Earlier this year, The Strategy Bridge asked university and professional military education students to participate in our fifth annual writing contest by sending us their thoughts on strategy.
Now, we are pleased to present the first-place winner, from Anna Cole, a recent graduate of Wheaton College in Wheaton, Illinois.
Introduction
A recent report produced by The National Security, Military, and Intelligence Panel on Climate Change described climate change as "one of the most pressing threats to both national and global security in the 21st century." It argued that increased levels of warming will pose "catastrophic, and likely irreversible, global security risks."[1] If climate change is not properly addressed, some of these risks include global migration crises between and within nations, increased conflict over declining resources, destabilization of international governments and institutions, unpredictable global power balance shifts, and serious public health crises.[2]
Yet despite the increasing urgency of the threat that climate change poses to U.S. national security—and the specifically international nature of this threat—foreign policy responses to climate change have remained decentralized, or, as in the case of the past four years, practically nonexistent. In this article, I discuss these two interconnected issues: the significant threat that climate change poses to U.S. national security and the lack of adequate attention paid to this threat in the arena of U.S. foreign policy. I provide an overview of the history of climate change policy in the U.S., with special attention to the evolution of foreign policy responses and their inadequacy in addressing climate change. I then propose that climate change must become a pillar of U.S. foreign policy strategy, moving from the periphery of policy consideration to a position of centrality.[3]
This is a broad issue that does not lend itself well to simple policy solutions, but there are three arenas where specific policies can significantly contribute to this shift: linking climate change to national security within the executive branch, pursuing a comprehensive international climate strategy, and addressing U.S. contributions to climate change—both at home and overseas. Central to accomplishing this will be emphasizing climate change in the National Security Strategy, continued participation in the Paris Agreement, and extending the authority of the Environmental Protection Act to federal actions taken overseas.
National Security Impacts
Caitlin Werrell and Francesco Femia, co-founders of the Center for Climate & Security, highlight that, under the Trump administration, "concerns about the national security implications of climate change have grown, rather than decreased."[4] This is notable given the Trump administration attempted to downplay the impacts of climate change, at times slipping into outright climate change denial.[5] In spite of the executive branch's suppression of the problem, the U.S. military and intelligence community consistently pointed to the national security impacts of climate change, signifying that these are no longer solely future scenarios, but are in many cases already here.[6]
Domestic Impacts
The Fourth National Climate Assessment, released by the White House in 2018, speaks to the gravity of the threat posed by climate change to national security. It argues the impacts of climate change are already being felt across the U.S., and that future climate change will "further disrupt many areas of life, exacerbating existing challenges to prosperity posed by aging and deteriorating infrastructure, stressed ecosystems, and economic inequality." The report highlights the uneven distribution of climate change's impacts: lower income and already marginalized communities will be hardest hit.[7] It emphasizes climate change will impact all sectors of society, from public health to the economy to agriculture.
With rising air and water temperatures, exposure to waterborne and foodborne diseases will likely increase, even as heat-related deaths rise and disease carrying insects and pests spread across the U.S. Continued warming will cause substantial losses to the economy—as it impacts trade, U.S. overseas business, and regional economies dependent on natural resources.[8] Some estimates suggest the U.S. could lose 1.2 percent of GDP per year for every degree Celsius of warming, cutting annual growth to half of its current rate.[9] Meanwhile, extreme weather events could lead to the creation of hundreds of thousands of climate migrants within the U.S., economically straining migrant-receiving cities. The exodus of over one million people from coastal areas following Hurricane Katrina only foreshadows what is to come. As seasonal wildfires are becoming commonplace across the Western U.S., hurricanes are intensifying in the Southwest, and increased flooding is impacting Midwest agriculture, some of the direct domestic national security impacts of climate change are becoming clear.[10]
Military Impacts
A recent Defense Department report highlighted the immediate threat climate change poses to U.S. armed forces and security, stating that roughly two-thirds of the 79 military installations reviewed are vulnerable to flooding, while over half are vulnerable to drought and wildfires. Some are already impacted: for example, Navy Base Coronado in California already undergoes flooding during tropical storms.[11] At least 19 senior military officials have made public statements about the security implications of climate change as a result of the increasing threats to military infrastructure.
