Alessandra Nisch
Putin’s Wars: Testing Boyd’s Strategy of ...

President Putin made three foundational assumptions in launching his war against Ukraine that should have been correct but were not. First, Putin assumed the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and easy fight. Second, he assumed the world would denounce the invasion but tacitly allow it. Third, Putin assumed the war would deter NATO expansion.

Putin’s Wars: Testing Boyd’s Strategy of Applied Friction

Strategic Culture

National Styles, Strategic Empathy, and Cold War Nuclear Strategy

National Styles, Strategic Empathy, and Cold War Nuclear Strategy

Strategic assessments reveal a given nation’s understanding of the security landscape and its relative power position. However, strategic appraisals can also betray the fundamental values and prevailing attitudes of the country generating the assessment. American estimators have shown a propensity to frame questions in a manner reflecting their internal predispositions—a tendency that has often contributed to flawed images of external threats. This was the case during the early Cold War when American analysts routinely transferred judgment to Soviet decision-makers. By projecting their own proclivities onto an adversary whose preferences did not align with the United States, analysts persistently misdiagnosed the threat and concealed opportunities to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities. It was not until American strategic analysis underwent a dramatic transformation in the 1970s that more reliable assessments began to emerge. The Cold War, then, offers a stark warning about the pitfalls of an ethnocentric view of the security landscape. Adversaries, after all, are bounded by distinctive national styles that diverge from American logic.

¿Dónde estamos? The United States Ignores the Global South at Its Own Risk

¿Dónde estamos? The United States Ignores the Global South at Its Own Risk

All too often countries outside of Europe, or wherever the military fight is currently happening, are absent from discussions of policy in Washington. The Global South especially is too rarely part of the national security conversation. Even among the major emerging economies, colloquially known as the BRICS, Brazil and South Africa often get left out of the discussion compared to their larger and/or more threatening counterparts in Russia, China and India.”

David or Goliath? How Thinking Like a Small Nation Can Help Counter China

David or Goliath? How Thinking Like a Small Nation Can Help Counter China

The continued posturing of the United States as the main geopolitical power represents a grave strategic misstep against the rising power of China. This posture overcommits resources to a narrow conception of warfare that then limits the availability of options. If, however, the U.S. were to strategize as a smaller, less wealthy nation, it may develop the strategic flexibility required to counter China.

Improving Foreign Policy Outcomes Requires Investment in Alternative Perspectives

Improving Foreign Policy Outcomes Requires Investment in Alternative Perspectives

Washington cannot afford a focus on unilateral U.S. perspectives, whether to prevent alienating potential partners or to forestall potential adversarial relations. When strategists center policy from a U.S. perspective, they ignore the real cultural risks that accompany those narrative frames. China is just as centered on their own conventional framing, with equally problematic results. Washington must counter Beijing’s growing influence across the instruments of national power without alienating potential allies and partners.

The Mote in Their Eye: Ethnocentrism’s Crippling Impact on Strategy

The Mote in Their Eye: Ethnocentrism’s Crippling Impact on Strategy

The implicit bias of ethnocentrism in the decision-making process warps an otherwise effective process of linking ends, ways, and means to achieve political objectives. Without a deliberate effort to control ethnocentric tendencies in its strategic process, the United States will continue to pursue ineffective strategic courses of action given the dual impacts of ethnocentrism on statecraft: misperceiving ourselves and stereotyping others.

Escaping the Cave: An Analysis of Russian and American Strategic Cultures Influence on War, Peace, and the Realm In Between

Escaping the Cave: An Analysis of Russian and American Strategic Cultures Influence on War, Peace, and the Realm In Between

In analyzing American and Russian strategic cultures, it is tempting to believe that once one determines how strategic culture shapes each nations’ preferences for decisions, one may also suppose that their strategic culture is somehow fixable. This sentiment is an intellectual dead end and entirely misses the point. Strategic culture is a package of robust variables and traits “not easily amended, let alone overturned, by acts of will.” As Gray points out, “even if you recognize some significant dysfunctionality in your strategic [culture], you may not be able to take effective corrective action.” Strategic culture’s persistence, however, does not mean it cannot or does not evolve.

A Transformative U.S. Strategy for Africa: A Proposal for New Wine in a New Bottle

A Transformative U.S. Strategy for Africa: A Proposal for New Wine in a New Bottle

Implementing a U.S. strategy for Africa that promotes the sustainable growth of African economies requires an approach focused on employing economic diplomacy at the continent level. Economic diplomacy provides a constructive way for the U.S. to positively influence African regional economic integration, the protection of human security, and African Union progression. Transnational threats, economic prosperity, and upholding a rules-based international order are issues that will continue to link African security with U.S. national security. An overarching strategy requires strong partnerships at the national level and leveraging U.S. strengths to increase pressure on great power rivals. This approach most effectively achieves African and U.S. economic and security objectives and counters the malign influence of China and Russia on the continent.

The Strategic Crisis in the American Way of War: A Global Discount Security Shop?

The Strategic Crisis in the American Way of War: A Global Discount Security Shop?

Why has the U.S. failed to see any conclusive strategic victories in any of its recent conflicts? Second, within the context of a changed global post-cold-war strategic order and a massive American globalized infrastructure in place to support military operations, is the inability of the U.S. to be successful a failure of the American way of war or a failure in strategy as it relates to the American way of war? Instead of trying to answer each puzzle, we seek to define the contours of it. We argue American strategy has become increasingly incoherent. This is the product of a stagnant American political system that led to an incredibly effective military, but one that is strategically incapable due to it being a global discount security shop.

On the Business Models of War

On the Business Models of War

The ultimate question begged by these musings is to consider what effect more than fifty years of trying to implement business management models into the American military has had? Are we more efficient and monetarily lean than ever before? It doesn’t seem so. We have the world’s most expensive military, with the costliest equipment and highest operating margins. It is difficult to  draw a direct causal argument, despite the apparent correlation in time, and beyond the scope of this article to do so. The  argument is simply that military effectiveness is a matter that ought not to be judged by monetary value (profit or cost-savings efficiency) of the services performed, and it is thus not appropriate for business management models. More bluntly, whenever a public organization (as opposed to a private one) is so conceived the result will be unavoidably perverse.

The Nature of Strategy: Pericles and the Peloponnesian War

The Nature of Strategy: Pericles and the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides’s account of the Peloponnesian War provides for a range of lessons about the nature of strategy applicable to a wide audience. The period demonstrates the inherent complexity in understanding the concept of strategy, a concept that remains devoid of a coherent, agreed, and universal definition. What the Periclean strategy does provide, however, is insight into the importance of understanding the implications of the political objective, strategy and military culture, and geography and operating environment and their influence on the nature of strategy.

The Ugly Rhymes of History? #Reviewing Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies

The Ugly Rhymes of History? #Reviewing Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies

Insurgency is an old concept. If you were to travel back to Iraq between 2334 and 2279 BC, you would find a man called Sargan. Sargan ruled a vast empire spanning from Southern Iraq to Southern Turkey, enforced by overwhelming military power. His Akkadian hordes, armed with high-tech composite bows and sophisticated logistics, laid waste to all before them. Their strategy was a simple one; ‘mass slaughter, enslavement, the deportation of defeated enemies, and the total destruction of their cities.’ For years their technological edge and brutal strategy allowed the Akkadians to dominate. When they inevitably fell, however, they did not fall to a superior empire. They were victim to a new phenomenon: a tireless, guerrilla-style attack from the unsophisticated barbarian hordes all around them. In 2190 BC the city of Akkad, near modern Baghdad, finally fell.