If the United States sees any value in attempting to build amicable relations with Russia in a post-Vladimir Putin future, it must set aside certain dangerous assumptions that have shaped and spearheaded American strategic policy in the Post-Cold War unipolar world. America’s strategy for dealing with Russia is outdated. The dangerous assumption that practicing Cold War era brinkmanship and hardlining actions to counter Putin’s strongman strategy as an effective tool only serves to strengthen his position. Putin is an experienced autocratic leader who has learned how to balance internal pressure from both his oligarchs and his people. He understands the American playbook, and he uses American predictability to strengthen his position. Based on America’s historical decisions in Syria and in Ukraine, Putin has assessed that the United States does not have the will to follow through on its threats. To avoid a strategic miscalculation, the United States should pursue soft power engagement that will put substantial external pressure on Russia to incentivize a change in its behavior.
Putin must balance his nobles’ appetites, the oligarchs, and his popularity through pluralism. As such, he relies heavily on shock and awe to keep himself in power.
Putin’s greatest threat and challenge is not the United States and its NATO partners, it is keeping his domestic rivals in check and preventing his multi-ethnic state from imploding. Anders Aslund, a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, simplified Putin’s motivation as being related to his ability to collect personal wealth and to keep his power.[1] Aslund’s assessment arguably falls short. While wealth and power may somewhat motivate Putin, he is mostly motivated by his future legacy. Money and power are a means to an end. For Putin, a successful legacy would see Russia’s return as a respected superpower with dominance over its own sphere of influence.[2] He would fashion himself as the next Peter the Great in order to leave a lasting legacy. Therefore, Putin must balance his nobles’ appetites, the oligarchs, and his popularity through pluralism. As such, he relies heavily on shock and awe to keep himself in power.
Protest against illegal arrest of Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny, January 31, 2021, (Кирилл Жаркой)
Whenever Putin encounters resistance, whether it is a regional neighbor like Ukraine, or a domestic dissident like Alexei Navalny, he will most likely choose to crush them. For example, Russian police arrested over one thousand of Navalny’s supporters during recent demonstrations across Russia.[3] Putin relies on populist and nationalist support as a counterweight to his oligarchs. While he uses the oligarchs for payoffs, protection, and political weight, he still needs to keep them in check. He uses the Russian military to rally support and has ordered large-scale exercises that petrify the West to win favour from the nationalist base.[4] The problem for Putin is that these shows of strength are like Roman bread and circus games—distractions and superficial appeasement. They are distractions for the real domestic problems that Russia faces such as an aging population, population decline, and the lack of civil rights. Putin will continue to put on these shows, and the West gives him all the ammunition he needs to continue placing NATO as a barbarian at Moscow’s gates.
Despite Russia’s veto, NATO intervened by launching a bombing campaign. For Russia, it was a clear message that its voice and position in the U.N. were hollow, even with a seat on the Security Council and a position as one of its five permanent members.
Regardless of the America’s humanitarian intentions, the decision to intervene in Bosnia in 1995, gave Russia and later President Putin the ammunition needed to treat NATO as an aggressive military alliance, and not one built to counter the original Warsaw Pact. Charles Krauthammer argued that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States became the unchallenged superpower; a hegemon in the international order.[5] Not too long after the end of the Cold War, Russia witnessed an American led NATO intervention in Bosnia during the summer of 1995 without formal support from the U.N. Security Council.[6] Despite Russia’s veto, NATO intervened by launching a bombing campaign. For Russia, it was a clear message that its voice and position in the U.N. were hollow, even with a seat on the Security Council and a position as one of its five permanent members.[7] The intervention disintegrated the notion for Russia that the U.N. and its permanent body were there for the purpose of balancing power. Russia’s perception shifted such that it felt compelled to fight American led Western dominance, as specifically mentioned in its 2000 National Security Concept.[8] Meanwhile, the United States continued to mount humanitarian interventions through a willingness to use its military capabilities, showing the world its credibility behind its threats of action.
The world watched as the United States did not militarily intervene when President Bashar al-Assad and other actors employed chemical weapons.