Climate Change as a Threat Multiplier and International Impacts
In regards to the national security threat posed by climate change, perhaps most concerning is the nature of climate change as a threat multiplier, intersecting with other factors to exacerbate international political instability.[12] The Fourth National Climate Assessment argues "the potential for conflict increases where there is a history of civil violence, conflict elsewhere in the region, low GDP or economic growth, economic shocks, weak governance, and lack of access to basic needs."[13] The destabilizing international effects of climate change are already revealing themselves. Take for example Somalia's decade-long, climate-change-related drought, which, although not the cause of the ongoing civil war, has exacerbated the conflict by increasing migration and strengthening terrorist groups, among other impacts.[14] The international impacts of climate change will affect vital U.S. interests, including trade, international development and humanitarian assistance, and transboundary resources.[15] The U.S. military could end up involved overseas, and political instability abroad could ultimately wind up at U.S. borders, either in the form of increased migration or violent conflict.
The Lack of a Centralized Foreign Policy Response
Despite the grave threat that climate change poses to U.S. national security, policy responses tend to remain decentralized and focused on domestic actions. This compartmentalized approach leads to inefficiency and negates the critical importance of addressing climate change at an international level.[16] Climate change is an international issue, and U.S. engagement with it must be similarly international. When climate change is dealt with in the arena of foreign policy, it is generally compartmentalized into the climate and energy diplomacy spheres. Yet, due to the threat multiplier nature of climate change, energy policy expert Jason Bordoff argues that climate change must be treated not only as a problem to be resolved but "as an issue that can affect the success and failure of strategies in areas as varied as counterterrorism, migration, international economics, and maritime security."[17] He posits that while past foreign policy efforts to address climate change—the Paris Agreement, the Green Climate Fund, and multinational clean energy innovation—were necessary, they did not go far enough, given the direct and indirect impacts of climate change on every area of foreign policy.
When not the primary topic of conversation, as in climate diplomacy, the environmental impacts of U.S. foreign policy are often ignored. This can be seen, for example, in the uneven application of the National Environmental Protection Act to extraterritorial or foreign policy actions.[18] While federal agencies are required to consider their environmental impact by preparing environmental assessments of future actions, this does not apply to actions that do not impact U.S. soil. Hence, federal trade deals, military operations, and development efforts are often performed without consideration for their environmental impacts.
History
The need for a centralized foreign policy response to climate change is perhaps clearest when examining the history of climate foreign policy in the U.S. The U.S. has a mixed record on addressing climate change at the foreign policy level. Climate change began to enter the national agenda at the end of the 1800s. Environmental concerns were first discussed at the national level, sparking a social movement of green activism before the global impacts of climate change began to be recognized. Non-governmental organizations began popping up, such as the Sierra Club in 1892 and the Natural Resources Defense Council in 1970.[19] Climate change explicitly entered U.S. policy discussions in the 1970s, with the adoption of the National Environmental Policy Act. This act required domestic federal agencies to make environmental effect assessments prior to making decisions.[20] Conversation around environmental issues focused on the dangers of pollution and conservation of natural resources, emphasizing the climate impacts of population and industrial growth. Around the same time period, international discussions around climate change began to take place, notably the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) following the UN Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment in 1972. UNEP emphasized the importance of sustainable development and the necessity of bringing environmental issues to government attention for collaborative action.[21]
It was not until the end of the Cold War that scholars and policymakers began to recognize the security linkages in climate discussions, beginning with Thomas Homer-Dixon's seminal article on the contribution of climate-related resource shortages to violent conflict.[22] As the conversation surrounding climate change and (inter)national security began to gain traction, new attempts at international collaboration were launched. U.S. participation in these conversations and commitment to reducing carbon emissions was somewhat ambiguous. The U.S. often played a leading role in beginning discussions and shaping convention frameworks, but then would fail to uphold its commitments or ultimately refuse to ratify climate agreements.
This was sharply demonstrated in the first significant international climate treaty in 1992—the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which sought to stabilize atmospheric greenhouse gases.[23] The U.S. was the first industrialized country to ratify the Convention. President George H.W. Bush spoke to the vital role that the U.S. played in this, saying, "I am confident the United States will continue to lead the world in taking economically sensible actions to reduce the threat of climate change."[24] At the same time, Bush argued against the treaty having binding limits and enforcement mechanisms, giving it no real teeth.[25]
The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change led directly to the Kyoto Protocol—under which countries agreed to limit their carbon emissions and participate in a carbon credit trading system. While the U.S. was instrumental in bringing about the Kyoto Protocol, its attempted implementation faced domestic pushback. The U.S. Senate refused to ratify it, although President Clinton signed it, and President George W. Bush ultimately withdrew U.S. consent entirely.[26] For the Bush administration, climate change was viewed primarily through an economic lens and backed by uncertain science.[27] Bush leveraged U.S. influence in the UN and in climate change negotiations to oppose international action.[28] Climate scholar Paul Harris sees the climate change avoidance strategies of the Bush administration as significantly contributing to continued Republican skepticism of mainstream climate science and of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Part of this disconnect was due to "disagreement about the pace, cause, and impact of climate change."[29] While the existence of climate change was recognized in the mainstream, disagreements about its nature and the necessity of addressing it have led to ongoing resistance to viewing climate change as a national security threat.
