History remains the best guide to predicting the future — but such predictions are still more likely than not to be wrong. Those who postulate and prognosticate on the future of warfare, and those consuming their output, would be well served by keeping this in mind. Such is the nature of predicting the future writ large, and this applies in the realm of warfare. The future is inherently unknowable as will be demonstrated through reviewing the general experience of prediction and then confirming this phenomenon applies to predicting future warfare. Acceptance of the unlikelihood of successful prediction should be cause for introspection; whilst several measures are offered, it is humility which is paramount.
the surest predictions tend to be those that are the most conservative, but their conservativeness lends those predictions to being less empowering for leaders.
A desire to know the future is an innately human need. The methods may have evolved over time, with examination of entrails now less common and the use of computational power on the rise. Alongside the more structured disciplines of the modern era such as technology foresight, there remains adherence to less robust approaches such as that of astrology, which has seen a rise in interest over the last few years though this may be attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic.[1] While some approaches may be more successful than others, the surest predictions tend to be those that are the most conservative, but their conservativeness lends those predictions to being less empowering for leaders.
Predicting the future of war is a compelling need for security institutions. The difficulty of anticipating the trends of future warfare are well commented on, from Clausewitz’s characterisation of war as a chameleon to Lawrence Freedman’s acknowledgement that such “prediction is difficult and likely to be wrong.”[2] Driven by institutional necessity as well as intellectual curiosity, scholars and military professionals have relied upon the study of history to inform societies, states, and their institutions about how they might prepare for and conceptualise future warfare. The episodic nature of war precludes military professionals from benefiting from the kind of experiential learning that doctors and lawyers rely on to mature and adapt their professions and associated institutions.[3] Thus, history provides the necessary and proper substitute for security institutions and their professionals to broaden their understanding of war and the most useful basis for extrapolating about its future character.
More specifically, predictions exist within a larger theory of causation.
History may be the best foundation for predicting the future of war, but the reality that prediction is likely to be wrong remains valid. More specifically, predictions exist within a larger theory of causation. Thus discrete, erroneous prediction by a theorist can invalidate their larger theory of future war. Giulio Douhet’s enthusiastic advocacy for the coming dominance of the air domain in 1921 was, he asserted, based on historical analysis. He stated that the lesson to be learnt from World War I was that war on land would inevitably devolve into attritional stalemate owing to the primacy of the defensive means.[4] It was the unlikelihood of decision on land that made Douhet assert that air would be the decisive domain in future conflict due to offensive primacy of aircraft. Bernard Brodie offered that Douhet was not alone in this misreading of the historical lessons of World War I and overlooking the return to manoeuvre demonstrated by both sides of the conflict on the Western Front in the final campaigns of 1918.[5]
Giulio Douhet (Wikipedia)
Where Douhet made a mistake in his reading of history, there can also be risks associated with wilful misreading or misrepresentation of history. John Mearsheimer in his acerbic Liddell Hart and the Weight of History asserts that Liddell Hart wilfully misrepresented history to create the impression that he had a decisive influence over the German Army in the lead up to and during World War II, amongst other transgressions such as retroactively changing his commentary on contemporary events.[6] Mearsheimer accused Liddell Hart of deliberate deception and considered the case an example of “the fragility of history and the importance of being alert to the danger of its manipulation for selfish purposes.”[7] Noting there are several rebuttals to Mearsheimer’s work, John Harris characterises the core critique of Liddell Hart was that while he was an admirable historian, he was unreliable as a historian of his own times and “especially with regard to issues in which he was personally involved.”[8] In predicting the future on the basis of history it is natural to use the most recent history as the basis for extrapolation, however proximity to events can cloud the effectiveness of historical analysis.
Mistakes in interpretation and misrepresentation of history are also susceptible to the bias, whether individual or institutional, of predetermined outcomes. A purist approach might be to suggest that one could discretely examine the historical event or period, with lessons or trends identified being derived from an objective assessment in isolation. However, this approach opens the door to interminable disputes over particular factors, technologies or military institutions that were decisive in an isolated instance.[9] Such varied debate should be welcomed. Even so, deriving insights for the future from history in isolation should be guarded against to avoid being misled by oversimplifying history through analogy. Neustadt and May in their work on applied history in the 1970s and 80s identified cases of policymakers making false equivalences between North Korean aggression in 1950 to Nazi Germany in the 1930s as well as flawed comparisons made between the French and American challenges in Vietnam.[10]
Whilst a single prediction can be accurate, this does not imply the predictor will always be accurate. A twenty year study of forecasting conducted by Philip Tetlock found that the average results for 28,000 predictions failed to exceed the performance of blind or uninformed choice.[11] Daniel Kahneman’s work on cognitive bias further confirms the pervasive influence of biases as observed by others on Strategy Bridge in the context of decision making.[12] Kahneman corroborates Tetlock’s findings that biases overly influence forecasts.[13] To counteract the effect of bias, he also offers advice about how we should treat outliers, i.e., those who have successfully made accurate predictions about the future in opposition to the trend of mostly being wrong. Kahneman asserts that prediction is subject to the rule of ‘regression to the mean’ where performance that is outside the expected average is unlikely to be sustained or enduring.[14] Using the example of a stock trader picking a well performing stock, he argues that it is likely that any individual trader will be outperformed by a market index over a series of picks over time.[15]
So what do we do if we’re going to be wrong?
