Military history attests to nations’ struggle to transition from a peacetime footing to a wartime posture, but this work draws solely from Israel’s modern experiences. While Finkel explores an overlooked concept, focusing analysis through the lens of Israel’s experiences since 1948 imposes methodological limits upon the work.
Oxytocin Beats Testosterone? #Reviewing Why We Fight
This book gives the reader much to consider and is particularly useful due to its unique approach that complements works in other fields like political science. There are no easy answers to why we fight. Regardless of some of oxytocin’s evolutionary victories over testosterone, this book provides much to ponder and understand regarding the inherent job security of being in the business of war.
#Reviewing Unforgotten in the Gulf of Tonkin
Unforgotten in the Gulf of Tonkin is an outstanding contribution that recounts and analyzes the growth and development of combat search and rescue. In telling that story, Bjorkman weaves in a rich and critically important discussion of larger ethical and moral issues associated with war. Her commendable work deserves a spot in the libraries of all military aviators and students of the profession of arms.
#Reviewing The Hardest Place
The Hardest Place is an incredibly well-written piece of non-fiction that blends aspects of both an action novel and a history lesson. Morgan puts a human face on both sides of the conflict in all its facets by continuously highlighting the individual stories of the women and men who served there. Military students of history, along with anyone interested in America’s longest war, would benefit from reading this excellent book. The military profession has a duty to learn from the conflict, and this book is an essential introduction to a small piece that represents much of the trouble with the broader whole.
2nd Quarter 2021 Journal Index
Following the overwhelming response to our 1st quarterly series on the next National Security Strategy, The Strategy Bridge is shifting gears. Our 2nd quarter series is all about assumptions in policy, strategy, and military strategy. What problematic or powerful assumption(s) should The Strategy Bridge readers contemplate and why?
#Reviewing The Compleat Victory
The Compleat Victory is a reminder that the hard-learned lessons of today’s conflicts are eerily like the lessons taught more than two centuries ago. Informal relationships outside of the chain of command still matter. The great captains of history have genius in planning as well as in execution, meaning high levels of grip as Weddle defines it. Finally, leaders and staffs must continually examine and evaluate their assumptions on the character or nature of the fight they are in.
Interpreting Sun Tzu: The Art of Failure?
Given the scarcity of authoritative writings or clarifying analyses on Sun Tzu’s text, how confident should we be that we have correctly grasped “the Way” of this ancient sage? Of particular importance, one of the core ideas we almost universally believe serves as a bedrock to Sun Tzu’s overall military philosophy—that his ideal strategic objective is “to take the enemy whole and intact”—rests on a problematic and potentially untenable textual foundation.
#Reviewing Twenty Years of Service
For a chewy policy book about a usually anodyne subject, pension reform, Archuleta’s Twenty Years of Service was an electrifying read. Published in 2020, two years after the Department of Defense implemented the first substantive change in its military retirement pension policy in seventy years, Twenty Years of Service asks, and deftly answers, two questions. First, why did the military’s pension system remain unchanged for so long when almost everything else about the military’s personnel policy had changed since World War II? Second, Archuleta asks why and how a change to the military pension system finally occurred as it did when President Obama signed the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act into law in November 2015.
A Tantalizing Success: The 1999 Kosovo War
Kosovo is a tantalizing case of success. Even today Kosovar Albanians speak favorably of America and NATO...Under certain circumstances, and with enough commitment, military intervention can work and save lives. But we need to look beyond the assumption that our decisions and actions determine success or failure, and instead make sure the dynamics of the local conflict are conducive to an intervention. Ultimately, not all problems can be solved with military force.
Cyberspace is an Analogy, Not a Domain: Rethinking Domains and Layers of Warfare for the Information Age
The buzzwordification of the term domain has long passed the point of diminishing returns, and nowhere is that a greater hazard than with cyber operations. It’s time to re-think cyber to reflect the realities of modern war, and with it the broader lexicon of what constitutes domains and layers of warfare.
Remembering the Geography in Geopolitics and Indo-Pacific Discourse
All too often, national security policy professionals presume modern technology has obviated the importance of geographic location and physical features. Yet physical geography remains central to national security realities that will only become more severe as competition between great powers of relative parity intensifies.
How the U.S. Can Recapture Escalation Control
Escalation control was once firmly part of the U.S. strategic lexicon. The term fell into disuse because it was assumed U.S. unipolarity made it dominant in any post-Cold War political-military competition. But such assumptions are clearly incorrect today. Indeed, U.S. responses to rival nations’ efforts to dominate escalation narratives have tended to telegraph timidity rather than strength.
The White Elephant in the Room: Antarctica in Modern Geopolitics
Antarctica’s isolation may have set the stage for a hard pivot in global interest. Discarding these holdover assumptions will be important to recalibrate our understanding of the region’s strategic relevance. Without reform to the Antarctic Treaty system, and great powers assuming collective responsibility, Antarctica could even become a potential catalyst for outright conflict.
Offshore Balancing with Chinese Characteristics
China cannot be an effective offshore balancer if it remains on the permanent defensive in its own neighborhood, hemmed in by American bases, naval forces, allies and security partners. To be in a position to balance the United States globally, it must not only break through the first island chain but achieve outright regional supremacy in the Western Pacific.
Hugging the Old Bear: Updating The American Playbook for the Long Game
If the United States sees any value in attempting to build amicable relations with Russia in a post-Vladimir Putin future, it must set aside certain dangerous assumptions that have shaped and spearheaded U.S. strategic policy in the Post-Cold War unipolar world. America’s strategy for dealing with Russia is outdated. The dangerous assumption that practicing Cold War era brinkmanship and hardlining actions to counter Putin’s strongman strategy as an effective tool is outdated and only serves to strengthen his position.