Presidents Clinton, Obama, and Bush (Jim Lo Scalzo)
Furthermore, addressing climate change is expensive. The aforementioned disagreement, paired with the Bush administration's resistance to policies that would restrict U.S. economic freedom, almost ensured that climate change would be ignored on the foreign policy agenda, despite growing scientific consensus about future harm. This impeded climate change responses from being incorporated into U.S. foreign policy priorities, even under the ensuing Democratic administration.
The Obama administration sought to reverse the impacts of the Bush administration, intentionally seeking international environmental leadership.[30] This led to U.S. participation in the Copenhagen negotiations and in increased foreign aid funding for climate change adaptation and mitigation. To avoid politically charged debates, the Obama administration disguised these funds as “green" or "clean" energy assistance.[31] To avoid contention with Congress, President Obama primarily relied on executive and regulatory approaches in addressing climate change.[32] Most significantly, under Obama, the U.S. implemented the Climate Action Plan—which emphasized addressing climate change at both international and domestic levels—and joined the 2015 Paris Agreement, which required participating nations to set their own carbon emissions reduction goals, with the ultimate goal of keeping the average global temperature increase below two degrees Celsius.
The presidency of Donald Trump marked another sharp turn in U.S. climate policy. While both Bush and Obama listed climate change as a key security threat in their National Security Strategies, President Trump chose to omit it.[33] Further, Trump withdrew from the Paris Climate Agreement and eliminated Obama's Climate Action Plan, receiving widespread international criticism for this action.[34] Over the course of his presidency, Trump reversed over 100 environmental rules.[35]
U.S. history with climate policy, especially in the foreign policy arena, has been characterized by inconsistency and partisan polarization. Significant use of executive action has led to dramatically shifting policies based on the party of the current presidential administration. Lack of bipartisan recognition of climate change as a significant national security threat has played into the inconsistency and prevented climate change from being more thoroughly prioritized in foreign policy.
Presidents Trump, Obama, and Biden (Mark Ralston/AFP/Getty)
Looking Toward the Future
The urgency of addressing climate change as a national security threat demands that U.S. foreign policy be completely re-centered around climate change. Steve Herz, senior international policy advisor to the Sierra Club, draws an analogy to foreign policy strategy during the Cold War: "Just as containing the Soviet Union provided the strategic lens through which presidents of both parties conducted foreign policy for much of the second half of the twentieth century, containing the climate crisis should be the primary lens through which presidents view the United States’ role in the world in the coming decades."[36] What might a climate-first foreign policy strategy look like? While the scope of this issue does not lend itself to simple policy solutions, I provide three policy recommendations that will begin the reorientation of U.S. foreign policy around climate change.
First, climate change should be foregrounded as a pillar of national security in President Biden's National Security Strategy. This would establish the centrality of climate change in foreign policy decision making processes and guide policy at the domestic and international level. Second, the U.S. should engage in a comprehensive international climate strategy, involving aggressive climate and energy diplomacy and foreign aid for building climate change resilience in developing countries. Finally, the U.S. must lead by example, cutting its own domestic carbon emissions and incorporating a more robust oversight process to evaluate the climate impacts of all foreign policy decisions. Expanding the influence of the Environmental Protection Agency through congressional means will be critical in accomplishing these goals. Each of these three areas will require significant policy changes to be truly effective in mitigating and adapting to climate change. Hence, this article focuses on the most vital policy recommendations, while providing an overview of broader changes that will be necessary.
The National Security Strategy is periodically delivered to Congress by the executive branch, as mandated by the National Security Act of 1947 and the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. There are six purposes of the National Security Strategy (NSS): to set forth the presidential vision for America's global role, to highlight top national security priorities, to guide resource allocation for national security related departments and agencies, to articulate key national security policies to allies and adversaries, to justify the budget request, and to inform the public.[37] The priorities set forth in the National Security Strategy guide the budgeting and program planning processes for departments and agencies related to national security.[38]
The "Interim National Security Strategic Guidance," released by the White House in March of 2021, gives a foretaste of Biden's National Security Strategy.[39] While climate change is frequently mentioned as a threat throughout the document, it is not highlighted as one of the primary national security priorities. Foregrounding climate change as a national security pillar in the strategy would ensure that it is a primary consideration in all national security related decisions and foreign policy strategies. This is critical, since past administrations have often failed to pay attention to climate change in issues that, at first glance, seem unrelated. Other key strategic documents, such as the National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy, are primarily based on the priorities laid out in the National Security Strategy. Incorporating climate change as a central priority of these documents would lead to an offensive and defensive strategy for the U.S. to build resilience and counter the impacts of climate change.
