Earlier this year, The Strategy Bridge asked civilian and military students around the world to participate in our sixth annual student writing contest on the subject of strategy.

Now, we are pleased to present an essay selected for Honorable Mention from Amelia Griffith, a recent graduate of the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island.

The socio-economic development and stability of African countries have long been linked to the promotion of U.S. national interests.[1] Africa is a continent of opportunities and challenges.[2] Underinvestment in Africa increases transnational threats to U.S. security and weakens America’s standing in the international order.[3] In his first foreign policy speech, President Joseph Biden addressed the 2021 African Union Summit in Addis Ababa, reassuring the international community that “America is back.” [4] He emphasized the U.S.’s renewed commitment to engaging with international institutions and called for cooperation among African nations to build a better future with prosperity and security for all.[5] What does it mean for America to be “back” in Africa? What is a constructive strategy for the U.S. in Africa in an era of strategic competition?

*U.S. President Joe Biden meets with Uhuru Kenyatta, President of the Republic of Kenya, in the Oval Office of the White House on October 14, 2021. (CNN)*

President Biden’s national security priorities are protecting the security of Americans, expanding economic prosperity, and defending democratic values.[6] However, without a forward-thinking strategy to “break the mold” on U.S. Africa policy, President Biden will miss the opportunity to safeguard U.S. interests and catalyze sustainable economic growth in Africa, advancing prosperity, health, and security for all. Therefore, to ensure the advancement and protection of U.S. national interests, the Biden administration must develop a transformative strategy towards Africa that is focused on economic diplomacy to promote the sustainable growth of African economies to address broader security concerns and apply pressure on great power rivals. First, this strategy is realized by thinking holistically and adopting a decade-long continental-wide approach that maximizes resources and addresses strategic competitors. Second, the U.S. must foster the regional integration of African economies to support the founding goals of the African Union. Lastly, regional economic integration must also incorporate human security to promote American and African national security.

For many African countries, transnational threats such as crime, terrorism, public health crises, and the impacts of climate change continue to destabilize their path toward further development. Moreover, U.S. strategic influence on the continent is diminishing as China grows its network of investment initiatives using predatory lending, outpacing the U.S. and undermining the potential of African economies.[7] Meanwhile, Russia expands its political influence through security agreements and support to autocratic African governments.[8] Over the past two decades, U.S. engagement in Africa has consistently focused on addressing geopolitical concerns and containing terrorism using a country-by-country approach.[9] Furthermore, since 2008, U.S.-Africa trade has steadily declined from four to one percent of all U.S. trade in goods, and China has surpassed the U.S. as Africa’s largest trading partner. [10]

President Biden’s restoration of multilateralism to address international security threats and promote global development is a shift in U.S. foreign policy welcomed by allies and partners. Also well-received was his initial approach toward Africa, including repealing President Trump’s travel bans and restoring U.S. foreign aid.[11] Additionally, in the Interim National Security Strategy Guidance, President Biden commits to building partnerships in Africa and supporting the continent’s development.[12] However, the Biden administration retains some Trump-era policies, most notably the hardline stance toward strategic competition in Africa, including a U.S.-led infrastructure program to compete against China’s Belt and Road Initiative.[13] Moreover, the Biden administration is reverting to the cordial but disengaged approach toward Africa, as indicated by only 17 African nations receiving invitations to the 2021 White House Summit for Democracy.[14] After one year in office, President Biden’s emerging U.S. Africa strategy “marks a break in tone from his predecessor” but without any fundamental shift in policy.[15] It is a gentler vintage of old wine in a new bottle.

In the context of this paper, economic diplomacy is the use of government relations and influence to facilitate international trade and investment.[16] Regional economic integration occurs when two or more countries agree to reduce or eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers to the movement of goods, services, and labor.[17] The stages of regional economic integration culminate with total economic integration or political union. At this point, a state renounces economic and political aspects of its sovereignty to a supranational institution, such as the European Union.[18] Human security is a security concept that encompasses human rights and focuses on ensuring an individual’s overall safety.[19] The United Nations promotes using human security to complement the traditional view that states must provide the means to protect their citizens.[20] Human security aims to advance social development by protecting people without reliance on the state as the primary guarantor or arbitrator and empowering them by providing opportunities to fulfill their potential.[21] Underdeveloped economies and economic inequalities pose significant threats to human security in Africa.

