Alessandra Nisch
Putin’s Wars: Testing Boyd’s Strategy of ...

President Putin made three foundational assumptions in launching his war against Ukraine that should have been correct but were not. First, Putin assumed the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and easy fight. Second, he assumed the world would denounce the invasion but tacitly allow it. Third, Putin assumed the war would deter NATO expansion.

Putin’s Wars: Testing Boyd’s Strategy of Applied Friction

Strategic Analysis

Data Analytics in the Combatant Command: Improving the Approach to Decision-Making

Data Analytics in the Combatant Command: Improving the Approach to Decision-Making

To complete their missions, combatant commanders will, out of necessity, leverage data as a weapon system as it constitutes the basis of information development within the commander's decision space. With new sensors, the amount of collected data continues to climb, making more data available for transformation into actionable information supporting decision-making. Given the enormous volume of data that presently exists and the supply of trained analysts within a command, the commander and staff are assumed to have the capability to effectively employ data analytics to support the planning and execution of operations within the area of responsibility decisively. The perception is partially true.

The Strategy Delusion

The Strategy Delusion

At a time when the U.S. maintains a significant military advantage over all other countries, it is seductive to think that simply applying those resources to any and all problems will cause success, but it will not. As a country, the U.S. can and must do better. One small step toward improving American strategic competence is to explicitly articulate our strategies as theories of success based on clear conceptualization of all variables and causal mechanisms.