With the National Security Strategy lending credence to the high priority of addressing climate change, the U.S. must then pursue a comprehensive international climate strategy. This encompasses the areas of climate diplomacy, energy diplomacy, and foreign aid. Biden has already made significant steps in this arena, including appointing John Kerry as the first Special Presidential Envoy for Climate Change and rejoining the Paris Agreement. Biden's appointment of Kerry signals a new linkage of climate change to national security and a recommitment to international leadership in the arena of climate change mitigation and adaptation.[40] Kerry will be able to ensure that climate change is in every conversation related to national security, where it might previously have been sidelined or considered irrelevant.
Yet further action must be taken if U.S. leadership in international climate diplomacy is to survive the Biden administration. Both Obama and Biden joined the Paris Agreement through an executive order. While this provided a work-around to congressional deadlock, it also made U.S. participation in a significant international climate agreement dependent on the whims of the current presidential administration. U.S. climate policy swings back and forth when new presidential administrations come into power, and the urgency of addressing climate change requires a greater level of long-term commitment. This can only be accomplished through congressional action. Congress should seek to officially approve the Paris Agreement as a congressional-executive agreement.[41] A congressional-executive agreement only requires a bicameral simple majority vote, which could theoretically be possible, given Democratic majorities in the House and the Senate. This would avoid the two-thirds majority Senate vote necessary to ratify it as a treaty, while still enshrining it as law.
Part of the Paris Agreement is U.S. contribution to the Green Climate Fund. This is central to addressing climate change as a national security threat. Under President Obama, the U.S. pledged $3 billion to "cut carbon pollution and strengthen developing countries’ resilience."[42] Leadership by the U.S. in this area led to other countries' willingness to contribute to the fund, propelling the fund to over $10 billion.[43] The Trump administration ended U.S. contributions to the fund, withdrawing $2 billion of pledged capital.[44] The Green Climate Fund is an investment that will prevent migration and national security crises in the future, and it is critical that the U.S. follow through on its $3 billion pledge.
To depoliticize investing in the Green Climate Fund, policymakers should stress the history of bipartisan agreement on climate-related assistance to developing countries. It was President George H.W. Bush who established the first international fund—the Global Environmental Facility—in 1992, and it was President George W. Bush who helped create the Climate Investment Funds in 2008.[45] To justify the costs of participation in the Green Climate Fund, policymakers should stress that this is preventive aid. Money invested in helping developing countries pursue climate resilience will counteract the threat of future climate-related migration crises that either overwhelm the U.S. directly or lead to international instability. Climate refugees are already migrating to the U.S. from Central America, and from the Middle East and North Africa into Europe. In an extreme climate scenario, over 30 million climate migrants could come to the U.S. over the next 30 years.[46] Emphasizing the national security threat posed by climate migration will counteract the politicization of climate aid allocations.
A comprehensive international climate strategy will necessitate more action from the U.S. than simply rejoining and fully participating in the Paris agreement—some areas for future policy consideration include ending multilateral coal financing, centering climate change in all energy diplomacy considerations, and international collaboration towards new clean energy technology. The U.S. can use a combination of support and pressure to encourage other countries in their commitment to reduced carbon emissions. The Paris Agreement sets the stage for these multinational collaborations to occur and sends a clear signal that the U.S. is serious about addressing climate change at the international level.
Finally, the U.S. must lead by example, cutting its own carbon emissions to prove that it is serious about combating climate change at the foreign policy level. This will set an international norm of conduct, which will make it easier for future climate negotiations to hold weight, and it will bolster American image abroad. The flagrant disregard that previous presidential administrations have shown for the global threat of climate change has severely damaged the U.S.'s influence and reputation.[47] Rebuilding this influence will be necessary in countering China's influence and pressuring other countries to uphold their climate commitments. It is also critical that the U.S. lead by example because the U.S. has cumulatively contributed more carbon to the atmosphere than any other country. While the U.S. is no longer the largest single greenhouse gases emitter—that position goes to China—its per capita emissions rate remains significantly higher than China's, and roughly twice as much as the average person in Europe.[48] U.S. action in reducing its own carbon emissions will be a significant step towards addressing the collective action problem posed by climate change and will make future international collaboration more fruitful, especially as other countries will no longer be able to point to the imbalance in U.S. demands and action.
