Alessandra Nisch
Putin’s Wars: Testing Boyd’s Strategy of ...

President Putin made three foundational assumptions in launching his war against Ukraine that should have been correct but were not. First, Putin assumed the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and easy fight. Second, he assumed the world would denounce the invasion but tacitly allow it. Third, Putin assumed the war would deter NATO expansion.

Putin’s Wars: Testing Boyd’s Strategy of Applied Friction

Air Force

#Reviewing Flying Camelot

#Reviewing Flying Camelot

In Flying Camelot: The F-15, the F-16, and the Weaponization of Fighter Pilot Nostalgia, Michael W. Hankins argues that starting as early as the 1960s, a group of fighter pilots and reformers sought to change the procurement process for aircraft to emphasize the importance of the fighter pilot and air superiority missions. Hankins states that this resulted in the development and acquisition of the F-15 and F-16 fighters by the United States Air Force. Hankins further asserts that these reformers sought to change how fighter pilots were trained to emphasize the importance of dogfighting and air superiority campaigns over other aspects of air combat.

The Air Force America Needs: Innovation, Spark Tank, and Ideas to Sustain Air Force Dominance

The Air Force America Needs: Innovation, Spark Tank, and Ideas to Sustain Air Force Dominance

The U.S. Air Force must prioritize leadership follow-up and engagement and organizational ownership of innovative solutions to show airmen that their ideas can be implemented. Not every idea should be enacted, but of the projects vetted and nominated by major commands and selected by Headquarters Air Force, the majority should be. This focus on implementation with the solutions recommended above will achieve and accelerate change to ensure the Air Force remains the dominant force America needs it to be in the years to come.

Sleepwalking into Risk: Learning from the U.S. Navy Surface Fleet

Sleepwalking into Risk: Learning from the U.S. Navy Surface Fleet

Producing new fighter pilots is not an overnight proposition. Increasing the capacity of production pipelines is a costly and long-term endeavor; as a result, the Air Force has proposed short-term capacity gains by operating the fighter pilot training systems at surge tempo and shortening time in the pipeline through syllabus reductions. Correspondingly, an oversupply of new fighter graduates with less-developed airmanship skills transfers risk to front-line units. Recent incidents within the U.S. Navy’s surface fleet offer a cautionary tale of unacknowledged systemic risks. What can the Air Force learn from the fleet as it attempts to reverse the downward flightpath of the fighter pilot force structure, modernize for peer competition, and continue armed-overwatch in U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility?

#Reviewing a Review of Kaplan and Another Kaplan: To Kill Nations: American Strategy in the Air-Atomic Age and the Rise of Mutually Assured Destruction

#Reviewing a Review of Kaplan and Another Kaplan: To Kill Nations: American Strategy in the Air-Atomic Age and the Rise of Mutually Assured Destruction

There are so many themes, plots, and subplots within this text that it is difficult to distill the work, but the main argument is that the U.S. Air Force incrementally developed an atomic air strategy from 1945 until the strategy fell apart after the Cuban Missile Crisis. Kaplan’s narrative relies heavily on this event to sever the interconnected pieces of atomic strategy and air strategy once the popular imagination began to view atomic weapons as unusable.

#Reviewing an Incipient Mutiny

#Reviewing an Incipient Mutiny

All of the author’s evidence and contextual explanations surrounding the Goodier court martial make this case clearly and effectively. Messimer’s work also sheds light on why flying training and flight duty pay are so thoroughly regulated in the military today. And over one hundred years later, it reminds us how military organizations in our country must be accountable for their responsibilities to the public, to the Press, and to Congress.

#Reviewing Flight Risk

#Reviewing Flight Risk

Flight Risk briefly illuminates the Afghan Air Force’s historical point of origin and then traces it to the Coalition’s Air Advisory Mission from 2005-2015. As an Afghan logistics air advisor from 2008-2009, the author accurately depicts the complex human dimension of the air advisory mission beyond worn platforms to those who have served in a very costly war. 

#Reviewing Always at War

#Reviewing Always at War

Deaile weaves a rich tapestry that incorporates doctrine, technology, and daily life in a way that previous authors in this crowded field have not fully explored. He has crafted one of the best single-volume treatments of SAC and its culture, and it should be required reading for anyone studying either Air Force history or Cold War military issues.

