Renewed interest in strategic competition heightens focus on the “rules-based international order.”[1] References to the rules-based order are frequent in everything from the Biden-era Interim National Security Strategic Guidance to the Trump-era Advantage at Sea. Yet what it means to defend the order, where that defense happens, and what those answers hold for questions of budgets and priorities, is often ambiguous. How should diplomats and operational forces bridge the gap between high-level pronouncements on the rules-based order and practical guidance and budgeting for the daily defense of that order? The development of the new National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy offers two venues to address that question. And the answers should focus not strictly on any one adversary, but on a series of domains: the global common—the high Arctic, the high seas, and space.[2]
…moderating competition in the commons can be a valuable way to constrain security contests in those spheres, helping to place guardrails on great power competition.
The Interim National Security Guidance speaks at length about the international order, and even briefly about the need to deter adversaries from “inhibiting access to the global commons.” What remains is for the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy to build upon that slight reference to explain how national and defense objectives should inform a unified, multi-service, multi-domain strategy for great power relations at sea, at the poles, and in space. They must do so because global commons are–and have often been–a key venue for day-to-day competition, proxy contests, and battles for prestige. As this article shows, moderating competition in the commons can be a valuable way to constrain security contests in those spheres, helping to place guardrails on great power competition. The result is predominantly a conceptual switch for the Defense Department: from an adaptation of the comfortable focus on great power rivals to a focus that understands the unique importance of the domains of competition. A tangible benefit of this approach is that it also helps frame hard choices about real service priorities.
History as a Guide for Competition in the Commons
Global commons, as an idea, originated as a description of a category of resources, access to which could not be relegated to a limited subset of actors.[3,4] Hence, the “tragedy of the commons” that results from unmitigated overexploitation. These domains experience minimal gatekeeping. Because the commons are where state authority is constrained to oases of ships, satellites, and bases, they are the very spaces where the rules of the international order are most likely to be repeatedly tested, reinforced, or rewritten. The actions of great powers in the commons may even directly shape the nature of strategic competition, if the history of how states have approached non-sovereign spaces are our guide.
The high seas, the poles, and space all require specialized investments and equipment to operate within, and it is no surprise that the most capable operators across these domains tend to be military forces.
The commons are arenas for competition precisely because they are at the fringes of sovereignty—if they were easy to dominate, they would have long before been incorporated into existing state structures. Instead, the commons are harsh environments where treaty or customary law often fill the gap left in the absence of enduring sovereigns. The high seas, the poles, and space all require specialized investments and equipment to operate within, and it is no surprise that the most capable operators across these domains tend to be military forces. Indeed, dominating the commons is, and has often been, a competitive advantage for wealthy, system-ordering states. The commons therefore influence competitive dynamics between states by nature of their complexity and the role that militaries play in accessing them. The so-called “heroic age of Antarctic exploration” was, for example, partially a proxy battle for military and national prestige at an unusually peaceful moment for Europe. The Cold War space race was famously a proxy contest for missile technology, and likewise featured military astronauts and technology even in the civilian U.S. space agency.
It should be no surprise, then, that the connection between frontier spaces and global power dynamics has often been important to state strategies and capability development during eras, as seen in the actions of big states like the British Empire and small states like the young U.S. or Norway. Suppressing maritime pirates and outlawing privateers at sea was an important part of the modern era’s project of state building and sovereignty development in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[5] The nineteenth century rise of the British Empire was linked to the refinement of legal ideas and naval force) associated with maritime zonation and sovereign immunity of British-flagged vessels at sea.[6]
Even smaller states have seen the commons as domains for competition. As the U.S. gained strength as a young nation, it turned to build its nascent Navy to safeguard U.S. interests on the fringes of state power–as in the Barbary wars, which featured heavily in the commissioning of the original six frigates.[7] Norway, newly independent of Sweden at the turn of the twentieth century, yet small and sparsely populated on the margins of Europe, saw its polar exploration credentials as a mark of admission into the community of nations.[8] Because of the political implications of such exploration, some Norwegian leaders also saw Roald Amundsen’s dash for the South Pole against Robert Falcon Scott as a risky provocation to a friendly great power at a moment of national uncertainty.
