We live in an era of great geopolitical change. From the way groups compete to the diffusion of power among state and non-state actors, the upcoming geopolitical shifts will bear little resemblance to those of the past. Many people have studied how artificial intelligence, global markets, social media, and hypersonic weapons will affect the way states compete in the future. Another major factor in future geopolitical competition, especially between the reigning hegemonic power of the U.S. and rising regional ambition of China, will be climate change. Climate change will have indirect and direct tangible near and long-term effects on societies across the world. This is a new problem to our modern societies, and one that humanity has not truly faced on a global scale since the General Crisis of the early- to mid-17th century, when the planet experienced an average temperature change of -0.5 degree Celsius over a 50 year period from the 1630s to the 1680s. Polities experienced a slow-motion crisis, which saw years of compounded climate change related dearth, war, and pestilence lead to slow unraveling of states and regional orders.
The siege and capture of Bautzen by the Elector of Saxony, John George I, during the Thirty Years' War, by Matthäus Merian (Wikimedia)
Now as then, climate change will affect the way states compete. The important question is not if, but how climate change will affect geopolitical competition between the U.S. and China. Conflict between the U.S. and China will emerge across the planet as China tries to take a more assertive and controlling role in a world where they will have more of a stake in outcomes and where they will have the ability to assert influence on these outcomes. This does not mean that they are trying to achieve despotic world domination.[1] However, the style of control China will seek will be antithetical to the current norm, established by the U.S. since the end of the Cold War. Unless the two powers are able to create new institutions or adapt existing institutions that dilute power between the two in an acceptable manner—similar to the nuclear arms agreements between the U.S. and the Soviet Union such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty—conflict and competition will arise.
The type of competition we are likely to see between the U.S. and China will be longer and in the aggregate more costly than what was experienced during the Cold War.[2] China is a nation state with a strong story rooted in a civilizational history, unlike the Soviet Union. China is better structured and positioned to deal with certain stressors that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Competition between the U.S. and China will be total in its scope, involving economic leverage, information warfare, psychological operations, lawfare, and military posturing; all of which are already observed in the South China Sea.[3] The great powers will clash in areas of overlapping interest and spheres of influence.[4] Some of these areas such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sahel Africa, the Arctic, Indonesia, and the South China Sea will see significant changes over the next 50 years from long term climate change and climate induced natural disasters.[5]
It is important to understand the effects climate change will have on these regions. First and foremost, climate change will exacerbate the current low to mid-intensity conflicts and create new ones.[6] These regions are home to some of the most populous developing countries in the world and many key resources. Nigerian oil, Myanmar’s land access to the Bay of Bengal from mainland China—circumventing the Malacca Trap—and ports throughout the Indian Ocean coast will be key parts of the future global economy.[7] These countries are also home to restive populations, with Bangladesh and Myanmar experiencing ethnic insurgencies and internationally connected religious extremists operating in Niger, Somalia, Nigeria, and the Philippines.
Desertification in Sahel Africa will lead to a decrease in arable land for farming and grazing, pushing groups to fight in order to survive in a growing desert environment, similar to what has happened in Sudan during the War in Darfur and Somalia’s ongoing Civil War.[8] Rising sea levels will salinate freshwater resources communities rely on in places like southern Bangladesh, leading to an increase in intra-state migration and conflict as new residents try to assimilate into existing communities. Increased temperatures can lead to crop failures and, more likely, lower crop yields affecting the food supply available to the local population, pushing communities to compete for what is left. These future economic centers are located in areas with some of the most at risk populations to climate change. Climate driven conflicts in these locations can trigger intervention by global powers with a vested interest in the outcome.
Animal carcasses rotting near the burned and looted village of Tawilla, west of El Fasher in North Darfur. (USAID/Wikimedia)
Secondly, climate change will put a unique, long term strain on states. Most countries are likely able to respond to a bad harvest year or a particularly destructive monsoon, but the layered effects of multiple dearth years and multiple destructive monsoon seasons are likely to overwhelm states' abilities to respond. As was observed with many European polities during the General Crisis, leaders were unable to create solutions to a slow-motion crisis that shook the very foundation of their society. A government action (or inaction) that creates unequal cost and benefits for different groups will likely create or exacerbate existing divisions. These divisions and problems could empower new groups who will resort to violence to obtain their objectives, whether local or international.
The effect of climate change in these regions will change how the U.S. and China compete in two ways. First, more frequent and destructive natural disasters will put a unique strain on the resources of these powers. Both the U.S. and China see the value placed in soft power approaches to disaster-stricken regions.[9] These countries will likely compete to use aid as a way to set conditions for future influence within the affected region. This can be done through the provision of short-term aid such as food or medicine or long-term aid like reconstruction assistance. By providing aid to countries, both the U.S. and China will be able to push their own narrative on which power is better for the affected country.[10] This can have significant long-term strategic effects in democracies such as the Philippines and Indonesia where popular opinion has major effects on foreign policy decision making.[11] These same disasters can negatively affect the ability of the U.S and China to deploy forces in contested areas, with rising sea levels and destructive storms causing significant damage to military installations.[12]
Secondly, the U.S. and China are unlikely to come to agreements that will provide long term solutions to climate caused problem sets. Unlike the Cold War, where the two great powers could come to agreements on how to cooperate to solve a problem with tangible actions that would lead to a long term solution, conflict between the U.S. and China will have problems where the only near term solution would be to change the interest of the parties involved. Climate change will make some near-term solutions impracticable since the problem derives from a slow-motion crisis that will play out over generations.[13] The current order is not able to respond to this slow-motion crisis. There is currently much less legitimacy and international consensus over principles, policies, and processes when responding to climate change. For example, developing nations do not believe the burden of adjusting to climate change should be carried evenly since most pollution has historically been caused by developed nations.[14] This lack of shared legitimacy over how to deal with climate change and climate related disasters will lead to increased friction between the U.S. and China, especially in competitive regions.[15] As resources run out, more and more people will have fewer and fewer resources to ensure their survival. And when survival is at stake small shifts in the environment can acquire explosive force. Competitive powers can take advantage of these forces and channel them into lines of action that achieve their goals and further plunge the powers into a security dilemma. Current institutions do not have the ability to deal with these consequences that derive from a problem set humanity cannot truly anticipate and whose outcomes are highly uncertain.