While there may be reason to doubt the accuracy of prediction, thinking about the future of conflict remains an important element of preparing for war, and military institutions have largely recognized its necessity. Acknowledgement that predictions are likely wrong should change behaviour.
If one accepts that the character of future warfare cannot be entirely anticipated, one can then aim closer to the mark that is both more useful and accurate.
Humility in the practice and presentation of prediction should be the first response. Introspection may also facilitate a more ruthless examination of the assumptions which underlie one’s thesis — overconfidence and conviction can blind an author. While any author will naturally favour their position, having a firm awareness of bias and contingency and the concomitant humility are fundamental to a more authentic engagement with alternate views. If one accepts that the character of future warfare cannot be entirely anticipated, one can then aim closer to the mark that is both more useful and accurate.
The most consequential objective a force can pursue is maintaining the capacity for adaptation.
Hedging is an appropriate response to uncertainty; maintaining a balanced approach which can react to a number of alternate futures. Douhet was so convinced that the air domain would be dominant in future conflict that he advocated for massive reallocation from the navy and army to fund an “Independent Air Force.”[16] Following his exhortations would have resulted in an unbalanced force of limited utility in the realised character of conflict that did not reflect his predictions. After avoiding the force design equivalent of placing all your money on a single horse, the most consequential objective a force can pursue is maintaining the capacity for adaptation. Adaptation capitalises on a hedging approach to predictions, and indeed it is premised on the fact that anticipating the exact character of future conflict is near impossible.[17] The aim of prediction could change to being least wrong when compared to potential adversaries, in order to reduce the adaptation required.
The nature of predicting the future is that the majority of predictions will be wrong.
The nature of predicting the future is that the majority of predictions will be wrong. This has been demonstrated in the case of generic predictions and predictions relating to the future of warfare. History is recognised as the best foundation for predicting the future of warfare yet the use, or claimed use, of history as the basis for prediction does not offer a panacea. When practitioners and audiences for predictions of future warfare accept that any individual predictions is likely to be wrong, several conclusions naturally follow such as maintaining a sense of humility and hedging force design so as not to overcommit to any one future vision. Maintaining awareness that predictions of warfare are likely wrong should lead to maintaining a broader aperture and openness to contrary views.
History has also demonstrated periods where predictions of warfare have coalesced and when proven wrong have had devastating results. This is exemplified by Ivan Bloch in 1899 who presciently identified many, though not all, of the characteristics of warfare encountered in World War I.[18] Largely dismissed at the time, the accuracy of his prediction was only realised in hindsight in large part owing to its divergence from the accepted orthodoxy.[19] Given any single prediction is likely to be wrong, those interested in the future character of warfare would be well served by entertaining non-conformist predictions of the future, lest they miss the next Bloch.
Will Hitchen is an officer in the Australian Army. The views expressed are the author's and do not reflect the official position of the Australian Army, the Australian Department of Defence, or the Australian Government.
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Header Image: First World War Fortress Chiusaforte, 2019 (Austrian National Library).
Notes:
[1] Ian Miles, "The development of technology foresight: A review," Technological Forecasting and Social Change 77, no. 9 (2010), 1448-1450; Kristoffer Lopez et al., "Social contagion of astrology in the social media amid COVID-19 pandemic," International Journal of Multidisciplinary: Applied Business and Education Research 2, no. 4 (2021), 350-351; Abhilasha Das et al., "Fixating on the future: An overview of increased astrology use," International Journal of Social Psychiatry 68, no. 5 (2022), 931.
[2] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 89; Lawrence Freedman, The Future of War: A History (New York: Public Affairs, 2017), xvi.
[3] Michael Howard, "The Use and Abuse of Military History," Parameters XI, no. 1 (1981): 13.
[4] Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 35.
[5] Bernard Brodie would note that Douhet “was not the only student of World War One, either lay or professional, who deduced the same lesson from the experience of that war without somehow taking into account such events as the German offensive of March 1918.” Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 80.
[6] John Mearsheimer, Liddell Hart and the Weight of History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).
[7] John Mearsheimer, Liddell Hart and the Weight of History, 13.
[8] Paul Harris, Men, ideas and tanks: British military thought and armoured forces, 1903-1939 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995).
[9] Daryl Press, "The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare," International Security 26, no. 2 (2001).
[10] Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 34-46, 157-171.
[11] Philp E Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
[12] James Davitch, "Do Not Trust Your Gut: How to Improve Strategists' Decision Making," The Strategy Bridge (2022), https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2022/8/31/do-not-trust-your-gut-how-to-improve-strategists-decision-making.
[13] Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Great Britain: Allen Lane, 2011), 209-221.
[14] Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, 175-184
[15] Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, 220-221. Warren Buffett is considered the champion of the argument that individual stock picking is outmatched by following indexes. See Warren Buffett, "Berkshire's Performance vs the S&P 500," Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (25 Feb 2017 2017), https://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2016ltr.pdf.
[16] Douhet, The Command of the Air, 24, 30, 187, 199-200, 228-234.
[17] An important topic, but unable to be discussed in any detail in this paper. See: Williamson Murray, Military Adaptation in War (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defence Analyses, 2009); Frank Hoffman, Mars Adapting: Military Change During War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2021).
[18] Ivan Bloch, Is War Now Impossible? (London: Grant Richards, 1899).
[19] Michael Welch, "The Centenary of the British Publication of Jean de Bloch's Is War Now Impossible? (1899-1999)," War in History 7, no. 3 (2000): 275-278.