The Continental Route

Economic diplomacy at the continental level would stimulate African economic growth and protect U.S. national interests. President Biden has committed to leading with diplomacy and using international economic policies to promote durable growth for the benefit of all Americans.[22] Economic diplomacy can overcome international trade and investment barriers by influencing public and private cross-border economic activities.[23] East Africa presents an opportunity for the U.S. to increase trade and investment with fast-growing African economies. But the limited regional response to the conflict and human rights crisis in Ethiopia highlights how weak economic and political ties threaten economic development, regional stability, and U.S. national security.[24] Economic diplomacy with the African Union and its regional economic communities would credibly accelerate regional integration and incentivize two-way U.S.-Africa trade, without imposing conditions on countries. Promoting the potential of African economies to the U.S. private sector would expand investment opportunities and demonstrate the economic benefits for Americans. The U.S. would stimulate sustainable long-term African economic growth through a continental framework and fulfill President Biden’s national security and domestic policy objectives. Furthermore, economic diplomacy would help frame the key challenges limiting African economic growth, including the influence of strategic competition.

By building robust African partnerships, the U.S. can enable a win-win approach to contain China’s and Russia’s growing influence on the continent and protect U.S. national security. African leaders and analysts have criticized a zero-sum approach to U.S.-Chinese competition, arguing that African governments can engage with China without being exploited or disinclined to choose one partner over another.[25] Grant Harris highlights that the U.S. needs “willing and capable” African partners to counter transnational security threats but argues that fostering genuine U.S.-African partnerships means avoiding transactional relationships and supporting economic development.[26] In the context of partnerships, the conflict in Ethiopia presents the U.S. with a security dilemma: continue using targeted economic sanctions for human rights violations, derailing Ethiopia’s textile manufacturing sector, and risk that the Ethiopian government will withdraw its peacekeeping forces from Somalia and strengthen its relationships with China. Through transparent partnerships, sustainable investments, and support for African regional economic integration, the U.S. would differentiate its approach from China and Russia. This holistic approach would enable the U.S. to support the development of African economies and outpace its strategic competitors in trade, investment, and influence on the continent over the long term.

Aligning U.S. foreign assistance with U.S. trade and investment policies would attract more foreign direct investment and increase the resilience of African economies to socio-economic megatrends.[27] The Prosper Africa Initiative aims to increase U.S.-African two-way trade and investment by leveraging multiple U.S. government agencies to connect African and American corporations.[28] Empirical research shows that foreign aid invested in public infrastructure and human capital is the most effective for attracting foreign direct investment.[29] African countries provide tremendous opportunities for foreign direct investment, and with its Belt and Road Initiative, China has already capitalized on public infrastructure investments. The research demonstrates that U.S. aid can serve more than an altruistic role and strategically attract private investment. Using targeted aid to bolster the Prosper Africa Initiative would increase foreign direct investment by providing U.S. investors access to a framework backed by the U.S. government. Investors would be more willing to explore trade and investment opportunities in Africa, such as advancing economic diversification in Ethiopia and meeting the demand for COVID-19 vaccines. This increase in foreign direct investment would promote sustainability and resiliency for African economies. There is the risk that targeted aid will also enhance Chinese foreign direct investment, but the long-term benefits of sustainable economic growth in Africa outweigh this risk.

A continent-level U.S. Africa Strategy would most effectively protect U.S. security interests. Seventy-five percent of the world’s fragile states are in Africa.[30] Fragile states nurture instability and directly threaten U.S. national security interests.[31] Harris argues that African transnational security threats will persist without a holistic approach to address the continent’s uneven economic growth and fragility.[32] Sam Wilkins argues that maintaining congressional support for an Africa strategy and China’s presence as a geostrategic competitor necessitates the development of a “truly continental” approach.[33] Ultimately, the U.S. lacks the military and diplomatic resources to employ tailored approaches while safeguarding its broad economic and security interests.[34] These arguments demonstrate that the U.S. must prioritize multilateralism over unilateral responses to crises and bolster Pan-African institutions that best serve African and U.S. mutual interests. Investing in the African people and the African Union’s bid for regional economic integration will enable the U.S. and Africa to address broader transnational security issues collectively and put the U.S. in the best position to compete against great power rivals.

