Alessandra Nisch
Putin’s Wars: Testing Boyd’s Strategy of ...

President Putin made three foundational assumptions in launching his war against Ukraine that should have been correct but were not. First, Putin assumed the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and easy fight. Second, he assumed the world would denounce the invasion but tacitly allow it. Third, Putin assumed the war would deter NATO expansion.

Putin’s Wars: Testing Boyd’s Strategy of Applied Friction

Understanding the Need for a Balanced Joint Force: A Mix Martial Arts (MMA) Analogy

Understanding the Need for a Balanced Joint Force: A Mix Martial Arts (MMA) Analogy

Human conflict ranging from individual-on-individual fighting to nation states waging war has seen evolutionary changes to techniques used in combat. The world of martial arts, like warfare, has seen a rapid evolution in individual fighting techniques. Each has various philosophical underpinnings and was developed to address the unique challenges faced by practitioners. Throughout the ages, the question many asked was which technique, martial art, was the greatest of them all. The same debate has emerged in state-on-state and state-on-nonstate warfare regarding the effectiveness of landpower, seapower, and airpower. The history and development of Mixed Martial Arts (MMA) helps illustrate the utility and shortcoming of each style of fighting, stand up strikers and ground fighters, as an analogy of today’s debate between land, sea, and air, and the necessity of mixing things up.

The Cost of Power Miscalculation

The Cost of Power Miscalculation

In light of the recent East-West tensions due to Russia’s near-annexation of Crimea, China’s aggressive behavior in the East and South China Seas, continued instability in the Middle East, and the threat of a nuclear Iran, or worse, a failed nuclear Pakistani state highlight the dangers the United States faces in the decades to come. The recently released DoD Budget and QDR both highlight the need to rebalance the force through greater investments in technological solutions at the expense of manpower along with the future applications of the joint force.

Russia’s European Designs: To Weaken, Not to Join

Russia’s European Designs: To Weaken, Not to Join

Current debate is focused on Russia’s actions in Crimea, the political crisis in Ukraine at large, or Western impotence. Russia’s long-term strategy is missing from the conversation. Perhaps Moscow does not have one, but that would be a foolish assumption. So what is motivating Russia to focus its attention on a tiny peninsula where some Russian speakers it could care less about reside?

Counter Terrorism, Continuing Advantage, and a Broader Theory of Victory

Counter Terrorism, Continuing Advantage, and a Broader Theory of Victory

When the strategist considers counter terrorism, they must grapple with the larger focus of their aim, which is the act of building a bridge between two unlike elements: policy and military action. At the tactical level, counter terrorism is an action meant to culminate in an event that prevents, preempts, deters, defeats, or punishes a terrorist. However, at the strategic level, counter-terrorism is meant “as a plan for attaining continuing advantage.” In order for our counter terrorism strategies to remain effective, we must reject the strategic heuristic of specific end states, and instead seek continuing advantage towards a better state of peace.

Enabling the Dragon: China’s Foreign Policy between Thucydides and Sun Tzu

Enabling the Dragon: China’s Foreign Policy between Thucydides and Sun Tzu

On March 8 Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi gave his first major press conference against the background of the ongoing session of the National People’s Congress. More than 500 journalists listened to the FM for 95 minutes, but it was the very last statement that deserves the most attention. Wang outlined the three main foundations for China’s new age foreign policy and behind the traditional aesthetically sophisticated formulas one can see a pure case of Thucydidian realism.

Why the March 16th Referendum May Not Be the Disaster Everyone Thinks

Why the March 16th Referendum May Not Be the Disaster Everyone Thinks

Ultimately to use a cliché, annexation of Crimea or any intervention into the territorial sovereignty of Ukraine will back-fire, because it will rile up support for Kiev not for Moscow and it will allow the Ukrainian’s to dislodge themselves from the yoke of Russian power. Instead of creating the new Soviet Bloc that Putin desires, he will be creating a western style democracy, that will look westward for assistance and further isolate Russia.

Overestimating Putin: Russia’s Strongman May Be Anything But...

Overestimating Putin: Russia’s Strongman May Be Anything But...

Amid the media response to the ongoing crisis in Crimea, a surprising theme has emerged in certain political circles: Putin-envy. The Russian president who has strived to cultivate a macho image has garnered praise for authoritative leadership and strategic acumen, ostensibly in contrast to his chief international rival, President Obama.