While the complexity of this issue at the domestic policy level is outside the scope of this paper, a starting consideration might be the value of pursuing a "quiet climate policy" as set forth by environmental policy expert Ted Nordhaus. Quiet climate policy options, like renewable energy subsidies and establishing a federal clean energy standard that requires utilities to transition away from carbon technologies, ultimately reduce carbon emissions while avoiding the politicization and potential gridlock that more visible policies like carbon taxes create.[49] The Biden administration has already taken significant steps towards attempting to cut domestic carbon emissions, pledging to cut greenhouse gas emissions in half by 2030 and linking this to investment in economic recovery and infrastructure.[50]
President Joe Biden speaks in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on March 31, 2021. (Jim Watson/AFP/Getty)
The U.S. must also lead by example by more rigorously evaluating the climate impacts of all aspects of foreign policy. This can be accomplished by explicitly extending the powers of the National Environmental Policy Act to encompass the actions of federal agencies overseas. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires that all federal agencies must consider the environmental impact of their actions by preparing an environmental assessment (EA), and in some cases, an environmental impact statement (EIS), which is more detailed and typically includes possible alternatives. However, application of the National Environmental Policy Act to U.S. actions overseas has been historically unclear, and most federal agencies fail to follow its guidelines when operating outside of the U.S.[51] Concerns over applying the National Environmental Policy Act to actions that solely affect foreign territory are the amount of time it takes to prepare an Environmental Assessment or Environmental Impact Statement and the impact on state sovereignty.[52] Under the Trump administration, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) updated its implementing regulations for the National Environmental Policy Act, explicitly stating the act did not apply to extraterritorial actions. This can be undone by the Biden administration's Council on Environmental Quality. The National Environmental Policy Act is intended to apply to both protection of the "environment" at-large and the "protection of the environment of Americans."[53] There is a strong argument to be made that the act must be applied to federal agencies' actions abroad in order to protect the environment at-large.
If U.S. foreign policy actions, which often come with significant environmental costs, do not fall under the jurisdiction of the National Environmental Policy Act, climate change is not truly central to foreign policy.[54] Some agencies already have internal processes for reviewing overseas actions' climate impacts, and explicitly extending the act would ensure that all agencies have those processes built in, making it less likely that a future Council on Environmental Quality reversal would lead to a return to inattention.
Viability
The U.S. has a long history of haphazard attention to climate change, often based on the whims of particular presidential administrations, and one might ask why a foreign policy centered around climate change should be any different, particularly given the currently divided nature of the American public. However, the time is right for bipartisan movement towards enshrining climate change mitigation and adaptation as a vital national interest, based on the primacy of climate change as a national security threat. While President Trump's administration did much to roll back President Obama's efforts in this area, the 2020 election results show that a lack of attention to the seriousness of climate change is a political liability. Young voters were an essential voter bloc, and their participation in the 2020 election was "decisive in key races," according to a recent analysis conducted by the Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement (CIRCLE) at Tufts University. The youth vote shifted the balance in both the presidential election and senate races in key battleground states. In CIRCLE's pre-election youth survey, the environment was a primary issue—78% of young voters described themselves as "very" or "somewhat" concerned about climate change, and 75% of youth "strongly" or "somewhat" favor green energy policies. Climate change ranked in the top three issues influencing young voters.[55] This concern is not constrained by partisan lines: a poll conducted by The Conservation Coalition and the Conservative Energy Network found that 68% of Republicans between the ages of 18 and 54 responded that climate change was important to their vote.[56] Young voters' voting patterns signal that a lack of support for green energy policies and climate change skepticism is already a political liability.
Republican politicians, traditionally climate change skeptics, are beginning to recognize this. Former congressman Bob Inglis (Republican, South Carolina) argues that Republicans "can't win the majority back [in the House] without winning suburban districts, and you can't win suburban districts with a retro position on climate change."[57] While the nature of policy recommendations may differ along partisan lines, there is increasing bipartisan consensus that something must be done. Representatives Kevin McCarthy (Republican, California) and Garret Graves (Republican, Missouru) are the leaders of a "new Republican posture on climate change," according to The Washington Post. Graves has described climate resilience spending as an "awesome conservative fiscal argument."[58] This argument could easily be extended to U.S. participation in the Green Climate Fund and other international climate resilience building endeavors. Participation in international collaboration now—while costly—will counteract the threat of spending even more money responding to climate impacts down the road.
