President Putin made three foundational assumptions in launching his war against Ukraine that should have been correct but were not. First, Putin assumed the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and easy fight. Second, he assumed the world would denounce the invasion but tacitly allow it. Third, Putin assumed the war would deter NATO expansion.
With meticulous source citations and an impressive bibliography, Morton has produced a succinct, yet informative examination of the evolution of manned aerial reconnaissance from its earliest beginnings to the conclusion of the Vietnam War. In his introduction, the author expresses his intention to not only offer an historical analysis of manned aerial reconnaissance but to fill a “considerable historiographical gap.” In this, he may well have succeeded.
Ackerman can be intensely precise about what he did in war. We’ve already seen that with his gloss of his own citation. By setting his scenes off the battlefield, by both showing the moment-by-moment of war as well as by showing its runup, aftermath and fallout, and by using language to describe experiences that torque speech Ackerman writes of his own distinctive and highly personal war, but in a way that is vividly broad and encompassing.
A single book, written in 1997, signalled every significant foreign policy move of the Russian Federation over the following two decades. The United States, Europe, and every nation intertwined with Russia failed to see the signs. From the annexation of Crimea to Britain’s exit from the European Union, the grand strategy laid out in Aleksandr Dugin’s Foundation of Geopolitics: The Geopolitical Future of Russia has unfolded beautifully in a disastrous manner for the western rules-based international order. Perhaps, his words also telegraph the belligerent Putin’s future intentions.
Kilcullen’s book is of value, especially for readers who are new to today’s complex battlefield. His use of Snakes and Dragons as a heuristic model is pithy, and his exploration of the evolution of insurgent and terrorist groups is fascinating. David Kilcullen is an erudite, multi-disciplinary scholar with astute observations. Nevertheless, Dragons and Snakes is not on the same level as his earlier books.
It is only at the end, perhaps, that the two authors diverge on the true lessons of the fight against ISIS, to include the tenuous gains resulting from the application of overwhelming military force. The mantra to “Kill ISIS” perhaps comes at a cost at all levels of war—strategically, operationally, and tactically. Read critically, Pittard and Bryant’s first-hand accounts provide a starting point for wrestling with the true costs of war on humanity and the limits of hunting.
Giglio laments that Americans, who still claim to be at war, have made little effort to understand the Islamic State beyond their high-profile attacks. Part memoir, part commentary, and part war story, Shatter the Nations is an accessible, engaging primer on the Islamic State and the challenges facing the region that hopefully serves as an antidote to the war weariness and lack of interest Giglio observes in the American public.
Whistleblowing has a long and predictably contentious history in America. What distinguishes essential whistleblowing from detrimental leaking? In assessing answers to that question, do the motivations of the individual revealing government secrets matter or should we focus primarily on the benefits and costs of their actions? Driving these tough questions is the considerable tension between the paramount need for secrecy to protect national security interests and the erosion of democratic governance that secrecy can abet.
Srivastava provides an excellent work on the legal and policy challenges American companies face if they want to innovate in the national security environment, but she does not offer a compelling vision for improving the situation. Anyone who wishes to improve this situation will need a solution and the support of a movement that is good for Congress, good for business, good for the defense and national security customers, and good for innovators. And that is the conundrum of innovating for national security.
Although much is written about victory in war, relatively little memorializes the lives lost for lost causes. Even after the mission fell to pieces, the men who fought in Arnhem showed remarkable determination, grit, bravery and sacrifice. The Allied defeat at Arnhem was as honorable as any victory, and Sir Beevor pays it a worthy tribute while weaving a human story about defeat and the inhumanity of war.
Most books about the final phase of the Pacific War detail the firebombing of Japanese cities, raise questions concerning dropping the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, or participate in a debate whether U.S. actions or Soviet intervention forced the Japanese to surrender…The approach Wukovits employs tells the reader about the air operations of a single air group on a single aircraft carrier. At the same time there are very few macro studies of the immediate aftermath of the Japanese surrender in August 1945.
An unseen, unspecified tension lurks throughout the entire book, leaving the reader with a sense of enduring consternation. For aspiring leaders, this novel presents a complex dilemma about human nature and war—or the blessed lack of it. It provides an opportunity to reflect on the challenge of maintaining a mission-focused mindset in an austere environment where all hope seems lost.
All For You satisfies the narrative requirements the Smithton readers demand from romance: it provides escape and a happy ending. But that assessment does not capture the full complexity of a novel that has its characters argue over how to provide for and take care of service members, how to prepare for deployment, and how to deal with its aftermath. And it doesn’t capture the full complexity of a novel that does all of that while pointing to dynamics of race, rank, and gender.
Killing for the Republic is, for ancient history, fairly accessible, and between that and its celebration of civic virtues and the republican spirit it may garner a significant audience. It does speak to fundamental questions: what made Rome special, and how is Rome relevant today? Republics do need citizens invested in military service and in public life generally. In the military sphere, for example, Eliot Cohen has written frequently and recently about civic virtue and citizen soldiering. While Brand's book asks us to consider the place of civic virtue in modern Republics, its mischaracterizations of Rome's military history and the civic virtues of its citizens make it difficult to recommend.
While still a republic, Rome built its empire through the virtues of its agrarian-based citizens and thanks to a political system characterized by the pursuit of liberty through divided sovereignty and participatory citizenship. The foundational element was a valorized civic mindedness, nourished by religious rituals, civic monuments, a commitment to family honor and communal glory, and that agrarian lifestyle. The latter habituated Roman citizens to the essential need of fulfilling their duty. Rome successfully cultivated martial virtues among the populace so that ordinary citizens could pursue their duty toward family and patria while also earning individual glory, but without threatening the delicate balance required to preserve the republican state.
Jonssan’s thesis is that the Russian government and armed forces believe there has been a change in the nature of war with the advent of the information revolution. Specifically, information warfare is now so potent that it can achieve political goals commensurate with war without recourse to military means. The resulting book offers an efficient overview of trends in Russian military thought since the collapse of the Soviet Union paired with detailed examinations of the two major subjects that have defined those trends: information warfare and color revolutions.
This analysis is anything but exhaustive. What separates “Guide to Tactics, or the Theory of the Combat” is how it situates itself in relation to On War. In many ways it serves as its inverse. Given that On War functions to describe the relationship of war to politics, “Guide to Tactics, or the Theory of the Combat” describes the relationship of tactics to war.
Paula G. Thornhill has written an easily accessible work explaining the origins and evolution of the United States’ armed forces under the Constitution. She aims to make American military institutions more understandable to readers by discussing their foundations, evolving missions and organizations, how they have functioned in war and peace, and the tradition of civilian control.
This is a serious biography of one of the most important task force commanders in American naval history. Trimble dismantles some of the historical and academic criticism concerning McCain’s scouting during Guadalcanal and his handling of the fleet during typhoons while maintaining fair criticism where needed. McCain comes forward as a real human struggling with the immense challenges posed by handling the navy’s air component combined with managing a huge task force operating in a hostile environment.
