#Professional Warfighters

A Historical Perspective on the so-called “Profession of Arms”

An on-going discussion at the Strategy Bridge on the topic of the Army as a profession got me thinking about the general idea of the “profession of arms.” Naturally, I immediately did two things: 1) Looked in the mirror and asked, “Do you even profession, bro?” and 2) Thought of historical precedents, as I always do when posed a quandary. Because of course I want to say that I’m a professional; as an Army officer, it’s like the kiss of death to my career if someone calls me unprofessional in an evaluation. And what would that mean for everyone’s favorite buzzphrase, “Officer Professional Development?” If we’re not professionals, then how do we do OPD (I don’t think most people do it, but that’s another story)?

Bottom line, the Army preaches professionalism ad nauseam but seldom bothers to ask the question of what professional warfighting organizations have looked like in the past. Which leads me to ask…

Most ancient and early-modern wars were fought with unskilled warriors, who relied on mass and fear to overpower their enemies.

What does a professional warfighting organization look like? Well, man has gone to war since the…um…pretty much always, according to archaeologists and historians. Most ancient and early-modern wars were fought with unskilled warriors, who relied on mass and fear to overpower their enemies. The real transition is when a society appoints a certain section of the population to learn war and practice it, for the general good. There have been several instances in history where these professional armies have developed. First off, we have…

Sparta

On the Grecian islands, the city-states developed tiny armies based around the phalanx formation (lots of dudes with pikes and shields forming a tight mass), where warfighting became phalanxes pushing each other around the battlefield until honor was fulfilled, and then they’d go and polish off a few amphorae of wine over the few guys who managed to get themselves killed. Sparta really messed this up for everyone by essentially creating a slave-based economy to support a class of warriors who brought killing into fashion again. Their tactics were designed to destroy the enemy’s phalanx and turn it into a death trap. The mark of a professional soldier is training, and man, did Spartans train. Not only did they train, they built a culture around being good at killing people. The problem became that the other city-states caught onto this idea, too and professional armies began popping up all over the place. Warrior-culture became the vogue (not unlike all things Spartan these days, except for the whole slave thing) and Sparta got out-manned and overrun.

Not pictured: The abuse of children and mass slavery. But sure, call your platoon the “Spartans.”

Not pictured: The abuse of children and mass slavery. But sure, call your platoon the “Spartans.”

The whole thing didn’t end well for the Grecian world, as when you make a name as the toughest kid in the neighborhood, all the other tough kids will come gunning for you.

Rome

The next kid on the block to up the ante on professional warfighting was Rome. Rome basically took the Spartan model, added combined arms, the idea of a Republic (ideals beyond the warrior for the warrior to fight for), a set period of enlistment, and a pension. Worked out pretty well for them; Roman legionaries were some of the best soldiers ever seen on the planet, as evidenced by an empire that ran from Britain to Persia. They had organized training, a robust non-commissioned officer corps (the sign of any good army), and a developed force structure (legions). Legionaries could serve their twenty years and retire to a piece of land in the newly conquered territories. Or they could die in battle versus these crazy Germans who kept attacking the frontier. Yup, over-expansion killed the Roman Empire even as its legions fought each other in civil wars. Not a pretty way to go.

"I can’t wait to get my twenty year papyrus…"

"I can’t wait to get my twenty year papyrus…"

Medieval Warfare

So after the Roman Empire fell, warfare veered towards the dude who brought more dudes on horses to the fight. It was the era of knights in shining armor, or, more accurately, knights in really heavy armor on big, armored horses, who would plow right through the enemy, causing massive blunt force trauma, decapitations, etc. Not the prettiest era ever. But for hundreds of years, the mounted horseman ruled the battlefield. Now horses and armor aren't cheap, nor is fighting on horseback easy, so a new class of warriors developed. Knights gained prestige through combat, and pledged their loyalty to the monarch, or lord, or whomever would toss them the biggest bag of gold. Ethics were attempted through the chivalric code, but that usually went out the window at the first drop of a coin. Knights became landed, because to have plentiful horses, you must have plentiful land. This tied medieval warriors down to one place and allowed for the great tradition of feudalism to begin. Knights were professional soldiers to the extent that their entire lives were essentially lived under arms, or at least, that was the original point. They would eventually become an upper class elite society, who would be shocked to meet the next level of professional soldier…

Swiss Mercenaries and the Landsknechte

By the 1500s, the pike and the crossbow had pretty much relegated knights to a supporting combat role. Monarchs had to protect their horsemen, because knights were doggone expensive and losing one on the battlefield took time and money to replace. In fact, cost was becoming an issue for everyone. The little Ice Age and the Plague had really done a number on Europe’s population. Leaders still wanted to fight each other but weren't sure they had the population to support war and the economy at the same time. Italy and Spain solved this problem by hiring German (Landsknecht) and Swiss mercenaries to fight their wars for them. These guys were good. Well, at war at least.