Over the past ten years, the primacy of climate change as a national security threat has become increasingly less partisan, and increasingly acknowledged within the top echelons of the U.S. government. This can be clearly seen in disagreements within the executive branch itself, most notably in the Pentagon's break from Trump's rhetoric regarding climate change, openly calling it a national security threat in recent reports.[59] Nonpartisan reports on the potential impacts of climate change, produced by agencies like the Department of Defense, emphasize current trends—sea level rise, extreme droughts—in a way that brings home the real nature of the threat while depoliticizing it.[60]
It stands to reason that a future Republican presidential administration would be forced to recognize the political liability of climate change denial and retain the foreign policy emphasis on climate change, given the decisive strength of the young voter bloc, shifting party consensus, and pushback from nonpartisan agencies. In the meantime, the Biden administration has already laid the groundwork for a re-centering of U.S. foreign policy around climate change.
The Biden administration will face challenges—specifically in regards to extending the reach of the National Environmental Policy Act, enshrining the Paris agreement in law, and handling competing foreign policy interests. However, as climate change becomes further depoliticized over the next four years, it will be possible to gain support for legislative changes that might previously have been considered impossible.
A helicopter flies over a flooded area of central Mozambique. (Citizen’s Climate Lobby)
Conclusion
Climate change poses a potentially catastrophic threat to U.S. national security. Disasters caused by climate change will directly impact U.S. economic prosperity, draining vital capital from the economy. Climate change will also lead to decreased international stability that will have spillover effects on the U.S., at the very least through disrupting trade partnerships and weakening alliances. Yet despite growing bipartisan recognition of this national security threat, climate change has remained a peripheral issue in foreign policy, considered when discussing climate diplomacy but ignored in counterterrorism and energy security negotiations, although it impacts each of these spheres.
Because of the urgency of addressing climate change, U.S. foreign policy should be re-oriented around climate change. This can be accomplished by linking climate change to national security, especially within the executive branch, pursuing a comprehensive international climate strategy, and addressing the U.S.'s own contributions to climate change, both domestically and abroad. Given the trajectory of President Joe Biden's first six months in office, the U.S. is well-positioned to recoup the losses of the past four years. It remains to be seen whether Biden's presidency will lead to an enduring fundamental reorientation of foreign policy, but there is reason to hope that climate change will one day be an integral part of U.S. foreign policy.
Anna Cole recently graduated from Wheaton College (IL) with a double major in international relations and music. At Wheaton, she was the student chair and co-founder of Voices in the Near East (VINE), a student organization committed to furthering interfaith relationships. She also worked as a research and teaching assistant in Wheaton’s International Relations and Anthropology departments. Anna is currently exploring career possibilities in the field of international relief and plans to pursue graduate studies in the near future.
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Header Image: The Earth and Climate Change (Mark Garlick/Getty)
Notes:
[1] Kate Guy, “A Security Threat Assessment of Global Climate Change: How Likely Warming Scenarios Indicate a Catastrophic Security Future,” Product of the National Security Military, and Intelligence Panel on Climate Change (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Climate Security, an institute of the Council of Strategic Risks, February 2020), https://climateandsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/a-security-threat-assessment-of-climate-change.pdf.
[2] Kurt M. Campbell and Richard Weitz, “Conclusion: The Clear Implications of Global Climate Change,” in Climatic Cataclysm: The Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Climate Change, ed. Kurt M. Campbell (Brookings Institution Press, 2009).
[3] I owe this argument to Jason Bordoff's article "It's Time to Put Climate Action at the Center of U.S. Foreign Policy," published in Foreign Policy (October 9, 2020).
[4] Caitlin Werrell and Francesco Femia, “Climate Change as a National Security Threat and What to Do About It,” War on the Rocks, December 3, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/12/climate-change-as-a-national-security-threat-and-what-to-do-about-it/.
[5] Alana Wise, “‘I Don’t Think Science Knows’: Visiting Fires, Trump Denies Climate Change,” NPR, September 14, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/09/14/912799501/i-don-t-think-science-knows-visiting-fires-trump-denies-climate-change.
[6] Werrell and Femia, “Climate Change as a National Security Threat and What to Do About It.”
[7] USGCRP, “Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in the United States: Fourth National Climate Assessment, Volume II” (U.S. Global Change Research Program, 2018), https://nca2018.globalchange.gov.
[8] USGCRP.
[9] Alice Hill and Leonardo Martinez-Diaz, “Adapt or Perish: Preparing for the Inescapable Effects of Climate Change,” Foreign Affairs 99, no. 1 (February 2020), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2019-12-10/adapt-or-perish.
[10] Hill and Martinez-Diaz.
[11] Tony Capaccio, Jennifer Dlouhy, and Ari Natter, “Defense Warns Affects of Climate Change to Armed Forces,” TIME, January 18, 2019, https://time.com/5507465/climate-change-impact-armed-forces-bases/.