Today, at least for Putin, the United States lost its credibility in its willingness to intervene. Putin witnessed two occasions where the United States practiced hardlining and failed to follow through: crossing President Obama’s Syria Red Line and using Little Green Men in Ukraine. In August of 2012, President Obama threatened to use military force in response to chemical weapon use in Syria and did not follow through. The world watched as the United States did not militarily intervene when President Bashar al-Assad and other actors employed chemical weapons. In the absence of a coherent American response, Putin seized the opportunity to support Assad’s regime.[9] When Russia seized Crimea and supported separatist forces in Donetsk in 2014, the United States reiterated Ukrainian sovereignty and condemned the violence. However, the United States gave a mixed response. While the United States provided material support and advisors for the Ukrainian military, along with sanctions, President Obama drew another red line that limited the American response against aggression towards NATO members; to which Ukraine is not a member. Today, Russia retains control of Crimea and continues to support separatist forces in Eastern Ukraine. For Putin, the American strategy of brinkmanship is a paper tiger.
The American playbook does not provide the right pressure to shape a change in Putin’s behavior. As Putin is a figure who is heavily reliant on his public image, he cannot afford to appear weak as it will internally threaten his position. Ukraine’s decision to push back against Russian aggression through threatening Crimea’s water supply forced Putin to react. Crimea relies on Ukraine to deliver its drinking water, primarily through the North Crimea Canal, which accounts for 80% of Crimea’s water use.[10] Ukraine held Crimea hostage and applied pressure on Putin, who promised the Crimean ethnic Russian population security and prosperity. The popularity boost that Putin enjoyed through Crimea’s capture eroded. As the Russian government spends billions of rubles trying to circumvent Ukrainian pressure, Putin knows that such spending, with sanctions, hurts the Russian economy.
The future of Russia’s economy, especially how to pay pensions for the country’s aging population, is an internal pressure that worries Putin.[11] Pensions are at the forefront of Russian domestic politics because of Russia’s aging population. In 2018, Putin initiated an unpopular bill, intent on raising the retirement age to receive benefits to 60 for women and 65 for men, and it received tremendous backlash.[12] Ukraine, while citing debt as the source of its decision to cut Crimea’s water supply, made the peninsula too expensive of a purchase for Putin to keep. Ukraine’s decision directly threatened his credibility. Putin took decisive action and mobilized tens of thousands of troops, armor, and equipment to send a clear signal to Ukraine. His military exercises were a show of force, and their proximity to Ukraine shows Russia’s readiness to escalate.
Putin believes that the United States will not fight a conventional war with Russia over Ukraine. America used poorly applied external pressure that instead strengthened Putin’s internal position.
In response to this action by Putin, Ukrainian President Zelensky turned to the United States and the West for support. With Russian troops conducting a large-scale exercise within 70 miles of the Ukrainian border, Zelensky urged the United States to invite Ukraine to become a member of NATO.[13] As Putin expected, the United States sent a military response as part of its outdated brinkmanship strategy, a game that Putin has mastered. A contingent of three hundred paratroopers deployed to Ukraine, and two warships sailed towards the Black Sea.[14] Despite the voiced concerns of the United States and NATO, Russia continued its exercises, increased its military presence, and deployed a fleet to the Black Sea to cut off the Kerch Strait.[15] The United States may feel that a show of solidarity is enough through teasing a tripwire force; in reality, it only fuels Putin’s objectives to portray himself as the protector of Russia.
America’s decision to dabble into what is now a regional water dispute is an action that bolsters Putin’s domestic base. It is not an accident that Putin’s decision to crack down on Navalny’s supporters happened around the time when President Biden “blinked” and offered future talks with Putin. The BBC interviewed Konstantin Eggert, a reporter who followed the development in Ukraine. When Putin denied America’s urge to de-escalate, and then received a phone call from the White House to set talks, Mr. Eggert argues Biden caved.[16] Putin believes that the United States will not fight a conventional war with Russia over Ukraine. America used poorly applied external pressure that instead strengthened Putin’s internal position. Instead, the United States should have set aside its old playbook and pursued soft power as its primary weapon to shape Putin’s decision making.