Landsknechte relied on massive two-handed swords, pikes, and beautiful music to rout their enemies.

Landsknechte relied on massive two-handed swords, pikes, and beautiful music to rout their enemies.

While essentially immoral and dissolute (“rape, pillage, and plunder” was a phrase they kinda coined), they excelled on the battlefield. They turned war into their full-time profession. All they did in life was go to war for the man with the biggest pocketbook. And for the monarch, it was usually more than worth it. German and Swiss mercenaries could destroy enemy conscript or volunteer armies more than five times their own size, through superior tactics, technology, firepower, and through sheer bravado. European leaders began to rely on mercenary armies because they appreciated the devastating power that professional soldiers could project. In fact, they began raising their own professional armies. German mercenaries eventually defeated the Swiss, through the use of firearms, and would dominate the merc scene into the 1700s. The idea of German invincibility would last until…

Napoleon Bonaparte

Napoleon burst a lot of bubbles when he came on the scene in 1795. Granted, many pre-existing notions had already been shattered by Revolutionary France’s shocking ideas of warfare. 17th and 18th century to that point warfare had been characterized by small, professional armies. These armies trained hard, fought hard, and were almost universally despised by the people they protected. Standing armies were incredibly expensive and were often viewed as tools of the state. Which they essentially were.

He gets extra style points for the hair.

He gets extra style points for the hair.

However, in the 200 years of war between 1580–1780, professional soldiers had almost always been the victors when they went up against militias or levees. This was why almost every single nation-state had developed a moderate to large standing army by 1780. Frederick the Great of Prussia had taken professional soldiering to a whole new level by implementing the general staff system, standard artillery calibers, and professional military education. The small yet mighty Prussian army had smashed the larger French armies over and over during the Seven Years War (1754–1763), leading to an aura of invincibility.

Inspired by American ideals of liberty, equality, and exuberant capitalism, the French people overthrew their government and declared themselves a democracy.

Enter the French Revolution. Inspired by American ideals of liberty, equality, and exuberant capitalism, the French people overthrew their government and declared themselves a democracy. French leaders also noticed how volunteer soldiers in the American Army had managed to stave off the professionals from Britain and Hess (German mercs). They took the idea one step further and created mass conscription, with a twist: a cause to fight for. The French Revolutionary armies won battle after battle against their neighbors, through the use of sheer manpower. Massive 300,000 man French armies would literally overpower the largest army that Austria or Spain could produce, which caused a crisis of faith for other European countries: they could continue to use very expensive professionals (and incur the time and cost it took to replace losses) or they could expose their people to democratic ideals and enlist them into their ranks.

Europe was already reeling from this idea when Napoleon showed up in Italy in 1797 and proceeded to destroy the Austrian armies in detail. His tactics and techniques would be studied and emulated for the next eighteen years, as war became the profession of Europe. He took conscript armies, trained them, instilled pride in them, and then turned them loose against the professionals of Europe (i.e., Prussia) and blew them away. Such was his impact on the profession of arms that he is still studied to this day. Even in…

The U.S. Army

Remember that bit about professional armies being unpopular? Yeah, the new United States hated the thought of a standing army so much that the U.S. Army after the American Revolution consisted of a few hundred troops at West Point and another thousand in the Ohio Country. It was far from a professional organization. America decried the large, professional armies of Europe, blaming them for the constant wars and bankruptcy there. Instead, we would rely on the militia. The idea was that militia units would be called into Federal service if an enemy threatened, negating the need for a large regular Army. The first trial for the militia was the War of 1812. They failed epicly. Apparently, just giving a man a gun and pointing him towards the enemy does not make him a soldier. Also, militia proved reluctant to invade Canada repeatedly, a favorite tactic of the early War Department.

Sir, do we really go rolling along, or is that just a metaphor for the transience of life?” “Shut up and fetch my damn horse.

Sir, do we really go rolling along, or is that just a metaphor for the transience of life?” “Shut up and fetch my damn horse.

