Three Dangerous Men: Russia, Iran, China, and the Rise of Irregular Warfare. Seth G. Jones. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2021.

The American national security community tends to focus on American capabilities, training, and objectives while not developing an adequate understanding of the competitor’s perspective. H.R. McMaster describes this focus as “strategic narcissism.” In contrast, McMaster advocates “strategic empathy,” which encourages viewing challenges and opportunities from the perspective of adversaries.[1] Sun Tzu, in a similar vein, wrote in The Art of War that “if you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”[2] Seth Jones seeks to capture McMaster’s concept of strategic empathy and Sun Tzu’s “knowing the enemy” in his recent book Three Dangerous Men: Russia, China, Iran, and the Rise of Irregular Warfare.

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Three Dangerous Men is a fast read that is also full of details and insights into the lives of Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov, the late Iranian Quds Force Commander Major General Qassem Soleimani, and Vice Chair Zhang Youxia of China’s Central Military Commission. Jones presents the reader with formative experiences in the life and professional development of the three military leaders and how they each contributed to shaping the 21st century military and foreign policies of their respective countries. Jones relies largely on foreign primary sources, which is demonstrated both in the nuance of his writing and in endnotes filled with Russian, Persian, and Chinese references. In addition to providing insights into the interlacing of these three men’s lives and careers and the foreign policies they represent, Jones provides a thoughtful account not only of how warfare has changed in the 21st century but also how American foreign policy must adapt to these changes.

Jones argues that these military leaders view America as the main source of instability within the international system and as a direct threat to their countries’ national interests.

Each military leader featured by Jones highlights a specific aspect of modern irregular warfare that American national security strategy must grapple with; increasingly sophisticated Russian information operations, low-attributable Iranian proxy warfare, and calculated Chinese influence operations, as means for not only their respective nations’ security, but for their strategic competition with America. Of note, Jones argues that these military leaders view America as the main source of instability within the international system and as a direct threat to their countries’ national interests. Based on this threat, and a recognition that they cannot compete with America in a conventional war, these leaders have helped developed irregular responses: asimmetrichnym (“asymmetrical”) in Russia, jang-e gheir-e kelasik (“nonclassic war”) in Iran, and san zhong zhanfa (“three warfares”) in China.

While these three strategies are distinct to the capabilities and geopolitical realities of each country, Jones observes many commonalities. The Russian asymmetric approach views and even pursues war as a continual, nondeclared struggle that seeks to use information campaigns to disorient and divide Russian opposition and then to conduct limited operations through non-attributional forces to expand Russian influence and power. Iran exploits the region’s unstable political environment to grow its own influence. Jones describes how their Quds Force has used proxies to achieve Iranian objectives in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen over the last twenty-five years, was largely responsible for Hezbollah’s success in the 2006 Lebanon War, and inflamed the insurgency in Iraq. Lastly, Jones shows how China uses political, psychological, and legal tools to coerce and influence other states to comply with Chinese interests. Jones emphasizes China’s use of espionage, intellectual theft, economic coercion, and infrastructure assistance programs to expand capabilities and undermine foreign institutions while indebting developing countries.

America is focused too exclusively on a potential conventional war and is not adequately acknowledging the irregular approaches of its competitors.

Given the growing nonconventional threat from these men’s militaries and the countries they serve, does America have the right foreign policy strategy? If not, how should it be reorganized? According to Jones, America is focused too exclusively on a potential conventional war and is not adequately acknowledging the irregular approaches of its competitors. Jones does not argue for disregarding the risks of a conventional war, but that American foreign policy needs a better equilibrium of investment and prioritization across conventional and irregular capabilities. To achieve this, Jones believes America should look back to its own irregular practices during the Cold War to rethink its approach to the 21st century environment.

Jones argues that there are four key components that need to be included in America’s strategy for countering these irregular challenges. First, America must center any strategy on the values of democracy, individual dignity and freedom, free press, trade, and enterprise. For Jones, this means American foreign policy must be grounded in “protecting the freedom of Americans from external enemies, advancing American prosperity, and setting an example for governments and populations overseas.”[3] Second, America needs a better cultural understanding of its near peer adversaries. China has a $18 billion market for English language training while America’s market for all language training is only $1.6 billion.[4] America needs to invest in developing leaders with robust understanding of the cultures of American competitors. Access to foreign press, speeches, and academic works should also be expanded by using translation tools. Third, Jones believes America needs a strategy to counter influence campaigns. During the Cold War, the U.S. Information Agency broadcast radio programs into the Soviet Union. Today, however, there are insufficient resources for providing alternative media to the curated online environments within Russia, Iran, and China. Lastly, the US must continue to work by, with, and through its partners and must remain globally engaged. If not, America’s competitors will fill the global gaps—as they have already started to do.

Jones’ Three Dangerous Men is an excellent primer for anyone seeking to develop an understanding of Great Power Competition within the 21st century. However, at times it reads more as Three Dangerous Countries by discussing the foreign policy approaches of Russia, Iran, and China far more than connecting the origins of these polices back to the three military leaders. The shortage of insights into the influence of these military leaders may be due to the authoritarian and restrictive nature of the countries these men serve within.

A better definition for irregular warfare should include some aspect of violence…

Another shortcoming of Three Dangerous Men is the broad definition Jones uses for irregular war, which he defines as, “activities short of conventional and nuclear warfare that are designed to expand a country’s influence and legitimacy, as well as to weaken its adversaries.”[5] While this definition is useful for understanding the competitive nature of the international system, it allows almost any state action to be considered an act of war. Jones uses this broad definition to include economic tools, such as the Belt-and-Road Initiative, and political allegiances, like Russia and Iran’s partnership with Syria, as irregular warfare. While these acts present challenges within the international system, and necessitate responses in line with Jones’ recommendations, they should be defined more clearly as diplomatic and economic competition than as elements of warfare. A better definition for irregular warfare should include some aspect of violence, such as the DOD’s Joint Operating Concept definition of “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over relevant populations. Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches…to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”[6]

Despite these minor issues, Seth Jones’ Three Dangerous Men should be read by anyone seeking a better understanding of the competitive nature of today’s international system. He does a superb job of showing how America’s competitors exploit asymmetric advantages to degrade America’s position in the world order. He provides clear and actionable recommendations for how America’s national security community should adjust its strategy to this environment and argues strongly for improving domestic understanding of America’s competitors. Without question, Jones provides a model for strategic empathy in his reliance on foreign and primary sources to inform this work. Such intercultural approaches are pivotal towards improving strategy and policy in today’s, and any era’s, global system.

Andrew Webster is an active-duty Army officer pursuing a master’s in public policy from Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect those of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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Header Image: Qasem Soleimani, Former commander of Quds Force of Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, ND (Sayyed Shahab-o- din Vajedi).

Notes:

[1] H.R. McMaster, Battlegrounds: The Fight to Defend the Free World (New York: Harper Large Print, 2020).

[2] Sun Tzu and Samuel Griffith, The Art of War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964) #18.

[3] Seth Jones, Three Dangerous Men: Russia, China, Iran and the Rise of Irregular Warfare (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2021), 185.

[4] Jones, Three Dangerous Men, 187-188.

[5] Jones, Three Dangerous Men, 11

[6] Department of Defense, Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC). Version 1.0 (2007), 1.