Rather than escalate, the United States could have broken the cycle of brinkmanship by exercising soft power, thus not allowing Putin to reap the benefits from a knee jerk response. Putin, in his own way, hunts for opportunities to embarrass the United States, like when he sent to the United States COVID vaccines and offered material support.[17] Here, the United States could have issued a public statement that offered humanitarian aid for the Crimean Peninsula. The United States could have forced Putin into a position where he would have lost face regardless of his response, thus applying effective external pressure in a fashion that directly attacks his persona without risking military escalation. By offering humanitarian aid, the United States could offer talks from a position of human rights and not play the brinkmanship game that Putin enjoys. It would be more beneficial for both Russia and the United States to instead focus on building mutual economic partnerships.
Man in Blue Jacket, March 5, 2021, (Valery Tenevoy).
One solution that the United States could deploy would be to develop a progressive plan to roll back the current sanctions imposed on the Russian state, and invite industries to work with Russia in the name of mutual economic progress, thus slowly pivoting Putin’s current behavior. Sanctions have not stopped Russia from achieving its objectives; Crimea is just the latest example. Perhaps it is time for a new strategy. Sanctions reinforce the target nation leadership’s propaganda and further erode stabilizing relations.[18] Instead, the United States should focus on targeting the internal pressures that worry Putin. Even as early as 2012, Putin voiced concerns over ethnic tensions within Russia.[19] Putin constantly worries over Russia’s declining population and concerns over the payment of pensions. The average age of the Russian population in 1990 was 34.9, in 2020 it was 40.2. Russia’s declining, and greying, population is a priority for Putin. UN demographers for Russia suggest a 7 percent population decline to 135 million by the year 2050.[20] Therefore, better paychecks and perhaps better benefits including pensions from prospective companies interested in doing business in Russia could offer a way for Putin to strengthen his popular base. Through foreign investment, Putin could ease some of the financial strain on the government to provide secure pensions. He can set the conditions for companies to offer better jobs and speed up growth in Russia without relying on his oligarchs. In a sense, it brings another actor into the fold that can weaken the oligarchs; an incentive for Putin.
The United States should not concern itself with how Putin will politically maneuver himself to win local support in response to stabilizing relations.
If the United States stabilizes relations with Russia and works towards a mutually beneficial relationship, it is possible to pave a way forward where American and European Union levels of transparency may bleed into Russia. According to Transparency International, Russia’s level of corruption decreased by ten points since 2018, and that trend will continue through Russian interconnectivity and access to the EU.[21] To do business within the EU, European markets force Russian businesses to play by Western European rules. At a grassroots level, the Russian people prefer a more transparent and less-corrupt Russia.[22] The United States should not concern itself with how Putin will politically maneuver himself to win local support in response to stabilizing relations. Instead, the United States, along with the European Union should focus on helping to provide a market and opportunities that Russia needs, thus playing the long game and winning influence in Russia.
Granted, Russia commits acts of disinformation, disruption, and routinely conducts operations to destabilize Western Democracies, but that is today’s Russia and the United States needs a lasting strategy for tomorrow’s Russia. The best way forward is to build domestic resiliency to counter disinformation, a topic thoroughly discussed, while focusing on engagement with Russia. In his speech to Congress on April 29, 2021 President Biden even acknowledged the possibility of developing positive relations with Russia.[23] To achieve a more Western-friendly Russia in the long term, the United States needs to realize that hard-lining and brinkmanship is a Cold War era strategy that needs to be set aside and replaced with a coherent modern strategy that applies proper pressure to shift Russian behavior.
Alexander Grinberg is an officer in the U.S. Army. The views expressed in this article are the author's alone, and do not reflect those of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
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Header Image: Moscow, Russia 22 Oct., 2019 (Ivan Shilov).
Notes:
[1] David A. Wemer, “Putin’s Ability to Stash Money in US banks and Real Estate is a ‘Strategic Danger,’ Warns US Sen. Whitehouse,” Atlantic Council, May 7, 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/putin-s-ability-to-stash-money-in-us-banks-and-real-estate-is-a-strategic-danger-warns-us-sen-whitehouse/.