Foreign military forces assisted the Philippine government's relief efforts in the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan in 2013. (U.S. Indo-Pacific Command)
The policymaker must keep history in mind. History does not repeat, but it does often rhyme, and the experience of states during the General Crisis can help inform how policymakers approach this problem set when dealing with U.S.- China competition.[16] The General Crisis saw an average global cooling of -0.5 degrees Celsius. Even the most optimistic projections have the planet warming on average by 1.5 degrees Celsius by 2052.[17] Virtually no European state avoided war during the General Crisis. Governments across the world experienced a significant uptick in revolutionary fervor. All of this conflict led to a complete rewriting of the international order in Europe with the Treaty of Westphalia.
There is no reason to believe that similarly seismic shifts in the way societies operate over the next 50 years due to climate change will not lead to similarly profound changes in the way the U.S. and China compete on the global stage. The real question is which state can ride the changing tide and adjust their policies to protect and advance their national interest abroad while avoiding the damaging realities of this future environment.
Anthony Patrick is an officer in the U.S. Marine Corps. The views expressed are the authors and do not represent the views of the U.S. Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
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Header Image: Dead acacia trees in Dead Vlei, near Sossusvlei, Namibia. (Wikimedia)
Notes:
[1] Heath, T. "China's Pursuit of Overseas Security." https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2271.html (retrieved February 16, 2020).
[2] Zakaria, F. "The New China Scare." https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-12-06/new-china-scare (retrieved February 5, 2020).
[3] C Cronin, P. "Total Competition: China's Challenge in the South China Sea (p." 1). https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/total-competition (retrieved February 16, 2020).
[4] Kagan, R. The Jungle Grows Back: America and our Imperiled World. New York: Vintage Books, a Division of Penguin Random House LLC, 2019.
[5] Havnes, H and Seland, J. "The Increasing Security Focus in China's Arctic Policy." Retrieved January 5, 2020, from https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/increasing-security-focus-china-arctic-policy/. (retrieved February 16, 2020).
[6] Espach, R, D Zvijac and R Filadelfo. "Impact of Climate Change on U.S." Military Operations in the Western Pacific . Marine Corps University Journal (2016)
[7] Kaplan, R D.. Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power. New York, NY: n.p., 2011.
[8] Welzer, H. Climate Wars: Why People Will be Killed in the 21st Century (2nd ed.). Malden, MA: n.p., 2019.
[9] Nye, J. "Soft Power." Foreign Policy (1990): 153-171.
[10] Thompson, Drew. “Tsunami Relief Reflects China's Regional Aspirations.” The Jamestown Foundation, January 18, 2005. https://jamestown.org/program/tsunami-relief-reflects-chinas-regional-aspirations/.
[11] Holst, Henry. “Hospital Ships: Soft Power Shock and Awe.” The National Interest. The Center for the National Interest, September 2, 2014. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/hospital-ships-soft-power-shock-awe-11161?nopaging=1.
[12] “Climate Change and U.S. Military Bases.” Climate Change and U.S. Military Bases. American Security Project. Accessed March 26, 2020. https://www.americansecurityproject.org/climate-energy-and-security/climate-change/climate-change-and-u-s-military-basing/.
[13] Haass, R. A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order (2nd ed.). New York: Penguin Books, 2018.
[14] “Can Climate Change Fueled Loss and Damage Ever Be Fair?” 2019. Civil Society Review. http://civilsocietyreview.org/report2019/.
[15] Hayton, Bill. “Two Years On, South China Sea Ruling Remains a Battleground for the Rules-Based Order.” Two Years On, South China Sea Ruling Remains a Battleground for the Rules-Based Order. Chatham House, July 11, 2018.https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/two-years-south-china-sea-ruling-remains-battleground-rules-based-order.
[16] Parker, G. The Global Crisis: War, Climate Change and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century (Abridged). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013.
[17] IPCC, 2018: Summary for Policymakers. In: Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty [Masson-Delmotte, V., P. Zhai, H.-O. Pörtner, D. Roberts, J. Skea, P.R. Shukla, A. Pirani, W. Moufouma-Okia, C. Péan, R. Pidcock, S. Connors, J.B.R. Matthews, Y. Chen, X. Zhou, M.I. Gomis, E. Lonnoy, T. Maycock, M. Tignor, and T. Waterfield (eds.)]. In Press.