*Map showing countries according to their categories in the 2020 Fragile States Index (Wikimedia)*

Regional Economic Integration

The U.S. has important strategic and economic interests in the African Continental Free Trade Area and must promote policies that support its implementation. If fully realized, the recently opened African Continental Free Trade Area will create the largest free trade area in the world, connecting 1.3 billion people in 55 countries with a combined gross domestic product of U.S.$3.4 trillion.[35] Through this continental free trade area, the African Union aims to accelerate African economic regional integration, attract foreign direct investment, and provide a post-pandemic economic stimulus, reducing the continent’s exposure and vulnerability to global economic disruptions.[36] Foreign direct investment initiatives such as the Prosper Africa Initiative would also benefit from African regional trade integration.[37] In the long term, the African Continental Free Trade Area provides the U.S. a tremendous opportunity to “empower Africa to drive its own growth” and advance mutual prosperity for American and African companies and citizens.[38] The U.S. would help the African Union fulfill one of its founding objectives by supporting the successful implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area. Furthermore, the transition to the African Continental Free Trade Area will provide another means to combat the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and increase the potential for a U.S.- African Continental Free Trade Area agreement and other public health programs. African economic integration under a continental free trade area resonates with President Biden’s domestic economic agenda and preference for using multilateralism to promote African development. The success of the African Continental Free Trade Area is critical for increasing economic prosperity in Africa and protecting the continent’s economic expansion from transnational challenges and security threats.

United States trade preference programs and regional economic communities are essential building blocks for African economic regional integration. The tariff-free provisions and relaxed rules of origin under the African Growth and Opportunity Act are instrumental in providing African countries access to U.S. markets and creating hundreds of thousands of jobs.[39] Within the eight African Union recognized regional economic communities,[40] countries continue to trade under established tariff agreements and cooperate on common natural resource issues as they transition to the African Continental Free Trade Area.[41] One of the Act’s goals is to negotiate bilateral free trade agreements with eligible countries.[42] Some analysts claim that third-party free trade agreements could undermine regional economic communities’ common external tariffs, exacerbate tensions, and complicate the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area.[43] Instead, the Act should be used as a U.S. intermediate position towards regional economic integration, providing countries time to consolidate the integration process without creating trade imbalances.[44] African regional economic communities are at various levels of development and often with overlapping memberships, but they provide the necessary stepping stones towards culmination under the African Continental Free Trade Area. The regional economic community framework also enables negotiated resolutions to ongoing disputes, such as the Grand Renaissance Dam dispute between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan. Given the potential for additional fragmentation, the U.S. should reconsider using free trade agreements and focus on improving trade preferences under the African Growth and Opportunity Act. This approach would most effectively support the transition from regional economic communities to the full implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area.

The Biden administration must increase the utilization of the African Growth and Opportunity Act and ensure its reauthorization to support the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area. The Act remains significantly underutilized by over forty eligible countries, particularly in the apparel and agricultural sectors.[45] The Act promotes sustainable economic growth by increasing trade and encouraging good governance.[46] President Biden recently terminated Ethiopia’s eligibility over human rights violations committed by the Ethiopian government in Tigray.[47] Some observers argue that the administration must work with beneficiaries to develop national African Growth and Opportunity Act strategies to improve economic and employment metrics for reauthorization.[48] The Act’s effectiveness as an economic sanction tool is debatable. Removing the Act’s benefits from Ethiopia’s apparel manufacturing industry will drastically reduce employment rates among a vast population of low-skilled labor, primarily women. Furthermore, Ethiopia has consistently been at the forefront of utilizing the African Growth and Opportunity Act.

To reduce the impacts on trade and economic growth, Congress should review the use of the African Growth and Opportunity Act eligibility criteria as a way of imposing economic sanctions on African countries. Furthermore, the Biden administration should advocate expanding the Act’s benefits to digital services and other rapidly emerging trade sectors. Congress may be reluctant to grant an extension without indicators that the Act will support the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area and African economic development. The U.S. Trade Representative and President Biden must engage with their African Union and national counterparts on African Growth and Opportunity Act national strategies and eligibility requirements. If African countries remain ineligible or cannot increase trade diversification under the Act, they may seek third-party free trade agreements to maintain tariff-free trade, significantly undermining the African Continental Free Trade Area’s implementation.

