President Putin made three foundational assumptions in launching his war against Ukraine that should have been correct but were not. First, Putin assumed the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and easy fight. Second, he assumed the world would denounce the invasion but tacitly allow it. Third, Putin assumed the war would deter NATO expansion.
The Strategy Bridge’s Student Writing Competition is back for 2020! The competition is open to students attending civilian universities and military war or staff colleges at every level, including distance learning, correspondence, and fellowship programs between 1 Jun 2019 and 31 May 2020. The competition deadline is 1 Jun 2020. Winning articles will be announced in July 2020 and published on The Strategy Bridge thereafter.
As the ground force provider with constant missions, the United States Army has, post-WWII, attempted to maintain readiness while it modernized simultaneously and in-stride. However, the force the U.S. Army wants to field in the future is transformational and therefore requires a more deliberate approach. The U.S. Army must determine not only how and when to modernize, but also how to mitigate the cost of modernization.
The global rise of authoritarianism is a pressing strategic problem for the United States and its like-minded allies. Chinese and Russian authoritarianism threaten the liberal order from without. Simultaneously, democratic backsliding in the U.S. and Europe undermines liberalism from within. The nature of these twin aspects of authoritarianism requires a joint response able to support and strengthen the liberal order against disintegration. This response must include a more expansive approach to countering the authoritarian warfare occurring below the traditional threshold of armed conflict.
To meet the challenge of rising Chinese power, the Department of Defense should implement three central allocations. The first is a service reallocation. The Department of Defense must reduce the size of the active-duty Army to fund the Navy’s shipbuilding program, which is critical to meeting the challenge of the growing People’s Liberation Army Navy. The second is a regional reallocation, the Department of Defense must shift military and naval resources from the Middle East to the Indopacific. The third reallocation is from the technical to the cognitive.
The Department of Defense (DoD) must make important strategic choices about the future. This requires understanding the future environment, determining future objectives, and shaping the department’s capabilities to meet future challenges. Each of these steps are difficult, but changing the allocation of resources is particularly challenging. For new/reprioritized capabilities to come into being, the Pentagon’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) system will need to operate.
This article contests the U.S. military’s current risk framework and provides an initial vector for how to consider risk in strategic competition. In doing so I also dismantle the U.S. military’s nascent risk “actions:” accept, avoid, reduce, and transfer. Using systems theory as a foundation, I illustrate how risk cannot be created or destroyed but can be accepted in its current state or transferred to another state. Finally, I recommend two revisions to the way the U.S. military measures risk to better derive clarity for commanders: increasing the precision of measurements and expanding the temporal scope to better assess cumulative risks.
The intertwining of economics and geopolitics means it is imperative that the United States strengthen its economic strategy for the Indo-Pacific to avoid ceding further influence to China. Specifically, the United States. should consider joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the Trans-Pacific Partnership’s (TPP) successor, for the economic and strategic benefits it provides.
References to the rules-based order are frequent in everything from the Biden-era Interim National Security Strategic Guidance to the Trump-era Advantage at Sea. Yet what it means to defend the order, where that defense happens, and what those answers hold for questions of budgets and priorities, is often ambiguous. How should diplomats and operational forces bridge the gap between high-level pronouncements on the rules-based order and practical guidance and budgeting for the daily defense of that order? The development of the new National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy offers two venues to address that question. And the answers should focus not strictly on any one adversary, but on a series of domains: the global common—the high Arctic, the high seas, and space.
To begin 2022, we asked contributors what areas of strategic competition require increased attention and how to resource those areas. As we begin this year of transformation on The Strategy Bridge, we are grateful for each and every submission and for each and every member of our community. We appreciate the creative and diverse approaches to answering our calls for submissions for 1Q22, and we look forward to more engagement with our community—with you—in the year ahead.
In 1932, Bolivia and Paraguay went to war over dry, sparsely populated territories in the Chaco region of South America. Three years of fighting had wide-ranging consequences. National consciousness developed among Bolivia’s disparate peoples and the war increased the importance of public opinion in political life. One postwar rallying cry of veterans, ¡Vamos a avanzar! (Let’s move forward), expressed their desire for reformist modernization.
In Beyond Blue Skies: the Rocket Plane Programs That Led to the Space Age, Chris Petty provides a basic, thoroughgoing primer on the history of rocket plane programs at Edwards Air Force Base, California, beginning with the X-1. This history connects directly both to the military and national security aims of the United States in the post-World War II world and the dawning of the space race.
Three Dangerous Men is a fast read that is also full of details and insights into the lives of Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov, the late Iranian Quds Force Commander Major General Qassem Soleimani, and Vice Chair Zhang Youxia of China’s Central Military Commission. Jones presents the reader with formative experiences in the life and professional development of the three military leaders and how they each contributed to shaping the 21st century military and foreign policies of their respective countries.
Before you finish the author’s introduction of Thomas Gordon’s Marine Maxims, Gordon confronts you with the assertion that there is nothing new in this book, that it is an accumulation of others’ ideas. On the surface, Gordon is correct. The concepts he discusses are not new. But dig a little deeper and Gordon’s assertion is also irrelevant. The value of Marine Maxims is in Gordon’s organization and synthesis of the material; his summation of each section; and the massive bibliography he provides for readers’ personal growth through further reading.
Given the profusion of books, articles, websites, and documentaries about Japan’s surprise attack at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, even someone with a passing interest in this historic event may wonder what another scholarly title could possibly add to the discussion. Japanese-German historian Takuma Melber’s answer in Pearl Harbor: Japan’s Attack and America’s Entry into World War II is two-fold: his book eloquently synthesizes both Japanese and American secondary and primary sources on the attack, and the narrative is told primarily from the perspective of the Japanese.
It is no small task to write a book that begins with the evolutionary history of humans and ends with artificial intelligence and the “Skynet” problem, but Coker has a long track record of wide-ranging analyses of war and warfare. Despite being retired from a professorship of International Relations at the London School of Economics (LSE) and Political Science, he continues to direct the LSE’s foreign policy think tank and is a regular participant or consultant in UK and NATO military education and strategic planning circles. Crucial to this book, he has published a number of other works, many of them full length treatments of subjects that are revisited more briefly in this impressive synthesis.
Elbridge Colby, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development and a leading official in the development of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, has the curriculum vitae to provide an authoritative reassessment of U.S. defense strategy. Anchored in theory and bolstered by historical references, the book provides valuable nuggets of information, but it stops short of being groundbreaking—particularly for readers who are already well abreast of Chinese affairs and the principles of strategy.
Taking over forty years to complete as Stillwell worked on other projects for the United States Naval Institute, the final result was well worth the wait since it not only demonstrates Lee’s importance to American naval professionalism in his own day, but also his legacy of leadership for today’s Navy. The particular goal for Stillwell was to revive the memory of Lee to illustrate these leadership traits. Whether Stillwell succeeds in bringing Lee to our generation of sailors in the United States Navy—much less general American society—remains to be seen, but the biography is top notch.
Out Standing in the Field gives valuable insight into what women go through in the armed forces. While it is a military-specific memoir, it will also resonate with many women who are in any traditionally male-dominated professions. Perron’s experiences are important to understand for those looking to bring about change, a popular topic in this Me Too era. What Perron endured, and the response of those in leadership roles, highlights what needs to be addressed to put the military on track for improvement.
