Alessandra Nisch
Putin’s Wars: Testing Boyd’s Strategy of ...

President Putin made three foundational assumptions in launching his war against Ukraine that should have been correct but were not. First, Putin assumed the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and easy fight. Second, he assumed the world would denounce the invasion but tacitly allow it. Third, Putin assumed the war would deter NATO expansion.

Putin’s Wars: Testing Boyd’s Strategy of Applied Friction

Renken on Ganske on Wylie

Renken on Ganske on Wylie

Carl von Clausewitz defines what’s in the “box” of war very well, but Wylie does something truly great by defining the boundaries of the box. When your control crisis reaches a certain point, you go to war. When the control achieved is sufficient, you attempt to end war. In between those two points, with the exception of offering clarifying cumulative versus sequential pathologies, Clausewitz still reigns supreme. It is perhaps fitting that a Sailor defines the fringe while a Continentalist fills in the content.

Strategic Reform: Strategy in a time of more uncertainty or less?

Strategic Reform: Strategy in a time of more uncertainty or less?

Three fundamentally flawed assumptions dominate the Pentagon’s current “strategy.” The first is that uncertainty in our security environment is growing, requiring us to spend ever more to secure general readiness for a dizzying array of contingencies. The second is that our only reliable guide star is a need to pace China with high-end forces optimized for an eventual force-on-force clash close to their coast. The third is that all other potential adversaries constitute “lesser included” cases, requiring merely diminished application of high-end U.S. strength. All are wrong.

Right Reason, Right Season

Right Reason, Right Season

Transformation is hard because organizations exist within a market place which is never truly static, yet changes at a pace which usually favors refinement over renewal. Narrow focus on efficiency creates real perceptive and cultural barriers to recognizing the need to transform. Successful transformation requires leaders who can articulate both why and when transformation is necessary—the right reason and right season.

Strategy as Narrative

Strategy as Narrative

Strategy is a form of communication; a message that you have the intentions and capabilities to impose your will, and the enemy cannot impose theirs. As war can be likened to two combatants trying to impose their will on the other, they must communicate their will and their intention not to abide by the will of the opponent. Since war is a human endeavor, this communication occurs in the same manner as other forms of communications. 

Military as Seminal Agent: Violence as a Vehicle for Destruction and Creation

Military as Seminal Agent: Violence as a Vehicle for Destruction and Creation

Ultimately, management of violence is an instrumentality for the military. The end sought is a new reality. The military destroys to create. No serious student of military history misses this point, but too often the focus on destruction blinds us to our responsibility for acts of creation that inevitably ensue.Ultimately, management of violence is an instrumentality for the military. The end sought is a new reality. The military destroys to create. No serious student of military history misses this point, but too often the focus on destruction blinds us to our responsibility for acts of creation that inevitably ensue.

Addendum to “Learning For the Next War”

Addendum to “Learning For the Next War”

If nothing else, what our operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have taught us is that our politico-military strategies need a corresponding, overarching, dare I say, “grand” strategy. Not just guidance. Perhaps, while we are writing the immediate history of our operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and, presumably a fresher FM 3-24, we can also include a comprehensive strategy that guides the country’s subordinate departments and agencies.

On “No More Easy Wars”

On “No More Easy Wars”

In Foreign Policy’s National Security Blog, Colonel Scott Gerber (USA) recently attempted to make out the Air Sea Battle (ASB) Concept as foolishness. Personally, I am extremely concerned about building an operational concept around a policy shift known as the “Asia Pivot.” My greatest concern is that the United States has not sufficiently fleshed out the strategic underpinnings of translating the Asia Pivot policy into action, however setting that aside for now, I will revisit that in a follow-on post. What I find striking about Gerber’s offering here is how he insists on building a straw man of mythological proportions in order to knock over the ASB Concept.

The Failure of the Current DoD Budget Debates

The Failure of the Current DoD Budget Debates

The current debates emanating among policy circles within the Department of Defense and Congress have predominately focused on the scale of budget cuts imposed by sequestration and how it will be implemented to achieve the President’s defense policy guidance. As resources decrease, each service is maneuvering themselves within the budgetary-policy debates to ensure they receive both an adequate role in shaping the future security environment and the resources commensurate with such a role.