Incorporating Human Security

Sustainable African economic development requires both regional economic integration and increased human security. For many African regional economic communities, successful economic integration with political cooperation is contingent on the security of their citizens and the stability of member states.[49] By 2050, Africa’s population will double and exceed two billion people.[50] This population growth, together with global economic potential, has the potential to foster significant job growth and advance social development across the continent.[51] However, failure would create a large population lacking opportunities and susceptible to poverty, public health issues, migration, and radicalization.[52] Africa’s population growth must be translated into human capital with individual security and freedom of movement to promote African development and mitigate instability. During the African Continental Free Trade Area protocol negotiations, the U.S. must engage with its regional economic community and African Union counterparts. This engagement will ensure that human security is incorporated into the regional integration process, enabling sustainable economic and social development across Africa.

Promoting human security in Africa is increasingly relevant to protecting U.S. security interests. Following independence, most African countries developed security concepts to counter external threats to their sovereignty and territorial integrity.[53] This type of state security has become increasingly irrelevant as internal security threats have become the primary source of insecurity in most African countries.[54] As security challenges have increased in complexity, many African countries have become unable or unwilling to fulfill their security obligations towards their citizens.[55] The United Nations underscores the achievement of human security as a prerequisite for achieving national security.[56] U.S. policymakers cannot adequately address U.S. security concerns until they understand this nexus.

The Ethiopian crisis highlights the urgent requirement to protect individual security from human rights violations when the state is unwilling to do so. Sanctions could compel compliance, but this is farfetched given that many African states are non-parties to African Union human rights protocols. Instead, the U.S. should actively engage the African Union and its members during the regional integration policymaking to identify human security objectives and provide states with the tools to develop and implement comprehensive security strategies. As an alternative to humanitarian interventions, the U.S. could promote a human security concept that protects Africans from internal and transnational security threats, enhances a state’s capability to protect its citizens, and empowers individuals to reach their potential through increased economic and social opportunities. In turn, increasing human security across Africa would provide the foundation for prolonged security in many African countries and reduce threats to U.S. national security.

*African Heads of State and Government pose during the African Union (AU) Summit for the agreement to establish the African Continental Free Trade Zone in Kigali, Rwanda, on 21 March 2018. (AFP)*

Adopting an integrated human security approach in Africa requires a flexible legal regime for trade and development. African regional organizations must demonstrate more commitment to achieving human security by using the rule of law and institutional accountability to complement the empowerment of individuals.[57] The African Continental Free Trade Area also includes social development goals, including advancing gender equality and ensuring food security while maintaining flexible trade provisions for member countries.[58] Legal scholars praise the African Continental Free Trade Area as an alternative model for sustainable development that “closes the loop” between trade regulations and development goals.[59] The U.S. can help empower Africans by implementing trade and investment policies that create jobs, increase prosperity, and provide a means for states to invest in their citizen’s well-being. By employing an integrated U.S. Africa strategy that incorporates human security into regional economic integration, the U.S. can shape continent-level legal regimes that promote long-term socio-economic development in Africa.

Sustained Realism

Some may argue that a U.S. Africa strategy tailored to countries or specific regions would be more effective than a continental-level strategy. Critics point to previous administrations’ failures to implement continental strategies and argue that Africa’s challenges are too complex to be comprehensively addressed by an overarching strategy.[60] These critics claim that Africa’s most pressing threats are best addressed using U.S. regional officials with the authority to coordinate all available instruments of national power.[61] These regional officials would enable the U.S. to “position itself as the partner of choice for African countries,” limiting the influence of great power rivals and protecting U.S. security interests.[62] Balancing the need to counter the malign influence of China and Russia on African governments against the long-term goals of good governance and prosperity while addressing regional security threats is complex. Such complexity necessitates using well-defined regional strategies rather than a potentially superficial continental strategy.

Regional economic integration in Africa faces several challenges. First, states will cede little economic sovereignty to supranational institutions because financial resources become constrained in large international institutions.[63] Second, private investors tend to establish their businesses in lower wage-rate areas, resulting in job gains in one region and losses in another.[64] Third, the potential for trade diversion, where the trade lost from non-member countries is greater than the trade gained with member countries, remains.[65] Lastly, given Africa’s colonial past, the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity remain at the forefront. Realists argue that a state’s desire for power and security will always trump its desire for integration and prosperity.[66] Additionally, African leaders may point to the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union to support the view that state sovereignty will always come before regional integration.

