Oversight

Against Complacency in Civil-Military Relations: Lessons from Romania

Against Complacency in Civil-Military Relations: Lessons from Romania

Discussions about civilian control of the military tend to generate mental images of tanks in the streets and coups d’états. Thankfully in Romania this is not a relevant fear. But a close examination of the situation on the ground underscores the need to avoid complacency in evaluating civil-military relations, even countries that are like Romania—staunch NATO allies, EU members, and consolidated democracies. Here, a combination of political consensus, institutional structures, and limited civilian expertise has afforded the Romanian military the autonomy to execute major aspects of defense policy with little in the way of contested democratic oversight.

Legislative Oversight Over the Armed Forces Is Overrated

Legislative Oversight Over the Armed Forces Is Overrated

In most democracies, legislatures have far less oversight power over their militaries than we might expect. The U.S. Congress and its relationship with the American armed forces is the exception, rather than the rule. Indeed, many legislatures around the world lack some of the basic instruments required to understand what their armed forces are doing, notably security clearances, subpoena power, and adequate staffing.

Predisposed to be Polarized: #Reviewing Whistleblowers’ Role in National Security

Predisposed to be Polarized: #Reviewing Whistleblowers’ Role in National Security

Whistleblowing has a long and predictably contentious history in America. What distinguishes essential whistleblowing from detrimental leaking? In assessing answers to that question, do the motivations of the individual revealing government secrets matter or should we focus primarily on the benefits and costs of their actions? Driving these tough questions is the considerable tension between the paramount need for secrecy to protect national security interests and the erosion of democratic governance that secrecy can abet.