President Putin made three foundational assumptions in launching his war against Ukraine that should have been correct but were not. First, Putin assumed the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and easy fight. Second, he assumed the world would denounce the invasion but tacitly allow it. Third, Putin assumed the war would deter NATO expansion.
It is about what they have taught us about what war is; what it does to people, countries, and cultures; and what should be considered before entering into war. These are the beginnings of my reflections on the Long War. To be honest, I am somewhat hesitant to pen any writings or articles but think that it is the right time to do so.
One does not intend here to attempt pithy conclusions as to who is playing Athens and who is playing Sparta in the modern geopolitical game in Eastern Europe. That is the concern of the Catch-22 addressed by Park, which I commend to you. But another question worth considering in this matter is, regardless of your geopolitical worldview, who is playing the parts of Corinth and Corcyra? And should we be more weary of the periphery?
The U.S. Army will not be very successful in the coming operating environment unless it develops a sense of strategic understanding in its officers (and senior non-commissioned officers). For the purposes of this essay, strategic understanding is defined here as: awareness, comprehension, and ability to communicate broad purpose for the use of force and the relationship between tactical action and national policy. Trends tell us two things that demand this characteristic: first, landpower is inherently attributional; second, the Regionally Aligned Forces model ensures that the American Army will go to more places, faster, in smaller numbers, than ever before.
In response to Putin, NATO-building begins at home. We need NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division, fully focused on the Alliance’s core business, reaching out to the member states’ ordinary taxpayers. The changing European security environment requires an emphasis on the big messages: Defense, deterrence and security. Thus, zeitgeist-motivated campaigns should be stopped. In these times, NATO must tell the people what armies, air forces really are for and how our soldiers serve their countries and our Alliance.
There is a lesson from Agincourt for today’s Airmen, specifically vis-à-vis the A-10. There is a difference in forces designed to offensively interdict and achieve superiority (the comparison’s to light and heavy cavalry are obvious), and those whose attack capability provide a distinctly defensive advantage.
The fact that our “global health security agenda” focuses on future pandemics and deliberate bioterror threats is laughable in the face of reemerging infectious diseases and slaughtered immunization workers. True health insecurity is present globally, and it should not require a mystery test tube and ill intent to be perceived as valid and pressing threat.
Understanding presidential decisions for and against increased force in ongoing conflicts is a significant and important endeavor. The implications include the impact on future decisions to commit troops in the first place—such as in Syria. National security decision making also affects civil-military relations, as well as the balance between executive and congressional powers. Finally, as escalation and de-escalation involves either mission creep or the need to adjust policy aims by taking an appetite suppressant, understanding its dynamics will illuminate leader perceptions, the difference between wartime realities and prewar expectations, and the impact on the U.S. debt and the American public.
Once again, the Army is attempting to transform itself. The question the Army can’t seem to answer is, “why?” Yes, the world is becoming more complex and competitive: China’s rise, a resurgent Russia, an unstable Middle East, and the continued threat of the metastasizing cancer of Al Qaeda spanning from North Africa to Central Asia are all challenging America’s global leadership position. However, no single threat has emerged as existential to the U.S. or its vital national interests.
Suicide bombings are nothing new — it is a tactic that been in use since the early 1980s — but it has typically been a man’s game. Until recently, that is. There is no place where female suicide bombers have blossomed more than in the Caucasus region of Russia: Chechnya and Dagestan. The practice of suicide bombings did not originate here but seems to be thriving in the Caucasus.
The civil-military divide in the 21st century can be described as one between the military and the elites that govern it, and as one between those elites in uniform and those in a regular coat and tie. While increasing the number of elites in uniform will help with the first divide, it does not do much for the second. The military should not abandon its values, and in fact, I believe it should continue to be defined by them. However, if the civil-military divide is to be closed, those in the military need to realize that underneath the uniform of their values lies an occupationally minded American, who is remarkably similar to every other citizen of our great Nation.
Where are the “generation of military reformers” that some despair will ever arise from the ashes of Iraq and Afghanistan? Coming into their own. Over the last month, I’ve observed an encouraging sign for our military profession. Several junior officers have used the power of the pen to reach outside of their foxholes, moving well beyond the typical sphere of influence of a newly commissioned lieutenant. Through their words, they have helped bring about the change of existing policies, shared lessons on leadership, and sparked multiple professional conversations.
Established by the US Congress in 2008, the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has drawn attention over the past couple of years for its aggressive pursuit of development project mismanagement by US and Afghan organizations. John Sopko, who became the SIGAR in 2012, struck the drum again this past month. Speaking at the Atlantic Council, a Washington-based think tank, Sopko reminded his audience that Afghan corruption could undo all that has been accomplished in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban unless the US implemented a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy. The prognosis from his office remains a compelling indictment of what has not been accomplished in that country over the past twelve years.
The civil-military divide in the Army Officer Corps is largely a self-inflicted wound. The Army should not stand by and allow it to grow and eventually damage the vital trust relationship the American people have in the United States military. It is within the Army’s span of influence to reduce this divide.
To create decisiveness in leaders—and to increase tempo—the Army should decrease leaders’ reliance on thick doctrinal manual, reinforced by top-down demands for every detail, through training that remains out of touch with the latest progression in learning. It cannot rely on checklists or computer-generated orders to put in place the mind and voice of an experienced, imaginative commander. The importance of a calm commander talking to his subordinates cannot be stressed enough. A mutual understanding will come from well-written yet brief doctrinal manuals, enhanced with the use of radios and other digital technology. So-called secure radios with inexperienced officers at both ends resemble talk radio shows. The computer cannot replace essential voice communications, while technology cannot replace the well developed and prepared mind.
While the argument against Russian violations of Ukrainian territorial sovereignty is a valid one, those making this argument may not be doing so based on their expressed concern for that sovereignty, but rather because it offers the most legitimate challenge to Russian action. The inconsistency of the Wests past behavior with this argument implies the real logic behind the Western position may not about sovereignty but simply about opposing Russia.