These arguments, however, fail to consider that the U.S. has a strong interest in promoting African regional economic integration over the next decade. Regional economic integration is a crucial component that supports the African Union’s objectives of accelerating “political and socio-economic integration of the continent,” managing challenges, and overcoming security threats.[67] Robert Blackwell and Jennifer Harris propose that the U.S. should make a fundamental policy shift vis-à-vis Africa and reallocate Department of Defense U.S. Africa Command funding toward foreign aid and investment and instead use economic power to secure U.S. national interests.[68] They argue that this would allow the U.S. to regain its status as a “powerful geoeconomic actor” in the international order and counter the economic coercion practices of China and Russia.[69] Consequently, U.S. alliances and partnerships would grow stronger, reinforcing the liberal international order.[70] In an era of limited funding and competing geostrategic priorities, the Biden administration must wisely allocate U.S. resources on the continent and promote African economic integration through multilateralism and cooperation.

Many regard the European Union as a model of how regional economic integration can lead to successful political interdependence at a continental level. For European Union countries, ceding economic and political sovereignty played an important role in driving integration and demonstrating the benefits of regional integration to those willing to cooperate.[71] But African interests are invariably different from European interests, and the African Union should only have limited law-making power in mutually agreed-upon areas.[72] Economic integration represents the most viable step toward regional integration for Africa and provides the greatest opportunity to create prosperity and security for its citizens.

Conclusion

Implementing a U.S. strategy for Africa that promotes the sustainable growth of African economies requires an approach focused on employing economic diplomacy at the continent level. Economic diplomacy provides a constructive way for the U.S. to positively influence African regional economic integration, the protection of human security, and African Union progression. Transnational threats, economic prosperity, and upholding a rules-based international order are issues that will continue to link African security with U.S. national security. An overarching strategy requires strong partnerships at the national level and leveraging U.S. strengths to increase pressure on great power rivals. This approach most effectively achieves African and U.S. economic and security objectives and counters the malign influence of China and Russia on the continent.

President Biden must publish a U.S. Africa strategy that clearly outlines the elements of a continental-level approach. In an era of strategic competition and limited military resources, economic diplomacy provides the Biden administration with a practical framework to increase engagement and investment in Africa while addressing geopolitical concerns and other sources of instability. Implementation requires innovative thinking and robust policies to support African interests and values. This transformative U.S. Africa Strategy will finally break the mold and place new wine into a new bottle.

Amelia Griffith is a recent graduate of the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. This essay reflects her own views and not necessarily those of the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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Header Image: Wine Rack (Dmitri Maruta)

Notes:

[1] Grant T. Harris, “Why Africa Matters to U.S. National Security,” Africa Center, Atlantic Council, May 2017, 1, 3, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Why_Africa_Matters_to_U.S._National_Security_0524_web.pdf.

[2] Luka Kuol and Joel Amegboh, “Rethinking National Security Strategies in Africa,” International Relations and Diplomacy 9, no. 1 (January 2021): 1, https://www.prio.org/download/publicationfile/2446/Rethinking%20National%20Security%20Strategies%20in%20Africa.pdf. Also, in this paper, Africa refers to the whole continent, both Sub-Saharan and North African countries.

[3] Harris, “Why Africa Matters to U.S. National Security,” 1, 3.

[4] U.S. Mission to The African Union, “President Biden’s Message to African Union Summit Participants,” 5 February 2021, https://www.usau.usmission.gov/slide/president-bidens-message-to-african-union-summit-participants/.

[5] Ibid.

[6] U.S. President, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, 9.

[7] Zainab Usman, “What Do We Know About Chinese Lending In Africa?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2 June 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/06/02/what-do-we-know-about-chinese-lending-in-africa-pub-84648#:~:text=According%20to%20SAIS%2DCARI%20researchers,borrowers%20between%202000%20and%202019.&text=By%202019%2C%20though%2C%20new%20Chinese,2018%20(see%20figure%201).

[8] Eric Schmitt and Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Russia Exerts Growing Influence in Africa, Worrying Many in the West,” The New York Times, 28 January 2020, updated 28 March 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/28/world/africa/russia-africa-troops.html.