Learning for the Next War: Providing Enduring Value to the Force

Learning for the Next War: Providing Enduring Value to the Force

Following the publication of the recent article “COIN Doctrine Under Fire,” I was lucky enough to ‘listen in’ on an enlightening conversation on one of the dozen listservs I frequent. While debating the merits of counterinsurgency, the list began discussing the value of capturing the pertinent lessons from a war…during and immediately following the conflict. On the discussion were of the authors of both the Army’s pre-eminent volume on Desert Storm and the first solid look at Iraqi Freedom.

#Reviewing: State Building and War

#Reviewing: State Building and War

In the wake of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, much ink has been spilled relating service member’s personal experiences or discussing the misapplication of American foreign policy. Few of them do both, let alone place such events in the greater context of history. In War, Welfare, & Democracy, Peter J. Munson does both by providing the reader a deep look into the driving factors in American foreign policy, punctuated by vivid images from his own personal travels. Readers will find this book both enlightening and engrossing.

Libya: Airpower, SOF and the NTC Part II

Libya: Airpower, SOF and the NTC Part II

I want to start this piece with a slight preface. In my last, and first, post I discussed the relative value of contributions made by the NATO assets involved in Operation Unified Protector. I discussed the relative values of their contributions in relation to the formation of the NTC. It occurs to me now that I wasn’t upfront about the manner in which I assessed relative contributions. When I rated the contributions of NATO’s combined airpower and the small but effective band of elite special operators on the ground I used the word significant. When seeking to emphasize the importance of the NTC’s establishment I used the word decisive. 

Libya: Airpower, SOF and the NTC Part I

Libya: Airpower, SOF and the NTC Part I

A fortnight ago, the Libyan rebels swept into the capital city of Tripoli and have since begun to assert control over territory it seemed only weeks ago they would never lay claim to. The side that spent months teetering on the brink of imminent demise has now become the mortal lock. Now that they’ve reached this position of unrivaled dominance it seems the world is ready to start talking in past tense about the conflict.

Why RMAs Still Matter

Why RMAs Still Matter

Often confused for one another, Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMA) are much less influential than the societal-military earthquake-inducing Military Revolutions (MR). The confusion is not simply semantic, but rather crucial as RMAs have little to no influence beyond the tactical and operational levels of war. RMAs, as Knox and Murray tell us in “Dynamics of Military Revolution,” are no “substitute for strategy.” 

Houses of Cards: Network Theory vs. Networks in Theory

Houses of Cards: Network Theory vs. Networks in Theory

In the fall of 2010 in Kunar, as the more active period of fighting subsided, we began to take a second look at the day-to-day intelligence reports we had amassed in an attempt to better understand the enemy. We had a lot of material to sift through, as there were a number of intelligence teams operating in the area. As you might be able to tell from the picture above, we tried to have a little fun with the process as well.

Guest Post: On ‘Building Better Generals’

Guest Post: On ‘Building Better Generals’

The Center for New American Security (CNAS) recently rolled out a provocative report titled,”Building Better Generals.” There are some valuable ideas to be considered here from LTG Barno, Dr. Bensahel, Ms. Sayler, and Ms. Kidder — especially on encouraging continued education for General and Flag Officers—and I recommend you take a look at it (see also, “’Building Better Generals’ Report Rollout Panel”)

Bridging Divides: Thoughts on a Startup Conference

Bridging Divides: Thoughts on a Startup Conference

A good sign of a successful gathering is not only the interaction that takes place at the event itself, but more importantly the conversation that occurs following. In this respect the Defense Entrepreneurs Forum has been blessed; one of the reasons I’ve been remiss in reporting out on the event is the rapidity and thoroughness that some of the participants have written on salient points from the weekend.

Strong State, Weak State: The New Sovereignty and Responsibility to Protect

Strong State, Weak State: The New Sovereignty and Responsibility to Protect

The enabling and assistance of states to solve their own problems—not the usurpation of sovereignty—is at the root of R2P and Sovereignty as Responsibility. Time and again representatives of R2P and the United Nations have expressed their explicit position that the UN wishes to avoid military interventions, but also wishes to prevent atrocities from occurring. This balance is prudent and necessary to ensure that states are fully functioning members of the international community and that any state that requires assistance in carrying out its duties of protection receives it in a timely manner.