President Putin made three foundational assumptions in launching his war against Ukraine that should have been correct but were not. First, Putin assumed the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and easy fight. Second, he assumed the world would denounce the invasion but tacitly allow it. Third, Putin assumed the war would deter NATO expansion.
The recent coups in sub-Saharan Africa have ushered in a new era in civil-military relations in the Francophone states of the continent. While military intervention and insurgency have long been a feature of politics in the region since decolonization, the quick succession of regime change and the seizure of power by a new generation of juntas against long standing personalist dictatorships suggests a break in previous political patterns.
The literature on international security for the last three decades has primarily focused on the twin problems of terrorism and insurgency as the principal threats to the global status quo, and in doing so has neglected the role of conquest as an instrument within great power competition. The emerging era of bare-knuckled territorial aggrandizement by revisionist great powers, therefore, has largely caught the academy underprepared. Given this, I offer a ten-year anniversary review of a book that could assist in shaping our understanding of the changing nature of the international system today.
Ethiopia provides a unique opportunity to strengthen and encourage regional institutions to act as arbiters in parallel with U.S. aims and strategic interests. Ultimately, a regional approach gives policymakers greater global flexibility to respond to the persistent challenges threatening U.S. interests in Africa while avoiding the pitfalls of unilateral engagement.
Wright’s “Africa in Global Society,” despite being twenty years old, contains a set of timeless lenses for viewing Africa in the contemporary era: Regionality, Continentality, New Issue solutions, and Democracy. When analyzed through this four-pillared framework, strategic and political engagement strategies may be more coherently framed and contextualized to facilitate the elusive whole-of-government approach.
With its emerging emphasis on strategic competition, the United States must focus on renewing its engagement with potential allies on the African continent. The rise of insurgencies in West and East Africa, the geostrategic importance of natural resources from the continent, and the ability to provide a credible alternative to China that offers African countries the freedom to self-determine their economic futures necessitates a new approach towards African countries as vital and enduring economic and security partners.
The Horn of Africa dominates today’s headlines. From ethnic cleansing in Ethiopia’s Tigray region to the ongoing war against al Shabaab, the region is beset by overlapping crises. Understanding today’s tumult in the Horn requires grappling with the complex legacy of the Cold War’s final chapter in the region. The Cold War accelerated and intensified the Horn of Africa’s zero-sum brand of ethnic politics from 1977-1985, and the thaw and subsequent end of the Cold War in Africa ended critical lifelines for the notorious regimes in Addis Ababa and Mogadishu, precipitating their collapse in 1991. This essay outlines how the Cold War’s conclusion laid the groundwork for the Horn’s bloody 21st century.
President Biden’s Africa team will face three dilemmas that would be recognizable to any American statesman responsible for Africa policy in the post 1945 period. The answers to these three foundational questions, set out in key strategic documents like the National Security Strategy, provide the intellectual framework that foreshadows subsequent resource allocations and shapes the policies through which the United States engages the African continent.
While Africa had been a sleepy backwater of the global Cold War at the time of Richard Nixon’s first inauguration on 20 January 1969, the continent became a central battlefield of the conflict by the time of Nixon’s resignation in 1974. Africa leaped to the front page of major American newspapers as issues of decolonization, race, and regional rivalries interacted dynamically with Cold War imperatives, accelerating both the intensity and complexity of African conflicts. This period from 1969-1980 spanned the tenures of three American presidents: Nixon, Ford, and Carter and witnessed two explosions of violence—the Angolan Civil War and the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia—that ended with successful and large-scale interventions by the Soviet Union and its Cuban allies. How did successive American administrations formulate strategies for great power competition in Africa during this period, and how effective were those strategies for meting these Cold War crises?
America can still be a voice against oppression overseas even as it struggles to become a more perfect union at home. For people striving for freedom and justice abroad—from Zimbabwe to Hong Kong to Belarus—the broad movement for racial equality in America illustrates the aspirational and redemptive qualities that make America’s democracy so exceptional. One hopes that this struggle against structural racism, like the first Civil Rights Movement, will strengthen and inform the future of American statecraft.