[12] Sherri Goodman and Gordon Sullivan, “Climate Change Is ‘Threat Multiplier,’” POLITICO, February 7, 2013, https://www.politico.com/story/2013/02/climate-change-is-threat-multiplier-087338.
[13] USGCRP, “Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in the United States: Fourth National Climate Assessment, Volume II.”
[14] Giovanna Kuele and Ana Cristina Miola, “Climate Change Is Feeding Armed Conflict in Somalia,” Institute for Security Studies Africa, April 6, 2018, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/climate-change-is-feeding-armed-conflict-in-somalia.
[15] USGCRP, “Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in the United States: Fourth National Climate Assessment, Volume II.”
[16] Jason Bordoff, “It’s Time to Put Climate Action at the Center of U.S. Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy (blog), July 27, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/27/climate-change-foreign-policy/.
[17] Bordoff.
[18] Maura M Kelly, “Environmental Responsibilities Overseas: The National Environmental Policy Act and the Export-Import Bank,” Environmental Affairs 34 (January 1, 2007): 27.
[19] Kathleen Mahoney-Norris and Derek S. Reveron, “Climate Change and Environmental Security,” in The Oxford Handbook of U.S. National Security, ed. Derek S. Reveron (Oxford University Press, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190680015.001.0001.
[20] OP US EPA, “What Is the National Environmental Policy Act?,” Overviews and Factsheets, US EPA, July 31, 2013, https://www.epa.gov/nepa/what-national-environmental-policy-act.
[21] Mahoney-Norris and Reveron, “Climate Change and Environmental Security.”
[22] Thomas F Homer-Dixon, Jeffrey Boutwell, and George W Rathjens, “Environmental Change and Violent Conflict,” Scientific American, 1993, 8.
[23] Mahoney-Norris and Reveron, “Climate Change and Environmental Security.”
[24] Anna McGinn, “Understanding the Paris Agreement,” Scholars Strategy Network, April 12, 2019, https://scholars.org/contribution/understanding-paris-agreement.
[25] Erin C. Pischke, Barry D. Solomon, and Adam M. Wellstead, “A Historical Analysis of US Climate Change Policy in the Pan-American Context,” Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences 8, no. 2 (June 1, 2018): 225–32, https://doi.org/10.1007/s13412-018-0476-7.
[26] Joyeeta Gupta, “A History of International Climate Change Policy,” WIREs Climate Change 1, no. 5 (2010): 636–53, https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.67.
[27] Mahoney-Norris and Reveron, “Climate Change and Environmental Security.”
[28] Paul G. Harris, “Preface to the Paperback Edition: Climate Change and American Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century,” in Climate Change and American Foreign Policy, ed. Paul G. Harris, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2016), 3–25, https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137120809_1.
[29] Mahoney-Norris and Reveron, “Climate Change and Environmental Security.”
[30] Mahoney-Norris and Reveron, “Climate Change and Environmental Security.”
[31] Mahoney-Norris and Reveron.
[32] Pischke, Solomon, and Wellstead, “A Historical Analysis of US Climate Change Policy in the Pan-American Context.”
[33] “Climate Change Dropped from National Security Strategy,” Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, December 18, 2017, https://climate.law.columbia.edu/content/climate-change-dropped-national-security-strategy.
[34] Majid Asadnabizadeh, “Climate Change in the Foreign Policy of the Trump Administration,” Environmental Policy and Law 49, no. 2–3 (August 16, 2019): 195–202, https://doi.org/10.3233/EPL-190157.
[35] Nadja Popovich, Livia Albeck-Ripka, and Kendra Pierre-Louis, “The Trump Administration Is Reversing More Than 100 Environmental Rules. Here’s the Full List.,” The New York Times, October 16, 2020, sec. Climate, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/climate/trump-environment-rollbacks-list.html, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/climate/trump-environment-rollbacks-list.html.
[36] Steven Herz, Brendan Guy, and Jake Schmidt, “A Climate-First Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs, November 25, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-11-25/climate-first-foreign-policy.
[37] Barry Pavel and Alex Ward, “Purpose of a National Security Strategy,” Atlantic Council (blog), February 28, 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/strategy-consortium/purpose-of-a-national-security-strategy/.
[38] Catherine Dale, “National Security Strategy: Legislative Mandates, Execution to Date, and Considerations for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress (Congressional Research Service, December 2008), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34505.pdf.
[39] Joe Biden, “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance” (The White House, March 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.