The strategic roles of the commons are not simply matters of distant history. In the Cold War, the U.S. pursued a particularly active slate of diplomacy tied to securing and constraining threats in common domains. The U.S. was central to the development of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, a major cornerstone of, and nearly synonymous with, the contemporary rules-based international order. The U.S. and Soviet competition in space was itself a major instigator for significant strides in space policy, including ratification of the Outer Space Treaty. Antarctica’s current peaceful status is a function of the Antarctic Treaty System originating in the early Cold War, a partial reaction to World War II and concerns over great–and not-so-great–power rivalries spilling out onto the continent.
The Commons Today
Today, the commons are again at the forefront of strategic challenges. China is seen by most as the greatest potential rival to the U.S. status as champion of the global order. It is notable, therefore, that Chinese aims are often seen as most destabilizing when the country is operating at the order’s physical margins. Maritime territorial disputes that seek to revise China’s commitments to recognized law of the sea are examples of threats to the order that are best understood, not as regional disputes, but as inherently tied to the maritime domain’s fungible legal status.[9] China’s ongoing initiative to become a “polar great power,” seen through its investment in an icebreaker fleet, an Antarctic initiative, and Arctic research bases, also clearly links perceptions of state influence with status in the polar regions.[10] The same is true of China’s efforts in space exploration, all while the PLAN commissions new ships at an astonishing rate.[11]
The Canadian Coast Guard Ship Louis S. St-Laurent follows the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Healy through the Arctic ice, Sept. 11, 2008. (PO3 Michael Anderson/U.S. Coast Guard Photo)
Not every action by a rival power can be parried during peacetime—that is both financially and operationally impractical.
Russia, even while focused in the near-term on reordering the European security environment, is an important long-term competitor in the commons. The country’s status as a great power is partially anchored in its self-image as a space and Arctic power. Russia’s two-year term at the helm of the Arctic Council, which began in 2021, coincides with a broader initiative to reinvest in Russia’s Arctic identity. And even in a region where Russia has much to gain from the status quo in the Arctic, tensions between Moscow and Washington over the legality of the Northern Sea Route underscore again how the mutable status of commons often serve as test cases for power rivalries pushing against the order. And when it comes to strategic investments, the commons are evident in Russia’s recapitalized submarine fleet, its sea-based precision weapons, and its November 2021 anti-satellite test.
Implications for National Strategy
Not every action by a rival power can be parried during peacetime—that is both financially and operationally impractical. As a result, U.S. strategy must provide guardrails and filters for policymakers to consider what adversary actions, individually or in aggregate, are strategic in effect. A focus on the commons offers one such filter—largely conceptual, but with implications for how to think about funding priorities. It would imply that any adversary efforts to undermine institutions that mediate state activities in global commons, or subject neighbors to self-serving reinterpretations of international norms in shared spaces, should be seen as particularly threatening to the order’s rules-based nature. Conversely, adversary actions in global commons that conform to international norms should be seen as positive for the sustainment of the order and its rules. A U.S. strategy that is competitive for the sake of competition may ultimately undermine the rules-based order if norm-abiding adversary behavior in the commons is met with provocation.
The Expeditionary Sea Base USS Hershel “Woody” Williams (ESB 4) prepares to pull into Dakar, Senegal, June 21, 2021. (U.S. Navy).
One clear implication that would follow from a strategy of defending the rules-based order in the commons is the need to resource day-to-day ordering activities, not just warfighting preparedness. Policymakers should emphasize order maintenance capabilities in the maritime arena such as more, small vessels and a more deliberate focus on building credibility in key international institutions, and the countries that make up those institutions.[12,13] Resourcing should also reflect the reality that day-to-day competition arises predominantly in some domains and not others. At sea, that would mean more support for peacetime missions, such as through station ships like the USS Hershel “Woody” Williams, which is active now in the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) area of responsibility.[14] At the poles, policymakers could pursue this agenda principally through icebreaker construction and deeper engagement with the Arctic and Antarctic coordination mechanisms, specifically the Arctic Council and Antarctic Treaty System. And in space, implementation might include more research, cooperation with partners, and norm setting in diplomatic forums to dissuade malign behavior such as Russia’s 2021 anti-satellite test.[15,16]
Acknowledging that protecting the order is not always a militarized endeavor should be frankly stated in the new strategies to help emphasize the role of non-Defense Department U.S. government partners and drive resources in their direction.