America decried the large, professional armies of Europe, blaming them for the constant wars and bankruptcy there.

While the aura of the staunch, untrained militiaman remained after the war, the War Department recognized that in order for the volunteer force to actually work, they would need training prior to going to war. Rather than call up the militia, the President would issue a call for volunteers. These volunteers would undergo several months of training before going off to war. Training became standardized through the use of drill manuals (doctrine) and professional officers, many of them West Point graduates (most of whom left the service after four years to go get rich working for the railroads), were put in the volunteer ranks. This practice began in the Mexican-American War and continued through the Civil War and Spanish-American War. It was incredibly successful. The regular Army remained small, never marshaling more than 30,000 men in the ranks until after 1900. Indeed, the idea of a large regular Army was still novel after World War II.

World War II brought about a change to American thought on large armies, as we adapted to our new place in world politics. A large regular force was required to counter the growing Soviet Union. Whereas the Army had before relied on National Guard divisions to serve as the basis for large-scale mobilizations, they now moved the Guard to an operational reserve to back-fill or augment active duty units. With this change came a growing need for better military education and doctrine.

Most soldiers cannot say that their sole occupation for their entire lives is the administration of violence.

So. The burning question: is the current U.S. Army a profession? From a historical standpoint, I am going to have to say that we are not. Yes, there are some few that stay in twenty to thirty years and make a career out of it. But for the vast majority of soldiers, the Army is a place that they pass through on their way to the rest of their civilian lives. Most soldiers cannot say that their sole occupation for their entire lives is the administration of violence. The one exception I would make is the Special Operations Forces community, where they embrace a lifestyle that is embued with the administration of violence and its members tend to serve for longer periods.

As we confront the future of the Army’s force structure modeling, we need to ensure that we don’t lose sight of the professional over the bureaucratic.

However, I do believe that as a whole, the Army inculcates the important aspects of a profession: values, traditions, training, and culture. These traits often make those who pass through the Army better people and more apt to succeed in their civilian lives. On the other hand, the Army has also developed a bureaucracy, which oftentimes overburdens the professional aspect of Army life with administrative humdrum and special projects. As we confront the future of the Army’s force structure modeling, we need to ensure that we don’t lose sight of the professional over the bureaucratic.


Angry Staff Officer is a first lieutenant in the Army National Guard. He commissioned as an engineer officer after spending time as an enlisted infantryman. He has done one tour in Afghanistan as part of U.S. and Coalition retrograde operations. With a BA and an MA in history, he currently serves as a full-time Army Historian. The opinions expressed are his alone, and do not reflect those of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.


Have a response or an idea for your own article? Follow the logo below, and you too can contribute to The Bridge:


Enjoy what you just read? Please help spread the word to new readers by sharing it on social media.

#Profession Versus Culture: Resiliency and The Gap

#Profession Versus Culture: Resiliency and The Gap

For those of us serving in the Army, it seems there should be little debate as to whether or not the modern, all-volunteer force is a “profession.” It is a unique member of the professional community, to say the least. The deeper question that should be asked is not whether the Army as an institution is a profession but, rather, what is the gap between that profession and the culture inside of it? What affects the delta between them and how do you close it? Also, how does that delta affect the resiliency of the profession?

#Professionals Know When to Break the Rules

#Professionals Know When to Break the Rules

The military is a profession. That does not mean that everyone in the military is a professional. There are many hard working service members grinding daily that do not meet that relatively high mark, but many others that do. So when does a soldier become a professional? In boot camp? On his first combat tour? Or in a classroom?Soldiers become professionals when they can make the right decision even when it contradicts the manual.

The Army Profession: From Macro to Micro

The Army Profession: From Macro to Micro

The Army does provide a unique and vital service to the United States. As the proponent for the application of sustained strategic landpower in the armed forces, no one else can match this ability. To do so, the Army must lead, and be led, by experts in the application of land-based combat operations. Expertise is built through effective training, education, and significant self-development, an important component that is often overlooked.

Why You’re Not #Professionals

Why You’re Not #Professionals

The discussion began with a tweet encouraging deliberation of the question, “Is the Military a Profession?” Scores of comments later, it ended with another that opined a prospective article title, “Why You’re Neither Professionals, Nor Warriors.” For all said in between, an answer to the essential question remained elusive. As an academic, this lack of resolution does not create discomfort, as there is rarely a correct or final answer to much in the humanities and social sciences. But for matters related to the military establishment, the matter of why an answer is impossible and what this means — and does not mean — for the military and its people is important.