[9] Tomas F. Husted, Alexis Arieff, Lauren Ploch Blanchard, Nicolas Cook, and Brock R. Williams, “Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement,” Congressional Research Service, 17 February 2021, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R45428.pdf.

[10] U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade, Trade in Goods with the World, Not Seasonally Adjusted, accessed 15 January 2022, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c0015.html; U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade, Trade in Goods with Africa, Not Seasonally Adjusted, accessed 15 January 2022, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c0013.html; Elliot Smith, “The U.S.-China trade rivalry is underway in Africa, and Washington is playing catch-up,” CNBC, 9 October 2019, accessed 25 January 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/09/the-us-china-trade-rivalry-is-underway-in-africa.html.

[11] Zainab Usman, “How Biden Can Build U.S.-Africa Relations Back to Better – The World Reacts to Biden’s First 100 Days,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 27 April 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/04/27/how-biden-can-build-U.S.-africa-relations-back-better-pub-84399.

[12] U.S. President, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (Washington DC: The White House, March 2021), 11, 20, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.

[13] Ibid; Patsy Widakuswara, “U.S. to Offer Alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” VOA News, 12 June 2021, https://www.voanews.com/a/usa_us-offer-alternative-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative/6206928.html.

[14] Steven Feldstein, “Who’s In and Who’s Out From Biden’s Democracy Summit” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 22 November 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/11/22/who-s-in-and-who-s-out-from-biden-s-democracy-summit-pub-85822; Marcel Plichta, “Biden’s Africa Policy is Kinder Than Trump’s, but Not Transformative,” World Politics Review, 28 September 2021, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/29994/on-africa-us-relations-biden-is-kinder-but-not-transformative.

[15] Usman, “How Biden Can Build U.S.-Africa Relations Back Better – The World Reacts to Biden’s First 100 Days.”

[16] Selwyn J. V. Moons and Peter A. G. van Bergeijk, “Does Economic Diplomacy Work? A Meta-analysis of Its Impact on Trade and Investment,” The World Economy 40, no.2 (February 2017): 336, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/twec.12392#:~:text=Our%20analyses%20show%20that%20reported,are%20sensitive%20to%20model%20specification.&text=Compared%20to%20other%20sciences%2C%20economic,positive%20effects%20of%20economic%20diplomacy. In this paper, the term economic diplomacy also includes commercial diplomacy.

[17] Anthony Venables, “International Trade: Economic Integration,” International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Pergamon Press, 2001): 7843; Kati Cole, Russell Lyons, and Deborah Cary, “Regional Economic Integration,” The Review: A Journal of Undergraduate Student Research 2 (1999): 70-71, https://fisherpub.sjfc.edu/ur/vol2/iss1/14.

[18] Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration (London: Routledge Press, 1973); Tebid Ethel Achoh, “Incorporating Human Security in Regional Integration: The Case of CEMAC,” Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center, Policy Brief 8, December 2014, https://media.africaportal.org/documents/Incorporating_human_security_in_regional_integration.pdf.

[19] UN Development Programme, Human Development Report 1994 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Ademola Abass, ed., Protecting Human Security in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010): 1, 4.

[20] UN Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now (New York: 2003): iv, 2, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/91BAEEDBA50C6907C1256D19006A9353-chs-security-may03.pdf; Derek S. Reveron and Kathleen A. Mahoney-Norris, Human Security in a Borderless World (Boulder: Westview Press, 2011): 2.

[21] Abass, Protecting Human Security in Africa, 4, 5, 9.

[22] U.S. President, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, cover letter, 11.

[23] Moons and van Bergeijk, “Does Economic Diplomacy Work? A Meta-analysis of Its Impact on Trade and Investment,” 336.

[24] See also, President Biden’s Execution Order declaring a national emergency to deal with the threat to U.S. national security posed by the humanitarian and human rights crisis in Northern Ethiopia and the imposition of targeted sanctions on the individuals deemed responsible. U.S. President, Executive Order no. 14046, “Imposing Sanctions on Certain Persons With Respect to the Humanitarian and Human Rights Crisis in Ethiopia,” Federal Register 86, no. 180 (21 September 2021), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-09-21/pdf/2021-20508.pdf.

