President Putin made three foundational assumptions in launching his war against Ukraine that should have been correct but were not. First, Putin assumed the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and easy fight. Second, he assumed the world would denounce the invasion but tacitly allow it. Third, Putin assumed the war would deter NATO expansion.
The bottom line is that the rise of ISIS has exposed the weakness of a strategic approach, which, for too long, focused just on neutralizing terrorist plots and killing or capturing senior terrorist leaders. This approach looked and often felt, as if it was proactive—taking the fight to the enemy. But in reality, as the defeats of 2014-15 have shown, it was too narrowly focused to succeed.
Innovation and leadership converge on this point: crafting environments and cultures in which the desire to improve outweighs the desire to stick with old habits. Because innovation and leadership have this in common, leaders shouldn’t think of innovation as something they do in addition to their real jobs. Innovation is leadership.
Our soldiers, officers, and civilians have faced the most intense fighting since Korea, and they have endured the stresses admirably (with remarkably few mistakes given the corrupting nature of war). Nor do I fundamentally disagree with how leadership theory has developed from these experiences; works such as Team of Teams by Stan McCrystal are already helping develop military leaders fitter for the future challenges of war. The problem is that all these remarkable feats of leadership have ultimately been tarnished, infected if you will, by one thing: the dramatic absence of strategy in the Western world since September 11th, 2001.
It’s not true that your life flashes before your eyes when faced with death. For me it was the books I’d read and the characters that had left an impression on my soul.It’s not true that your life flashes before your eyes when faced with death. For me it was the books I’d read and the characters that had left an impression on my soul.
Millennials are on track to make up nearly fifty percent of the workforce by 2020. That is to say, they represent the future of the U.S. military. While the military should not change its core character or values to accommodate Millennials, it should recognize their views of the world differ from those of past generations. While Millennials present some new training and leadership challenges (getting them off their phones, for example), they also offer a way for the military to advance into the modern world at the ground level.
From the autumn of his lifetime in public service, Gates offers a final lesson for reformers. When the ideas for change stop flowing, leave. “The reality of reforming bureaucracies is that when a leader thinks he is done, he probably is done.” This is a straightforward statement, but its implications are radical: leadership is reform, and reform should be constant.
Mission command is more than a philosophy of command. It represents a culture where mutual trust and the concomitant willingness to accept prudent risk govern. It comes with an expectation that commanders respect their subordinates’ judgment and issue orders that focus on intent rather than tasks. Mission command relies on a shared understanding (of the environment and expectations) that enables every member of the team to exercise disciplined initiative. When done well, mission command is the result of effective leadership.
The Australian Army needs a more agile system that is able to anticipate change and continuously adapt to the new generation of soldiers in its ranks, developments in the strategic environment, and new methods of learning that leverage technology. The possession of such an evolved system will better ensure that the soldiers and officers of the Army remain prepared for future operational challenges.
Anyone who hasn’t been trapped under a rock over the past few years has heard innumerable comments on the Secretary of Defense’s decision to admit women into combat career fields, and the build-up leading to this decision—the Marine Corps’ large-scale integration experiment, the Army’s adventures with females in Ranger training, etc. Most of these commentaries miss the mark in one way or another—some are little more than feelings and prejudice cloaked as professional opinion—and few begin where they should, with first principles and the law. Only with these foundations can we evaluate what the services have done in meeting the requirements laid before them.
One of the more egregious omissions in Western scholarship has been the treatment of China’s great War of Resistance, waged against Japan from 1937 to 1945. Given the countless volumes written about other campaigns of World War II this omission is inexcusable; this was, after all, not only a war American soldiers and spies participated in, but the ultimate reason Americans were involved in the Second World War in the first place. Fortunately, our picture of China’s part in World War II has brightened considerably over the last decade...Books focused on individual campaigns are just now being written and published. Peter Harmsen...is at the forefront of the effort to tell the story of China’s experience in World War II from the perspective of the soldiers who fought it.
Kurt Degerlund’s thought-provoking article points to the forces at play as military leaders seek to direct and influence others to achieve objectives. He hits upon a key fact - words have meaning and power. But rather than words and concepts being used or re-used in a manner that constrains us, we could instead embrace a world where words remain useful if we decide to change their meaning.
I commend Kurt Degerlund for writing a terrific essay and having the courage to share his views. He has contributed to professional military discourse in a positive manner, but allow me to say, “Yes…AND.”
Carl von Clausewitz, the young Prussian strategist of the Napoleonic age, is a giant in the field of security studies. His seminal work, On War, is widely considered the definitive text in understanding the nature of war. His famous quote, “War is the continuation of politics by other means,” is generally considered the cardinal rule for war—it is often quoted and equally often ignored in practice. So, it is unsurprising that contemporary Western strategists and thinkers look towards Clausewitz for answers and insights, but is he the only choice?
Looking over the horizon, China’s emergence as a potentially formidable countervailing force to U.S. power and American values cannot be underestimated. Beijing’s ability to limit Washington’s options or undercut its leverage in advancing U.S. national interests would indicate China’s arrival as a consequential agenda-setter able to co-opt power with other countries or international entities at the expense of U.S. influence and global leadership.
For those who wish to be either a mentor or protégé, or those who wish to foster effective mentorship in their organization, Kimball’s Army Officer’s Guide to Mentoring is an excellent how-to manual. His observations, insights, and best practices are drawn from the experiences of those who have profited from effective mentor-protégé relationships. They are practical, easy to implement, and sure to make each reader more aware of his or her own approach to and effectiveness as a mentor.
Looking to the future, as the military grows to incorporate full benefits to same-sex couples on base and more inclusion of women in combat roles, could the next generation of Military-Americans actually become the country’s most accepting of diversity?