Another implication of such a strategy is that defending the order is not solely a military affair. The commons are intricately tied to the rules-based order because many of the order’s norms, institutions, and treaties exist to mediate interactions in shared spaces. That means that defense of the order includes significant diplomatic components, including: fully funding the U.S. diplomatic corps; U.S. ratification of the law of the sea; updating space law to account for increasing privatization; extending the Antarctic Treaty System; and elevating U.S. engagement in institutions such as the Arctic Council, the International Maritime Organization, and the International Telecommunication Union. Acknowledging that protecting the order is not always a militarized endeavor should be frankly stated in the new strategies to help emphasize the role of non-Defense Department U.S. government partners and drive resources in their direction. As in the Cold War, seeking opportunities to constrain risks, de-escalate tensions, or even outright cooperate in the commons can be mutually beneficial to rival parties.
There are also a few pitfalls that policymakers can evade when integrating commons into national strategy. First, unlike other entities such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development or the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S. does not label space as a global commons, and Antarctica is an arena where state claims are technically deferred but not nonexistent.[17,18] This is easily remedied with language that speaks to “shared spaces,” “common domains,” or “areas of limited sovereignty.” That the U.S. government chooses not to label space and the Antarctic as global commons should be understood as a legal matter and not one that changes the substantive reality of those spaces and their historic roles in strategic competition. Indeed, a concerted U.S. policy initiative on global commons in the Cold War, often to constrain, not expand, competition in those arenas, is the reason why these domains have their unique legal structures today.
Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall delivers his keynote address at the 36th Space Symposium, Aug. 24, 2021 in Colorado Springs, Colorado. (Space Foundation)
Second, cyberspace is often a challenging consideration in discussions of the commons. Arguments for its inclusion seem obvious: the domain appears to be ruled by no one, and is so democratizing that it stretches our notion of what kinds of actors can pose strategic risks. Yet servers and service-providers all physically exist in some jurisdiction, meaning that a seemingly stateless internet is often countless “internets” all hosted by, and theoretically subject to, national laws. The cyber domain also strays from the original resource-based definition of the commons—there is no obvious risk of uncontrolled overexploitation of the cyber domain. Addressing cyber threats is unequivocally important. Yet treating the domain as a global commons akin to the sea, poles, and space may stretch the concept of commons more than it helps.
Frontier spaces, those areas not subject to standard divisions of state sovereignty, have long been connected to the basic nature of the rules-based order.
Third, a strategy of the commons should not whitewash how the commons differ.[19] On the high seas, competition will likely continue to take the form that it has for centuries, by commerce and naval power. In space, norms continue to evolve. Constraints on weapons staging in space can work to America’s advantage by limiting the scale of needed investments even as the domain grows in importance as a warfare enabler. The Antarctic Treaty System forbids explicit military activities on the continent, but the military can and does play a role in facilitating access. This access capacity should remain an area of focus for the Coast Guard and the Air Force, and sustaining Antarctica’s peaceful character offers a clear US diplomatic agenda as the Antarctic Treaty ages. That the commons share an important link to the rules-based order does not mean they are equal in interest, status, or character.
Conclusion
Defending the international rules-based order is a lofty goal worthy of U.S. strategy. Yet the objective remains nebulous and therefore challenging for diplomats, services, and combatant commanders to resource and implement. What does it mean to safeguard the order, where specifically does that defense take place, and with what? The development of the Biden administration’s new National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy present opportunities to address these questions and draw a connection that the administration’s interim guidance tentatively invites: the role of global commons.
