President Putin made three foundational assumptions in launching his war against Ukraine that should have been correct but were not. First, Putin assumed the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and easy fight. Second, he assumed the world would denounce the invasion but tacitly allow it. Third, Putin assumed the war would deter NATO expansion.
Since 2001, the landscape of warfare has drastically changed. Drones, armed non-state actors, and private security firms have become common on the battlefield, and their influence continues to evolve and grow. While their involvement in the future of warfare is uncertain, more than likely they will be as commonplace in future conflicts as tanks, airplanes, and submarines are today. In his latest book, Claude Berube offers readers a vivid glimpse of this possible future.
Volatile. Uncertain. Complex. Ambiguous. Pick your euphemism. The world can be both rich with culture and diversity and at the same time violently unforgiving. From nuclear-ambitious despots to resurgent Cold War adversaries, from refugee crises to climate change, threats and challenges exist in every corner of the globe. The question most often posed each year is which of these threats and challenges deserve our utmost focus? Where should we target our effort? What truly awaits us over the horizon?
Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland can help us better understand the experience of Clausewitzian genius. Now, this sounds about as illogical as Lewis Carroll’s famous riddle, uttered by the Mad Hatter: “Why is a raven like a writing desk?” But unlike the riddle, which was initially constructed without an answer, the concept of genius links Clausewitz and Alice without artifice. While Clausewitz’s “field of genius...raises itself above rules,” Wonderland is a fantastical space that enables Alice to raise herself not only above rules, but also sense. To see how this is so, we can appeal to Alice and her encounters in Wonderland to highlight the complexity found within military genius. But first we must locate genius in the space where theory fails to map onto reality.
Sparrow’s account of Scowcroft is full of insight and surprises. Readers will take pleasure in Sparrow’s depiction of the NSC debates, executive-level relationships, and the nuanced recollections of a consummate strategist. Anyone interested in understanding the unique role of the NSC in foreign policy and executive-level decision-making during the Nixon, Ford, Reagan, or first Bush administrations will be interested Sparrow’s work. This book also has practical use for journalists, political scientists, as well as students of U.S. security strategy, foreign policy, and American government.
After a few seconds, my driver and I looked at one another and burst out laughing. The MRAP-ATV (Mine Resistant Ambush-Protected All-Terrain Vehicle, one of those machines ordered by Robert Gates that saved my life and countless others) lay still, angled into a massive hole in the road. The hood had twisted up and over the top of the vehicle and radiator fluid leaked onto my gunner, who crouched beneath the turret in a vain attempt to avoid it. I felt surprisingly calm—it was a relief to finally get blown up—and my shoulders continued to roll with the laughter, the most vivid memory of my life.
The alternative to a good theory of causality is not the lack of a theory of causality, but a poor or ill-considered theory of causality. Unfortunately, such a theory of causality has made it remarkably difficult for airmen to explain and advance what air, space, and cyberspace do for the joint community and national objectives. We’ve spent the last decade disrupting threat networks from the air, but without the language of causality, we’ve analytically relegated these actions to the realm of support instead of claiming the mantle of airpower. A water-thin theory of causality leaves us all scrambling for the prize real estate on the “tip of the spear,” while a better theories of causality allows us to appreciate how the diversity of airmen’s contributions actually complement each other.
Brand matters. Whether you’re talking about Apple computers, Breitling watches, or Coca-Cola products, how a brand is perceived is important. It creates value. And the higher the perceived value, the more revenue the brand generates. So why should it be any different for you? Shouldn’t your personal leader brand be synonymous with quality performance? Don’t you want your name to be first on a senior leader’s mind for career opportunities and assignments? Don’t you want to be perceived as someone who adds value to any leadership team? Yet most of us overlook our leader brand. We take it for granted. If – and that’s a strong if – we even consider our brand. Because, to be completely honest, most of us don’t.
The Molotov cocktail is one of the most visible icons of civil resistance in the modern age. Whether it is on the streets of Kyiv, Athens, or the latest site of any G20 meeting, the Molotov cocktail is one of the variables modern media will seize on to determine whether a mass demonstration is a protest or a riot. The image of fires burning and bottles being hurled through the air are eye-catching because they are asymmetric, providing average civilians with potent lethality to challenge even the most heavily-armed riot police.
China is often credited with taking the long view to achieve its strategic goals; however, that luxury may be coming to an end. There is an oft-quoted story about former Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, who, when asked about the effects of the French Revolution on China, demonstrated the Chinese long view by answering, “It is too soon to tell.” U.S. strategists...have watched China slowly grow in power, both militarily and economically, over the last few decades with an arguable long-term goal of displacing the U.S. as the dominant global power...China has remained in the shadows of global security, rarely venturing out to address even regional challenges, hoping their gradual, long term, hegemonic rise would become a fait accompli. That hope may now be at risk.
The strategic mind of the navalist is on full display in the latest Wheel Book from the U.S. Naval Institute. Naval Strategy, edited by Thomas J. Cutler, is paired well with the earlier installment, Naval Tactics by Captain Wayne P. Hughes Jr., USN (Ret.). Cutler’s volume, however, is the meatier one as it includes articles by Admiral J.C. Wylie, Sam Tangredi, Milan Vego, Samuel Huntington, Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral James Stavridis, amongst others. The essays by Wylie and Corbett are themselves worth the price of admission.
The violence occurring in the Middle East is the result of a revisionist movement, namely the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which seeks to conquer the greater region and expand its caliphate. A group that knows no geographical boundaries, its rapid rise is a symptom of what is widely regarded as the post-Westphalian trend the world has taken. Further, the volatility accompanying years of sectarian division has only been exacerbated by western involvement in the region, a century-old pattern of attempts to dictate the direction of governance dating back to World War I.
The West needs a new plan for curbing violence and increasing stability and prosperity in the Middle East. We have decades of experience from which we can learn in order to map out more effective future strategies. This article details a new 5-point plan for promoting peace, prosperity, and stability in the Middle East.The West needs a new plan for curbing violence and increasing stability and prosperity in the Middle East. We have decades of experience from which we can learn in order to map out more effective future strategies. This article details a new 5-point plan for promoting peace, prosperity, and stability in the Middle East.
The United States’ favorite “ally without portfolio,” Saudi Arabia, reacted coolly to recent news of the US-Iranian nuclear deal, with a combination of official tepid praise and private indignation. Many wondered at the time what the long term fallout from the deal might be and it looks like Saudi Arabia is finally giving the world their answer: they aren’t giving up on wrecking the deal just yet.
Top military leaders instruct officers to attend more closely to the tangled connections between a military unit's actions, its armed adversaries, and the sociopolitical landscape on which conflicts unfold. Insofar as these causal connections elude military professionals, armed interventions will tend to induce unwelcome consequences and, thereby, strategic discontent. Educators can help. The skilled integration of political science in the classroom provides a way for educators to squarely address these leaders’ concerns. But we first have to rethink fundamentals. Namely, what does military expertise and advice entail?
Few, if any students or practitioners of strategy can argue the importance of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan’s influence on sea power theory, as well as his impact on the American military institution as a whole. As with any theorist, however, we tend to examine his body of work, and to look at the factors that shaped who he was as a strategist and a mariner. Most works only give a cursory glance at the things that influenced Mahan’s character across all facets of his life. In God and Sea Power, author Suzanne Geissler goes beyond that, following the closely-interwoven relationship between Mahan’s faith and his work as a sailor, leader, and strategist.