The Intersection of #Profession and Ethics: Redefining the Modern Military

The Intersection of #Profession and Ethics: Redefining the Modern Military

As good professors so often do, D. Shanks Kaurin's initial query of three simple questions spawned a series of follow-on questions. Does Samuel Huntington’s oft-cited definition of a military profession in The Soldier and the State still ring true in the 21st century? Does training and continuing education play a role in defining a profession? Is a universal code of ethics required?

Little Room for Hope: Russia’s Planned Decay is Being Well Documented

Little Room for Hope: Russia’s Planned Decay is Being Well Documented

What’s most tragic for that desolate landscape called Russia is that its people, due to centuries of lies and indignity, have replaced hope with blind fealty. For us in the West, there is perhaps some room to be optimistic. Leading the commentary on all these affairs is this all-star cast of women journalists and political scientists that have powerful and influential opinions. Two of them — Gessen and Ioffe — are immigrants from Russia. Anna Politkovskaya, a brave and renowned Russian journalist would have joined them in offering her informed voice, but she was brutally killed for it in 2006.

Democracy: The Key to Avoiding Future Wars? (2)

Democracy: The Key to Avoiding Future Wars? (2)

In the Kantian framework, different kinds of agents pursue democracy at three levels: the individuals within a nation, the states in their relationships with one another and also with their citizens, and humankind. In this post we shall look at how individuals within a nation should behave if they want to truly abide by democratic principles. Should they rebel and when? Should they support war, and which type of war if any?

#Profession in One Tweet

#Profession in One Tweet

Try the “One Tweet” challenge on your own. Capture what you perceive as the essential elements of your own profession or organization, and challenge your peers and subordinates to do the same. Keep in mind that challenges like this often reveal more in what they exclude than what they include. Compare the results and use the similarities and differences to drive a conversation that leads to actions like a “stop doing” list. You might be surprised by the results.

#Talent Management, Personal Choice, & Officer Assignments: Or How Would We Get Anyone To Go To Minot?

#Talent Management, Personal Choice, & Officer Assignments: Or How Would We Get Anyone To Go To Minot?

Discussions abound recommending a market-based military assignment system where Air Force officers (or their sister service counterparts) apply for jobs and commanders hire them instead of the current system that pathologically rejects the officers’ desires and commanders’ inputs. In my personal experience, discussion about this possible market-based system immediately and inevitably devolves into the exact same fundamentally flawed question: How are we going to get people to go to Minot?

Combatant Commander-Based Design: The Modular Army in Context

Combatant Commander-Based Design: The Modular Army in Context

A strong argument can be made that the modular Army design got it right because it focused on the application of strategic landpower, i.e., the Combatant Commander’s problem. Rather than focusing on tactical echelons (whether brigade or division), the modular design focused on the relationships between the levels of war and subordinated the tactical and operational levels to the strategic level.

Land Power’s Exceptionalism

Land Power’s Exceptionalism

The case for land power rests on the warning that in war, technology supports, not augments, people. Current events make the case for land power. The nature of land power provide a reassurance to allies and can effectively deter aggression. If called upon, land power can also compel decisions, all as part of an interservice effort. The dazzle of new technology can be blinding for some people, and that may discount the importance of the soldier in strategy development.

Democracy: The Key to Avoiding Future Wars? (1)

Democracy: The Key to Avoiding Future Wars? (1)

It is useful—and necessary—to stop, think and reflect on the idea of democracy and its relationship to violence and ultimately war. What is a democracy? What does it mean to behave and act according to its principles? What does it mean for a citizen and what does it mean for a state? Are democracies more peaceful than other regimes? How should democracies act and react in the international world?

The Meme of Land Power’s Exceptional Discrimination

The Meme of Land Power’s Exceptional Discrimination

Swiping at other forms of warfare is still not a positive argument for land power, what it does, and why it is important. To suggest land power as the pinnacle of military force discards joint complement, which empirical examination of warfare does not confirm. Ultimately, the contribution of land power to net strategic effect is just as subject to friction as every other blunt instrument of military might — to suggest otherwise is dangerous.

Effective Communication in “The Non-Expert Zone”

You are a subject matter expert within an organization. You have identified a problem. You have a plan to remedy it. Your plan requires additional funding, equipment, or authority; a waiver, change, or addition to an existing policy; or change or addition to law. As you brief your plan to higher levels within your organization on your way to the person with approval authority, it is likely that your audience does not share your knowledge, experience, or subject matter expertise.