Frontier spaces, those areas not subject to standard divisions of state sovereignty, have long been connected to the basic nature of the rules-based order. Mediating interactions in the commons—through conventions, norms, or organizations—is a central function of today’s order, and rulemaking, or rule-breaking, in areas without universal sovereignty make the commons an arena where the order is particularly subject to reinforcement or revision by major powers. Whether those powers seek to maintain the commons as domains for mutual gain, commerce, and security, or whether great powers seek to carve out exceptions to the rules in their near-abroad, will shape the trajectory of great power relations in our era.
Joshua Tallis is the author of The War for Muddy Waters: Pirates, Terrorists, Traffickers, and Maritime Insecurity. He is a research scientist at the Center for Naval Analyses and holds a Ph.D. in international relations from the University of St Andrews. The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not reflect the official position of the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
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Header Image: Satellite over the coast. April 9, 2016 (SpaceX via Unsplash).
Notes:
[1] “Building a Sustainable International Order,” RAND, accessed January 16, 2022, https://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/international-order.html.
[2] Only a portion of the Arctic (the high Arctic, about 20 percent of the overall Arctic maritime area) is high seas territory.
[3] “Glossary of Statistical Terms: Global Commons,” OECD, las updated November 12, 2001, https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1120.
[4] Mark Raymond, “Puncturing the Myth of the Internet as a Commons,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, (2013): 53-64, https://www.jstor.org/stable/43134322.
[5] Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).
[6] Barry Ryan, “The Disciplined Sea: A History of Maritime Security and Zonation,” International Affairs 95, no. 5 (2019): 1055-1073, https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/95/5/1055/5537416.
[7] Ian Toll, Six Frigates: The Epic History of the Founding of the U.S. Navy (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006).
[8] Roland Huntford, The Last Place on Earth: Scott and Amundsen's Race to the South Pole, Revised and Updated (New York: The Modern Library, 1999).
[9] “Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea,” Council on Foreign Relations Global Conflict Tracker, last accessed January 16, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea.
[10] Rush Doshi, Alexis Dale-Huang, and Gaoqi Zhang, “Northern Expedition: China’s Arctic Activities and Ambitions,” Brookings, April 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/research/northern-expedition-chinas-arctic-activities-and-ambitions/ .
[11] Taylor A. Lee and Peter W. Singer, “China’s Space Program Is More Military Than You Might Think,” Defense One, July 16, 2021, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/07/chinas-space-program-more-military-you-might-think/183790/.
[12] Joshua Tallis, “To Compete With Russia and China at Sea, Think Small,” Defense One, May 12, 2020, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/05/compete-russia-and-china-sea-think-small/165337/. See also, Joshua Tallis, “How Good Order at Sea is Central to Winning Strategic Competition,” CIMSEC, August 12, 2020, https://cimsec.org/how-good-order-at-sea-is-central-to-winning-strategic-competition/.
[13] Michael Mazar, “Summary of the Building a Sustainable International Order Project,” RAND, 2018, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2397.html.
[14] Eric Coffer, “USS Hershel “Woody” Williams Arrives in Senegal,” Commander U.S. 2nd Fleet, News Stories, June, 25, 2021, https://www.c2f.usff.navy.mil/Press-Room/News-Stories/Article/2680949/uss-hershel-woody-williams-arrives-in-senegal/.
[15] Therese Hitchens, “Exclusive: UK Pushes New UN Accord On Military Space Norms,” Breaking Defense, September 13, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/09/exclusive-uk-pushes-new-un-accord-on-military-space-norms/.
[16] Christian Davenport, “The Pentagon is Looking for Garbage Collectors in Space,” Washington Post, January 27, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/01/27/space-debris-pentagon-contract/?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=wp_main.
[17] “Global Commons,” Council on Foreign Relations, last accessed January 16, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/global-commons?topics=All®ions=All&type=All&page=8.
[18] “Encouraging International Support for the Recovery and Use of Space Resources,” Executive Order 13914, April 6, 2020, https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/eo/eo-13914.pdf.
[19] Joshua Tallis, “Lessons for Space from the Oceans and Poles,” Proceedings, June 2020, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/june/lessons-space-oceans-and-poles.