[25] Remarks by Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta in Darlene Superville, Tom Odula, and Cara Anna, “Trump Administration to Open Free-Trade Talks with Kenya,” Associated Press, 6 February 2020, https://apnews.com/article/politics-africa-us-news-donald-trump-united-states-80e695f86116f81922ef64bae30df4e8; see also Adva Saldinger, “African Leaders Question U.S. Position on China at Investment Event,” Devex, 19 October 2020, https://www.devex.com/news/african-leaders-question-us-position-on-china-at-investment-event-98347.

[26] Harris, “Why Africa Matters to U.S. National Security,” 1, 3.

[27] The International Monetary Fund defines [foreign] direct investment as a cross-border investment in which an investor that is “resident in one economy [has] control or a significant degree of influence on the management of an enterprise that is resident in another economy.” International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (6th ed. 2009): 278, Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual - Sixth Edition (BPM6) (imf.org).

[28] Nicolas Cook and Brock R. Williams, “The Trump Administration’s Prosper Africa Initiative,” Congressional Research Service, 17 November 2020, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11384/6; U.S. Agency for International Development, Prosper Africa, https://www.prosperafrica.gov/about/.

[29] Pablo Selaya and Eva Rytter Sunesen, “Does Foreign Aid Increase Foreign Direct Investment,” World Development 40, no. 11 (2012): 2155, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.06.001; Ravi Panchagnula, “Are U.S. Government Foreign Aid Flow and FDI Flows Intertemporally Related? An Investigation of Twenty-Three Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Electronic Theses and Dissertations 5824 (2021): viii, 27, https://openprairie.sdstate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6800&context=etd.

[30] The Fund For Peace, Fragile States Index, 2021, https://fragilestatesindex.org/global-data/; Harris, “Why Africa Matters to U.S. National Security,” 1, 3.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Harris, “Why Africa Matters to U.S. National Security,” 1, 3, 5.

[33] Sam Wilkins, “Does America Need an Africa Strategy?” War on the Rocks, 2 April 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/04/does-america-need-an-africa-strategy/.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Maryla Maliszewska and Michele Ruta, “The African Continental Free Trade Area, Economic and Distributional Effects,” World Bank Group, 27 July 2020, 1, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/34139/9781464815591.pdf.

[36] Kingsley Ighobor, “AfCFTA: 100 days since start of free trading, prospects seem bright,” African Renewal, 7 April 2021, 1, https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/april-2021/afcfta-100-days-start-free-trading-prospects-seem-bright.

[37] Landry Signe, “U.S. trade and investment in Africa,” Brookings, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Policy, 28 July 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/us-trade-and-investment-in-africa/.

[38] Landry Signe, “Boosting United States-Africa trade and investment relations through the African Continental Free Trade Area,” Brookings, Testimony before the U.S. International Trade Commission on U.S. trade and investment with sub-Saharan Africa, 24 July 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/boosting-united-states-africa-trade-and-investment-relations-through-the-african-continental-free-trade-area/.

[39] U.S. Department of States, 2019 Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) Ministerial Closing Remarks, 13 August 2019, https://2017-2021.state.gov/2019-africa-growth-and-opportunity-act-agoa-ministerial-closing-remarks/index.html.

[40] The African Union recognizes eight regional economic communities: Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Community of Sahel–Saharan States (CEN–SAD), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Southern African Development Community (SADC).

[41] James Thuo Gathii, African Regional Trade Agreements as Legal Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011): xxix.

[42] Brock R. Williams, African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), Congressional Research Service, 6 January 2022, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF10149.pdf.

[43] Liz May and Andrew Mold, “Charting a new course in U.S.-Africa relations: The importance of learning from others’ mistakes,” Brookings, 21 June 2021, 5, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2021/06/21/charting-a-new-course-in-us-africa-relations-the-importance-of-learning-from-others-mistakes/.

[44] May and Mold, “Charting a new course in U.S.-Africa relations: The importance of learning from others’ mistakes,” 8, 9.

[45] U.S. Trade Representative, Readout of Ambassador Katherine Tai’s Participation in the Virtual AGOA Ministerial Meeting, 20 October 2021, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2021/october/readout-ambassador-katherine-tais-participation-virtual-agoa-ministerial-meeting

[46] Brock R. Williams, African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), Congressional Research Service, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10149.

[47] U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. Terminates AGOA Trade Preference Program for Ethiopia, Mali and Guinea, 1 January 2022, U.S. Terminates AGOA Trade Preference Program for Ethiopia, Mali and Guinea | United States Trade Representative (ustr.gov).

