for grasping the problems in context. If current patterns are allowed to resemble the past, history only stands to repeat itself.
Will Turner is an officer in the U.S. Army and a student at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect those of Johns Hopkins SAIS, the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
The Strategy Bridge is read, respected, and referenced across the worldwide national security community—in conversation, education, and professional and academic discourse.
Thank you for being a part of the The Strategy Bridge community. Together, we can #BuildTheBridge.
Header Image: Tsavo East National Park Kenya, Africa, Kenya, 2019 (Damian Patkowski)
Notes:
[1] Stephen Wright, “Africa and Global Society: Marginality, Conditionality and Conjecture,” in Sola Akinrinade and Amadu Sesay, eds., Africa in the Post-Cold War International System (London; Washington: Pinter, 1998), 133.
[2] Wright, 137.
[3] Wright, 140.
[4] Wright, 140-141. “The social costs of SAPs have been excessive. High unemployment, less social welfare in terms of education and health facilities, a shrinking middle class across the continent as devaluation has undermined buying power.”
[5] Gilbert M. Khadiagala. Euro-African Relations in the Age of Maturity. Africa in World Politics: Reforming Political Order (Westview Press, 2009), 307.
[6] Khadiagala, 308.
[7] Khadiagala, 309. “This is hardly a generous offer as the EU is offering to eliminate tariffs on the remaining 3 percent of ACP imports, and in return they demand that Africa eliminates 80 percent of its tariffs on EU imports. The risk and the negative impacts will be far greater for Africa. Increased competition from the EU's highly subsidized agricultural products such as maize, milk, tomatoes, and meat could mean the loss of domestic and regional markets for millions of African smallholder farmers. And the loss of markets means loss of livelihoods, which in Africa often leads to loss of life altogether.”
[8] Khadiagala, 317. “Bilateral agreements, particularly between Spain and West African nations, have failed to halt the flow of African migrants to Europe. Similarly, the EU hurriedly created FRONTEX, a border patrol force to operate in the Mediterranean, but patrols and helicopter surveillance units off the coasts of Senegal, Mauritania, Cape Verde, and the Gambia have been ineffective. The influx of illegal immigrants to Europe has also occasioned clashes among EU members, as illustrated in the EU summit on migration issues in Tampere, Finland, in September 2006. All these talks, Spain pleaded for help to deal with the surge of African migrants, repeatedly stating that it was unable to cope with the influx: “These people coming from the African continent are knocking on the door of the whole of the European Union-we just happen to be the closest border country towards the African continent." More poignantly, President Ricardo Melchior of the Canary Islands threatened to “send these people arriving in small ships to Madrid and Brussels so that they can understand how serious the situation is.”
[9]Wright, 139.
[10] Wright, 143.
[11] Eki Yemisi Omorogbe. “Can the African Union Deliver Peace and Security?” Journal of Conflict & Security Law (Oxford University Press, February 26, 2011), 62.
[12] PSC Report. “Rwanda and SADC Take the High Road but Should They Have Invited the African Union on the Journey?” 20AUG2021. https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/top-level-discussions-were-needed-before-troops-marched-into-mozambique.
[13] Wright, 142.
[14] Gorm Rye Olsen. The Ambiguity of US Foreign Policy towards Africa (Third World Quarterly, 31MAR2017), 2107. Other major initiatives include Feed the Future (FTF), the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI), The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), Power Africa, Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI), Prosper Africa, and the Women’s Global Development and Prosperity (W-GDP). See the following CRS report for more information: Congressional Research Service. “Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement,” February 17, 2021.
[15] Olsen. The Ambiguity of US Foreign Policy towards, 2098. With the case of Sudan, A.C. Budabin notes that “the combination of elite advocacy along with the mass mobilization earned the Save Darfur Coalition enviable access to Congress, The White House and the US Department of State.”
[16] Mathieu Olivier. “Russia/Africa: Wagner, an Investigation into Putin’s Mercenaries,” 28JULY2021. https://www.theafricareport.com/112649/russia-africa-wagner-an-investigation-into-putins-mercenaries/ The report points out that through Russia’s security relationship with the government of CAR—via Valery Zakharov—Wagner was in complete control of the government; Wagner is currently thought to operate in at least eight African countries in a similar manner.
[17] Wright, 144.
[18] Olsen, 2101.
[19] Wright, 137.
[20] Christopher Alessi and Beina Xu. “China in Africa,” 2. cfr.org/backgrounder/china-africa. “…an annual growth rate of 10 percent for three decades until 2010, requires substantial levels of energy to sustain its momentum. It has become the world’s largest energy consumer and producer in the world…China became a net importer in 1993 and has surpassed the US as the world’s largest importer of oil in recent years.”
[21] Alessi and Xu. “China in Africa,” 4.
[22] CSIS Briefs, “Personal Ties: Measuring Chinese and U.S. Engagement with African Security Chiefs,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, August 4, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/personal-ties-measuring-chinese-and-us-engagement-african-security-chiefs.
[23] Al Jazeera. “China’s Xi Promises 1bn COVID-19 Vaccine Doses to Africa,” November 29, 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/29/chinas-xi-promises-1-billion-covid-19-vaccine-doses-to-africa.
[24] Mohana Basu. “China to Seize Uganda’s Entebbe Airport after Loan Default? Viral Report Officially Denied.” The Print, November 28, 2021. https://theprint.in/world/china-to-seize-ugandas-entebbe-airport-after-loan-default-viral-report-officially-denied/773150/.
[25] Emily Crane and Samuel Chamberlain. “China May Be Eyeing Its First Military Base on the Atlantic Ocean: Report,” New York Post, https://nypost.com/2021/12/06/china-may-be-eyeing-its-first-military-base-on-the-atlantic-ocean-report/. Also: China-Lusophone Brief. “Equatorial Guinea into China’s ‘Arms,’” June 5, 2019. https://www.clbrief.com/equatorial-guinea-into-chinas-arms/.
[26] Olsen, 2101.
[27] Wright, 136.
[28] Michele Barbero. “France Bids Adieu to Its Military Mission in West Africa,” July 7, 2021. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/07/france-military-leaving-west-africa-colonialism-macron/.
[29] Alessi and Xu. “China in Africa,” 7.
[30] Wright, 144.
[31] Gyimah-Boadi and Joseph Asunka. “Do Africans want democracy — and do they think they’re getting it?” Afrobarometer, November 2, 2021.” https://afrobarometer.org/blogs/do-africans-want-democracy-and-do-they-think-theyre-getting-it.
[32] Wright, 142.
[33] Emma Ashford. “Great-Power Competition Is a Recipe for Disaster,” 01APR2021. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/01/china-usa-great-power-competition-recipe-for-disaster/.