[2] Jakub Janda, “What Putin Really Wants- And Why We Cannot Give it to Him,” Observer, January 25, 2017,
https://observer.com/2017/01/russia-vladimir-putin-interests-opposite-united-states-donald-trump/.
[3] Vanessa Romo, “At Least 1,700 Protestors In Russia Arrested After Nationwide Anti-Putin Rallies,” NPR, April 22, 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/04/22/989694331/at-least-1-700-protesters-in-russia-arrested-after-nationwide-anti-putin-rallies.
[4] Pål Kolstø, "Crimea vs. Donbas: How Putin Won Russian Nationalist Support—and Lost It Again." Slavic Review 75, no. 3 (2016): 702-25, (Accessed 25 April, 2021.).
[5] Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1990-01-01/unipolar-moment.
[6] Vesko Garcevic, “NATO’s Intervention Changed Western-Russian Relations Forever,” Balkan Insight, March 22, 2019, https://balkaninsight.com/2019/03/22/natos-intervention-changed-western-russian-relations-forever/.
[7] Steven Erlanger, “Yeltsin Adamant on Role in Bosnia,” The New York Times, February 16, 1994, https://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/16/world/yeltsin-adamant-on-role-in-bosnia.html.
[8] Russian Federation, “National Security Concept of the Russian Federation,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, January 10, 2000, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/589768.
[9] Imran Rahman-Jones, “Why Does Russia Support Syria and President Assad?” BBC, April 11, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/newsbeat-39554171.
[10] “Russia Fears Crimea Water Shortage as Supply Drops,” BBC, April 25, 2014, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27155885.
[11] Clara Ferreira Marques, “Crimea’s Water Crisis is an Impossible Problem for Putin,” Bloomberg, March 18, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-03-19/russia-vs-ukraine-crimea-s-water-crisis-is-an-impossible-problem-for-putin.
[12]Ann M. Simmons, “Putin Dials Back Pension Plan After Backlash,” The Wall Street Journal, August 31, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-proposal-to-raise-retirement-age-poses-problems-for-putin-1535533201.
[13] “Ukraine Urges NATO to Set up Membership Path,” DW, https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-urges-nato-to-set-up-membership-path/a-57110384.
[14] Dan Peleschuk, “Your American Tax Dollars Just Sent 300 US Paratroopers to Train Ukrainian Soldiers,” PRI, https://www.pri.org/stories/your-american-tax-dollars-just-sent-300-us-paratroopers-train-ukrainian-soldiers.
[15] “Russia Sends More Warships to Black Sea as Ukraine Tensions Simmer,” South China Morning Post, April 17, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/world/russia-central-asia/article/3129977/russia-sends-more-warships-black-sea-ukraine.
[16] Sarah Rainsford, “Why Russia May Not be Planning the Invasion that Ukraine Fears,” April 15, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56746144.
[17] Jake Rudnitsky, “Putin Sends Military Plane with Coronavirus Aid to Help U.S.” Bloomberg, April 1, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-01/putin-sends-military-plane-with-coronavirus-aid-to-help-u-s.
[18] Richard N. Haass, “Economic Sanctions: Too Much of a Bad Thing,” Brookings, June 1, 1998, https://www.brookings.edu/research/economic-sanctions-too-much-of-a-bad-thing/.
[19] Alissa De Carbonnel and Gleb Bryanski, “Putin Warns Ethnic Tensions Risk Tearing Russia Apart,” Reuters, January 23, 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-putin/putin-warns-ethnic-tensions-risk-tearing-russia-apart-idUSTRE80M1QI20120123.
[20] UN, https://population.un.org/wpp/Graphs/Probabilistic/POP/TOT/643.
[21] Transparency, January, 2021, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020/index/rus.
[22] Cain Burdeau, “Russia Rocked by Anti-Corruption Protests in Wake of Navalny Arrest,” Courthouse News Service, January 25, 2021, https://www.courthousenews.com/russia-rocked-by-anti-corruption-protests-in-wake-of-navalny-arrest/.
[23] NBC News, “Biden Warns Russia: ‘Actions Have Consequences,’” NBC News, April 28, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v9HTbGo39pY.