President Putin made three foundational assumptions in launching his war against Ukraine that should have been correct but were not. First, Putin assumed the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and easy fight. Second, he assumed the world would denounce the invasion but tacitly allow it. Third, Putin assumed the war would deter NATO expansion.
American concern for a domestic nuclear attack atrophied after this policy change. The Cold War had ended without a nuclear crisis; so, too, had the age of terrorism. As the world advanced into the Digital Age, a full-scale nuclear war seemed completely incomprehensible, much less a more conventional conflict between nuclear-armed superpowers.
In the book Homegrown: ISIS in America, the authors provide a highly detailed account of ISIS activities in the United States. The book explores an area which has been underexamined in the terrorism/counterterrorism, security, and intelligence literature. Culminating over four years of collected research, the authors use the following sources for data collection: The Program on Extremism at George Washington University, court documents, trial attendance, interviews, and approximately forty Freedom of Information Act requests.
...the discussion of U.S. grand strategy by both the neocons such as Robert Kagan and liberals such as David Rothkopf seem to be bereft of proper geostrategic contextualization due to fervent dogmatism, and is out of touch with today’s geopolitical realities. Part of the absence of nuanced contextualization can be understood in light of the fact U.S. foreign policy and its grand strategy are grounded in the ahistoric inclinations of its citizens.