[48] Witney Schneidman, Kate McNulty, and Natalie Dicharry, “How the Biden administration can make AGOA more effective,” Brookings, 15 November 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2021/11/15/how-the-biden-administration-can-make-agoa-more-effective/; Mwangi S. Kimenyi, “AGOA Utilization 101,” Brookings, 23 March 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2015/03/23/agoa-utilization-101/.

[49] Tebid Ethel Achoh, “Incorporating Human Security in Regional Integration: The Case of CEMAC,” Kofi Annaan International Peacekeeping Training Center, Policy Brief 8, December 2014.

[50] The Economist (Online), “Africa’s population will double by 2050,” 28 March 2020, https://www.economist.com/special-report/2020/03/26/africas-population-will-double-by-2050.

[51] Signe, “U.S. trade and investment in Africa.”

[52] Ibid.; One study has demonstrated that Boko Haram members identified with financial incentives, rather than religion, as the key aspect in their decision to join the group, see Harris, 5.

[53] Kuol and Amegboh, “Rethinking National Security Strategies in Africa,” 4.

[54] Ibid.,5.

[55] UN Commission on Human Rights, Human Security Now, 2, 3.

[56] Ibid., Reveron and Mahoney-Norris, Human Security in a Borderless World, 14.

[57] Abass, Protecting Human Security in Africa, 4.

[58] AfCFTA Articles 3(e), 3(g), 5, and 7, https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36437-treaty-consolidated_text_on_cfta_-_en.pdf

[59] Katrin Kuhlmann and Akinyi Lisa Agutu, “The African Continental Free Trade Area: Toward a New Legal Model for Trade and Development,” Georgetown Journal of International Law 51 (2020): 754, https://www.law.georgetown.edu/international-law-journal/wp-content/uploads/sites/21/2020/11/THE-AFRICAN-CONTINENTAL-FREE-TRADE-AREA.-TOWARD-A-NEW-LEGAL-MODEL-FOR-TRADE-AND-DEVELOPMENT.pdf.

[60] Marcus Hicks, Kyle Atwell, and Dan Collini, “Great-Power Competition Is Coming to Africa, The United States Needs to Think Regionally to Win,” Foreign Affairs, 4 March 2021, 10, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2021-03-04/great-power-competition-coming-africa.

[61] Ibid., 3, 13,

[62] Ibid.

[63] Abdulmalik Abukar Yusuf, “Progress of Regional Economic Integration in East Africa,” Journal of International Trade, Logistics and Law 7, no. 1 (2021): 70, http://jital.org/index.php/jital/article/view/222/pdf_121; see also Larry Elliot, “Greece’s problems are the result of the eurozone having no fiscal policy,” The Guardian, 1 February 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/feb/01/greece-problems-eurozone-fiscal-policy-germany.

[64] Yusuf, “Progress of Regional Economic Integration in East Africa,” 71; see also Yohannes Zelalem, “Assessing Ethiopia’s Market Potential in the new IGAD FTA Initative,” Higher Education Policy, 12, no. 2 (2017): v–viii.

[65] Scott Thompson, “The Disadvantages of Regional Economic Integration,” bizfluent, 26 September 2017, The Disadvantages of Regional Economic Integration (bizfluent.com).

[66] Mina E. Tanious, “The impact of economic interdependence on the probability of conflict between states,” Review of Economics and Political Science 4, no. 1 (2019): 43, www.emeraldinsight.com/2631-3561.htm; see also John Mearsheimer, “Why we will soon miss the cold war,” The Atlantic Online, August 1990, https://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/politics/foreign/mearsh.htm.

[67] The African Union, “AU in a Nutshell,” accessed 28 January 2022, https://au.int/en/au-nutshell.

[68] Robert D. Blackwill and Jennifer M. Harris, “The Lost Art of Economic Statecraft, Restoring an American Tradition,” Foreign Affairs, 22, https://www.jstor.org/stable/43948183.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Michele Olivier, “Despite Brexit, the EU still holds valuable lessons for African integration,” The Conversation, 25 June 2017, 2, https://theconversation.com/despite-brexit-the-eu-still-holds-valuable-lessons-for-african-integration-78963.

[72] Ibid., 4.