#Reviewing Tiger Check

#Reviewing Tiger Check

In the beginning, being a fighter pilot was all about having what later came to be called “the right stuff:” good eyesight, excellent hand-eye coordination, good stick and rudder skills, and aggressiveness. Fino goes to great lengths to demonstrate that over the course of next three decades these skills did not necessarily change, but they did evolve as pilots had to contend with increasingly complex aircraft systems. The history of fighter aviation rapidly became the struggle to understand automation.

Reflections on Airpower: Offensive Strike

Reflections on Airpower: Offensive Strike

As the Islamic State advance was brought to a stop, coalition aircraft were free to attack the enemy from their front line positions to deep behind into the territory they held. The uncontested hold of the air provides us the ability to target and destroy the support network that keeps the self-declared caliphate fully functioning. From Mosul to Raqqa, the destruction of logistic depots, training camps, communication facilities and financial complexes, in addition to the destruction of their fighting units in direct contact with friendly forces, applies pressure on every aspect of the organization.

Reflections on Airpower

Reflections on Airpower

When I look at our presence in the Middle East, the word that comes to mind is “persistent.” It is this persistent presence that has led to the development of the sprawling bases you see in Jason Koxvold’s photographs. These photographs will give a unique look into the locations and lives of Airmen who are the foundation beneath the operations of Airmen like me as we conduct missions in support of America’s national interest.

Maintaining An Innovative Edge: The (Abbreviated) Case For U.S. Air Force Warrant Officers

Maintaining An Innovative Edge: The (Abbreviated) Case For U.S. Air Force Warrant Officers

The debate surrounding warrant officers in the Air Force is bigger than simply money and prestige, both for individuals and for within the force. Today’s Air Force risks both bleeding talent from within based on the current force structure, and its education and training programs for internally growing talent is unlikely to adapt fast enough to keep pace with significant changes in the digital battlespace modern airmen confront. Flexibility is the key to airpower, and the prospect of reintroducing warrant officers on the terms the Air Force needs today are critical to that flexibility.

#Reviewing Air Power Abandoned: Longing for More Raptors

#Reviewing Air Power Abandoned: Longing for More Raptors

The decision to stop production of arguably the world’s greatest flying machine elicits impassioned opinions on both sides of the argument. Raptor supporters argue that the Air Force is significantly weaker than it should be because of the limited number of F-22s, while supporters of Secretary Gates’ decision argue the cancellation of the line allowed the investment of billions of dollars in equipment that saved countless lives in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Same Wars, Different Fights: The Army and Air Force Visions

Same Wars, Different Fights: The Army and Air Force Visions

These two visions are a result of the last 15 years of fighting experience that the Army and Air Force have built. They are both highly divergent, and also complementary. The Army has taken the brunt of the changes that have occurred in the global civilization since the fall of the Soviet Union and is now learning to operate against connected and individually powerful enemies who operate in complex social and urban terrains. The Air Force has been finding its connection to its joint family, overcoming the hubris of early airpower advocates and finding a voice in the joint fight. The two services probably fight better together now than at any other time in the past. But can that hard won cooperation be sustained with such radically different visions of their futures?

#Reviewing The Air Force Way of War

#Reviewing The Air Force Way of War

Much has been written about the transformation of the United States Air Force between the Vietnam War and Operation DESERT STORM. In his classic book Sierra Hotel, C.R. Anderegg documented the revolution in training that occurred at the Fighter Weapons School at Nellis Air Force Base during this era, led by the so-called “Fighter Mafia” of Air Force legends such as John Jumper, Ron Keys and Moody Suter. Steve Davies opened the door to the secret MiG program known as “Constant Peg” that occurred during the same time period in his book Red Eagles, while former Red Eagles Squadron Commander Gail “Evil” Peck gave his unique perspective on this historically significant squadron in his book America’s Secret MiG Squadron.

Army-Air Force Talks

Army-Air Force Talks

 Dan and Dave, no relation to the famous Olympic decathletes, began a dialogue following a workshop on the development of an Air Force Operating Concept. At the conclusion of day 1 of the workshop, Dan and Dave had a discussion on the future of the military; to include the direction our respective services are headed. The idea popped up that these deep discussions should be published, for others to read and debate. The richness and value of discussions on the future of warfare is worthless if left between two people.