President Putin made three foundational assumptions in launching his war against Ukraine that should have been correct but were not. First, Putin assumed the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and easy fight. Second, he assumed the world would denounce the invasion but tacitly allow it. Third, Putin assumed the war would deter NATO expansion.
The works of Thucydides, Sun-tzu, and Clausewitz comprise the lodestone of strategic studies. Yet, international law is conspicuously absent in all three of their works. This feature creates a potential blindspot for any strategist who narrowly relies upon the classical trilogy of strategic thought for understanding strategic decision-making processes and interactions in contemporary conditions.
The examples presented throughout the book demonstrate not only how successful lawfare has been in the past, but arguably that the United States should continue to apply it throughout its international diplomatic and military strategies...Lawfare is a must read and belongs in the library of strategic thinkers, in and out of the government!