You have now entered the Non-Expert Zone.

In most organizations, when leaders get promoted, their responsibility increases. This increased responsibility often forces that leader to shift from focusing on a few problems in depth to the wave tops of many problems. S/he now depends upon his subordinates to go in depth on a subject, handle problems at the lowest possible level, and only bring forward problems that demand the promoted leader’s time and attention. As the subject matter expert with a problem to solve, you not only need to have a solid plan, but also know the best way to present that plan to each unique audience on the way to its approval.

Here are some considerations for tackling this problem:

Identify the stimulus for the problem.

To fully understand the stimulus, trace it as far back as you possibly can. In my experience, and to make an Army-centric example, the content of a Field Manual can sometimes be traced to a Department of Defense Directive, to an Executive Order, to a Law, and then to an event of some kind that caused Congress to act. Additionally, this tracing may lead to the discovery that the stimulus is actually caused by a narrow view of a policy or law and you can remedy the problem at a lower level.

Make your short- and long-term plans to remedy the problem.

If your plan requires additional funding, ensure you take the fiscal year budget cycle, unfunded requirements process, and future years defense program into account. If your plan requires additional equipment, identify the source as specifically as possible; examples would include where to purchase a piece of equipment, or from what organization you can take to meet your shortfalls. If your plan requires additional authority, a waiver, change, or addition to an existing policy, find out who can make that decision. If your plan requires a change or addition to law, meet with your Congressional Affairs/Legislative Affairs personnel and find out the best way forward.

Determine risk versus gain.

If the current situation remains, what is the risk? If those risks are fully or partially realized, what is the consequence? If the consequence occurs, how much time and money will be spent fixing the problem after the fact? What is the gain if the problem is fixed?

Determine your audience.

Determine who you need to brief and at what level they sit. Find out how each of those people prefers to be briefed. My first line supervisor learns best via auditory stimulus, so I use text or slides sparingly and talk a lot. My next supervisor is visual, but prefers text over graphics. Above him is a supervisor who is visual, but leans towards graphics vice text. Next up from him is a supervisor who does auditory first and then likes to see the words on paper, so I brief him verbally then hand him paperwork to review. With each of these supervisors, my use of doctrinal terms and shorthand ebbs and flows due to some of them having a military background and some not.

You should also find out what each audience values. When addressing intelligence organizations at DoD, I often tie my message to the intelligence requirements process. When working with operational organizations at DoD, I speak to the various orders and plans that drive their efforts. When speaking to foreign policy organizations, I tie my message to the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, or similar documents. When dealing with Congress, I know that the Intelligence Committees value the Intelligence Community (IC) and that I need to use IC-centric terminology when briefing them. The Armed Services Committees value the Military Departments and Combatant Commands, so I speak to supporting the warfighter when briefing them. The Appropriations Committees value how money is expended, so I use language from the Government Performance Results Act when briefing them.

Tailor your brief and rehearse.

You will now need to build different versions of your brief based upon who you are briefing, how they prefer to be briefed, and what they value. Rehearse! Rehearse! Rehearse! This includes role-playing within your organization, preferably with people that are not familiar with the issue at hand. During rehearsals, read any prepared language out loud — you will be surprised how many errors you find by doing this.

Execute your brief.

Enter the room to brief having left your ego at the door. Present your plan in an objective, dispassionate, professional manner including or discarding doctrinal terminology or shorthand based upon the audience. Answer the question asked. Do not answer the question not asked. Admit when you do not know something. Offer to find out and return with the answer. Returning with the answer gives you an opportunity to demonstrate to the audience that you heard them and took action to meet their requirement. This goes a long way towards building rapport which may contribute to approval of your plan.

When navigating the Non-Expert Zone, always remember that success is possible, but persistence is the key. Some problems take multiple years to solve. Do not give up the fight; do not let the system win. As General “Vinegar” Joe Stillwell said, “Don’t let the bastards grind you down.”


Phil Walter has served in the military, the intelligence community, and the inter-agency. The views expressed here are those of the author alone and do not contain information of an official nature. He tweets @philwalter1058 and blogs at


Have a response or an idea for your own article? Follow the logo below, and you too can contribute to The Bridge:

Enjoy what you just read? Please help spread the word to new readers by sharing it on social media.


Header image: Major Doland Johnson, 434th Wing Navigator, briefing an Airborne soldier about a jump from 434th C-119's.