[40] Alice Hill and Madeline Babin, “Biden’s Climate Change Policy: Why His Special Envoy Role Matters,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 10, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/biden-climate-change-policy-why-climate-envoy-matters.
[41] Daniel Bodansky, “In Brief: Legal Options for U.S. Acceptance of a New Climate Change Agreement” (Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, May 2015).
[42] The White House, “Climate Change and President Obama’s Action Plan,” The White House, December 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/president-obama-climate-action-plan.
[43] The White House.
[44] Chloe Farand, “Green Climate Fund Replenishment Fails to Fill Hole Left by Trump’s US,” Climate Home News, October 25, 2019, https://www.climatechangenews.com/2019/10/25/green-climate-fund-replenishment-fails-fill-hole-left-trumps-us/.
[45] Matthew Kotchen, “Trump Will Stop Paying into the Green Climate Fund. He Has No Idea What It Is.,” The Washington Post, June 2, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/06/02/trump-will-stop-paying-into-the-green-climate-fund-he-has-no-idea-what-it-is/.
[46] Abrahm Lustgarten, “The Great Climate Migration Has Begun,” The New York Times, July 23, 2020, sec. Magazine, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/23/magazine/climate-migration.html.
[47] Asadnabizadeh, “Climate Change in the Foreign Policy of the Trump Administration.”
[48] Justin Gillis and Nadja Popovich, “The U.S. Is the Biggest Carbon Polluter in History. It Just Walked Away From the Paris Climate Deal.,” The New York Times, June 1, 2017, sec. Climate, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/01/climate/us-biggest-carbon-polluter-in-history-will-it-walk-away-from-the-paris-climate-deal.html, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/01/climate/us-biggest-carbon-polluter-in-history-will-it-walk-away-from-the-paris-climate-deal.html.
[49] Ted Nordhaus, “Climate Change Requires Big Solutions. But Baby Steps Are the Only Way to Go.,” Foreign Policy (blog), July 20, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/20/climate-change-requires-big-solutions-but-baby-steps-are-the-only-way-to-go/.
[50] “Fact Sheet: President Biden Sets 2030 Greenhouse Gas Pollution Reduction Target Aimed at Creating Good-Paying Union Jobs and Securing U.S. Leadership on Clean Energy Technologies,” The White House, April 22, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/22/fact-sheet-president-biden-sets-2030-greenhouse-gas-pollution-reduction-target-aimed-at-creating-good-paying-union-jobs-and-securing-u-s-leadership-on-clean-energy-technologies/.
[51] Kelly, “Environmental Responsibilities Overseas: The National Environmental Policy Act and the Export-Import Bank.”
[52] David Heywood, “NEPA and Indirect Effects of Foreign Activity: Limiting Principles from the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality and Transnational Lawmaking,” BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, 2013, 37.
[53] “Forthcoming CEQ Regulations to Determine Whether NEPA Applies to Environmental Impacts Limited to Foreign Countries,” Environmental Law Reporter, 1978, https://elr.info/sites/default/files/articles/8.10111.htm.
[54] In particular, the military significantly contributes to greenhouse gas emissions, yet this is not acknowledged by the Pentagon. For examples, see Neta Crawford, “Pentagon Fuel Use, Climate Change and the Costs of War” (Boston University, November 13, 2019), https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/Pentagon%20Fuel%20Use%2C%20Climate%20Change%20and%20the%20Costs%20of%20War%20Revised%20November%202019%20Crawford.pdf.
[55] “Election Week 2020: Young People Increase Turnout, Lead Biden to Victory,” Center for Information & Research on Civic Learning and Engagement, November 25, 2020, https://circle.tufts.edu/latest-research/election-week-2020.
[56] “TCC/CEN Clean Energy & Climate National Survey,” Conservative Energy Network, October 2020, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5bb4d5ed16b64071e405f888/t/5f884afc626d312807185237/1602767614115/TCCCEN-CleanEnergy-Climate-Survey.pdf.
[57] Steven Mufson, “Are Republicans Coming out of ‘the Closet’ on Climate Change?,” The Washington Post, February 4, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/can-republicans-turn-over-a-new-leaf-on-climate-change/2020/02/03/6a6a6bd8-4155-11ea-aa6a-083d01b3ed18_story.html.
[58] Mufson.
[59] Alex Ward, “The Pentagon Calls Climate Change a National Security Threat. Trump Isn’t Listening.,” Vox, January 18, 2019, https://www.vox.com/2019/1/18/18188153/pentagon-climate-change-military-trump-inhofe.
[60] Christina Couch, “Taking Politics Out of Climate Change,” May 17, 2017, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/depoliticizing-climate-change/.