Understanding Karzai: Building NATO’s Strategy Bridge in Afghanistan

Understanding Karzai: Building NATO’s Strategy Bridge in Afghanistan

NATO members have sacrificed a great deal in Afghanistan. They must resist the temptation to allow obvious slights and insults from driving policy and strategy to squander that sacrifice. Seeing Karzai’s persona from a balanced perspective is essential to reframing NATO’s policy and strategy in Afghanistan beyond the end of 2014. There is a way for the national interests of both Afghanistan and NATO member states to be jointly met, but it requires a long view, seeing the future in terms of generations and tempering our ambitions for immediate action and results.

War Games: What Will Be Our Next Conflict?

War Games: What Will Be Our Next Conflict?

If conventional war was suspect prior to the GWOT, the possible outcome of the Crimea conflict could almost cement the impossibility of such a war occurring again in the future. It may sound sick when I say that this current dynamic is actually a healthy exercise, as it should provide our government with a wake-up call concerning what a possible conventional war could look like.

Thinking Critically: Teachers Before Texts

Thinking Critically: Teachers Before Texts

Success will largely hinge on the willingness of the various services (critical thinking is important in all domains) to make significant changes. This is a goal that may be even more elusive than increased funding, however. If that is so, then the product of the U.S. professional military education programs will continue to be largely the result of the quality going in and luck in who facilitates instruction, thus remaining inconsistent.

Crimea: Russia Is Harvesting the Seeds Sown in the 1990s

Crimea: Russia Is Harvesting the Seeds Sown in the 1990s

The way out of the Crimea issue is achievable considering the national interests of both the US and Russia. Negotiations can be made, back doors can be opened, and assurances can be given to Kiev and Europe. What is happening in 2014 does not necessarily entail a Cold War part deux, yet the path our policymakers are on make that more likely; simply because we forego history for expediency and bluster.

Crimea: It’s About U.S. Power

Crimea: It’s About U.S. Power

The United States has a choice that the Crimean case illustrates very clearly: the U.S. can help shape this new world, or it can continue to be shaped by it. Based on the debate and news that the White House has not asked for any military options in Crimea, it looks like the latter is coming true (although, it should be said, there are some interesting non-military options, too). In the end, the endless debate about Crimea is truthfully not about its future, but about the decline of U.S. power. The United States only has its postwar self and current self to blame.

The Crimean Crisis Isn’t Just About the Crimea

The Crimean Crisis Isn’t Just About the Crimea

The Crimean situation, or the “Situation Formerly Known as the Ukrainian Situation,” has no good solutions. But there are some worse than others. On one level, it doesn’t matter much to America, nor to Europe, whether Russia or Ukraine (or, if you want to get really old school, the Turks) controls the Crimea. From a popular-sovereignty point of view, the peninsula is largely Russian and so it makes sense that it would wish to be part of Russia. From a force-majeure point of view, Russia has a fleet and forces on the scene, first mover advantage, and plenty of motivation. So there is a powerful case for acceding to the fait accompli, because after all, who wants to be the last man to die for Simferopol?

Talent Management in the Army: Rethinking the Block Check

Talent Management in the Army: Rethinking the Block Check

The problem with the current [OER] system which recognizes up to 49 percent of officers as ‘above average’ is that it obscures the truly exceptional work done by a few individuals. The Army model fails top performers by focusing not on the work that is done, but rather on counting the officers doing the work. In a 49 percent top-block system, above average performance is defined as a function of those who are deemed above average — an officer’s ‘block’ is not a reflection of their individual performance or productivity. The top-performers are not recognized for their true accomplishments and impact.

Peacetime Restrains Strategy: R.B. Haldane and the Shortfalls of His Army Reforms

Peacetime Restrains Strategy: R.B. Haldane and the Shortfalls of His Army Reforms

As the United States begins to formulate a new strategy for a post-Afghanistan era it should look back to this century-old calamity for perspicacity, not for similitude. British pre-war army reforms, implemented by Richard Burdon Haldane — Secretary of State for War (1905-1912) — and subsequently named after him, present another lesson from which strategists could analyze a familiar conundrum. Strategy is as vital in peace as it is in war, but peacetime restrains it. History provides invaluable insights into untangling this contradiction at a time of budgetary and political uncertainty.

The Noise Before Defeat: A Critique of “Seduced by Success”

The Noise Before Defeat: A Critique of “Seduced by Success”

We're fooling ourselves if we believe our adversaries won't continue to engage us asymmetrically for the foreseeable future. So while we must remain committed to proficiency along the full spectrum of operations, let's not abandon the simple truth that armies fight wars among the people because they have to, instead of the more convenient conception of war against traditional combined arms foes.