President Putin made three foundational assumptions in launching his war against Ukraine that should have been correct but were not. First, Putin assumed the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and easy fight. Second, he assumed the world would denounce the invasion but tacitly allow it. Third, Putin assumed the war would deter NATO expansion.
A newly discovered drawing, now in the collection of the German History Museum in Berlin, promises to shed new light on Clausewitz's life. Furthermore, its connection to real-life events provides a better understanding of the decade’s influence over Clausewitz's thought and the realities surrounding the creation of On War. The find highlights an overlooked memorandum Clausewitz wrote in 1825 that, for its part, reveals Clausewitz as a thoughtful and consummate military professional. In fact, the ideas expressed in this memorandum matured on the pages of his general theory, On War, reinforcing the notion of his theory as a product of complex reflection on the realities military professionals encounter.
Observing civil rights activists through the lens of Cold War national security concerns makes the rise of a federal militarized police force in the United States appear logical, necessary, and socially acceptable. The United States, while engaged in a global ideological conflict with the Soviet Union, could ill afford any stains on its national reputation. America could not claim to stand for global democracy yet consistently deploy its military to suppress domestic civil unrest and constitutionally protected political movements. Nor could the federal government allow individual states to openly dismiss federal mandates or jeopardize American foreign policy objectives…The Cold War emphasis on national security granted law enforcement the license to develop and implement unconventional warfare strategies into the types of extralegal methods of policing used on Americans like James Baldwin. These strategies evolved into future approaches recognizable in counter-terrorism operations, the War on Drugs, and the Global War on Terror.
The works of Thucydides, Sun-tzu, and Clausewitz comprise the lodestone of strategic studies. Yet, international law is conspicuously absent in all three of their works. This feature creates a potential blindspot for any strategist who narrowly relies upon the classical trilogy of strategic thought for understanding strategic decision-making processes and interactions in contemporary conditions.
Clausewitz’s concepts of grammar and logic have stood the test of time. His dictum that war is indeed “the continuation of policy by other means” holds true today, and while the character of war has evolved, the higher logic and the influence of policy has remained a constant. This article will first address some key definitions, before exploring the concept of logic and grammar as introduced in On War and as they relate to his own experiences. These concepts will then be explored through the prisms of two contrasting case studies: industrialised warfare on the Western Front during the First World War, and the new logic of war in the face of the unprecedented existential threat of the Nuclear Age.
The pillars of the trinity provide a foundation to understand how hybrid warfare employs irregular, unconventional, and conventional military power to balance against the risk of war trending towards absolute violence and open conflict. Consequently, hybrid warfare is an operational concept where military and non-military capabilities are optimised to distort reason, shape passion, and leverage chance to achieve strategic objectives and reduce the risk of escalation.
Incorporating the centre of gravity with the indirect approach makes one’s actions more potent, providing an effective focal point that if successfully hit promises high yields for minimal costs. While like any other stratagem it will not always be possible to find the opportunity for both to be applied in conjunction with each other, perhaps because one lacks the options for manoeuvre or the centre of gravity is too well guarded, the yield is exponentially increased when a convergence exists.
Jonssan’s thesis is that the Russian government and armed forces believe there has been a change in the nature of war with the advent of the information revolution. Specifically, information warfare is now so potent that it can achieve political goals commensurate with war without recourse to military means. The resulting book offers an efficient overview of trends in Russian military thought since the collapse of the Soviet Union paired with detailed examinations of the two major subjects that have defined those trends: information warfare and color revolutions.
This analysis is anything but exhaustive. What separates “Guide to Tactics, or the Theory of the Combat” is how it situates itself in relation to On War. In many ways it serves as its inverse. Given that On War functions to describe the relationship of war to politics, “Guide to Tactics, or the Theory of the Combat” describes the relationship of tactics to war.
Stoker’s work is essential reading because it forces us to engage with what it really means for a war to be limited. He also pointedly warns the reader that potential opponents understand limited war better than the U.S. does, although he does not definitively prove this claim. But the work is also frustrating. The question of why the U.S. does not win wars is complex. Simply waging wars more decisively is not enough.
Former Defense Secretary and retired General James Mattis is said to have told Marines in Iraq that the most important six inches on the battlefield were between their ears. He was referring to the need for calm under fire. Today, his warning is appropriate for everyone, everywhere, because the United States is in an information war—and it is losing.
For modern readers, the fear Napoleon and his victories struck into the hearts of European monarchs and generals is inconceivable…Not everyone saw Napoleon as a military genius beyond human explanation, however. Scharnhorst admired his understanding of the social and political changes wrought by the French Revolution and his ability to apply these changes to warfare. Nonetheless, Scharnhorst believed Napoleon’s success harbored clues about his possible defeat.
Without Gerhard von Scharnhorst, it is unlikely there would be a Carl von Clausewitz. An officer with extraordinary talents and intellect, and an even more remarkable fate, Scharnhorst forever changed the path of the Prussian Army, molded the idea of the Prusso-German General Staff, and forged some of the most influential concepts in the realm of military theory and practice. Yet, he is primarily known as a teacher and mentor to the West’s most influential strategic thinker, Carl von Clausewitz...especially among those less versed in German language and history. With this series, The Strategy Bridge strives to fill this gap.
Charles Dickens fans should note that this article is not about one of your favorite Victorian novels. Rather, it examines the case of Admiral Horatio Nelson, Baron of the Nile, and how his expectations of what his military operations might accomplish often matched the results. Secondarily, this characteristic of great expectations aligns nicely with attributes in Carl von Clausewitz’s exposition of military genius in On War. Finally, both Nelson’s approach, and Clausewitzian examination of the concept of military genius have a direct bearing on how officers command at sea.
A successful cyber doctrine must epitomize Clausewitz’s argument in favor of an active or attack-based defense, found in a relatively unknown but rich section of On War entitled “Methods of Resistance.” The chapter opens with a compelling reminder that the advantage of the defense is its defining purpose is to ward off an attack, and this warding off has as its principal strength the idea of awaiting.
Let’s renounce the dictum that “war is thus an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will.” Instead, let’s focus on understanding wars as involving fighting others to achieve tacitly or formally agreed political outcomes. War is not, in the end, about compulsion, it is all about bargaining violently.