Ambassador Herman Cohen is one of many career diplomats, along with ambassadors like John Campbell and David Shinn, who devote personal time to researching, understanding, and commenting on African affairs. Cohen’s most recent work traces U.S. foreign policy in Africa from Franklin Roosevelt to Donald Trump, intertwining historical files and personal insights to weave a picture of what the author titles, Eight Decades of Realpolitik.
Past failures undermine the credibility of U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa and demonstrate the struggles experienced by the blue-helmets are caused by both the context in which they operate and a long process of transition towards new forms of peacekeeping that contradict their core principles.
Taken as a whole, this work offers a critical means to analyze coup success and introduces a layer of analysis that has been greatly needed. Above all his work underscores the need for scholars to work harder at differentiating between the motivation behind a coup and the probability of its tactical success.
Despite progress since the height of Boko Haram in 2014, this violent extremist organization remains a significant threat to Nigeria and the Lake Chad Region. The eight-year conflict is now responsible for over 20,000 deaths, and the large-scale humanitarian crisis is on the verge of famine status. Nigeria’s long-term success is critically important to the United States in the strategic battleground of the African continent. Both the evolving Boko Haram threat and the decreasing patience of war-weary regional allies suggests a revitalized strategy is needed.
We are in a heady age for nonsense about African state institutions. Portland State University political scientist Bruce Gilley launched a firestorm recently with his analytically incoherent article “The Case for Colonialism,” arguing colonial institutions produced better outcomes than post-colonial ones have and most who lived under those institutions think so. In my area of research, Mozambique, the World Bank added its own voice to the chorus of nonsense, announcing that it now considers the country to be in a “fragile situation” for the first time. The newfound fragility came as news to Mozambicans, who have seen their country rocked by both renewed civil conflict and massive financial scandal in the past three years but are now in the midst of a seemingly durable ceasefire and a slow but steady economic recovery. Western misconceptions about how African states actually function are as widespread now as they’ve ever been, even as Western engagement in Africa continues to grow.
McCain has usefully drawn our attention to a case that teaches by negative example. In the same way that the United States thought that anti-terrorism operations in Southwest Asia and Africa would contribute to strategic victory in the global war on terrorism, South African leaders believed that that the use of highly trained and mobile forces in operations against Cuban forces and insurgents would ensure the survival of white majority rule and domination over Namibia. The end result demonstrates the difficulty of devising a grand strategy in the face of great uncertainty and flux.
Within lies both the necessary pragmatism with which a practitioner must approach thinking about African wars, but also the necessary idealism of “African Solutions to African Problems,” which is what Barlow ultimately desires. If only as a way to frame the conversation about the nature of intervention in Africa, the significance of the book moves from useful to indispensable.
The waning weeks of 2016 and the first month of 2017 witnessed one of the most strategically effective uses of military force in the 21st century. When long-time President of the Gambia, Yahya Jammeh, refused to step down after being voted out of office, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sponsored a Senegalese-led intervention that forced Jammeh to leave the country. This intervention upheld the integrity of the Gambian democratic process and allowed the victor, Adama Barrow, to assume leadership of the small West African country. The ECOWAS intervention force assembled the means to impose its will on their opponent, formulated and executed a strategy calibrated to achieve the political effects desired, and achieved all of its policy goals--all without firing a single shot.
Sub-Saharan Africa’s civil aviation industry represents a potential bright spot in a region facing several economic challenges...However, regional policymakers, airline carriers, and international aviation regulators must address numerous security, safety, and governance challenges if this potential is to be more fully realized.
Robert Mugabe — the 90-year-old despot, long time leader of Zimbabwe, and recently selected African Union chairman — takes every opportunity he can to deride the U.S. He has spoken out against the ‘imperialist’ U.S. throughout Africa and on the stage of the UN. The quintessential autocratic dictator remains a pesky thorn in our side. For many, the fact that he remains in power represents a failure of U.S. policy. While his existence may not be palatable to the western world writ large, a well-developed U.S strategy has limited his nefarious behavior and caused his influence to dwindle. He has been reduced to a silly old man spending his remaining years criticizing what he calls American imperialism. U.S. policy towards Zimbabwe, with no military force, and very little assets, has neutralized him. In an age of limited resources, U.S. policy towards Zimbabwe provides a blueprint for containing rogue states.
