War and the Art of Governance. Nadia Schadlow. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2017.
For more than 170 years, senior U.S. military leaders have confronted the vexing problem of reestablishing civic order in foreign states during and after a war. In virtually all of its major wars, American forces have applied some form of governance in an attempt to convert battlefield victory into broader strategic success. The efforts have been diverse and often spontaneously developed, and the results have been mixed. In 2017, Dr. Nadia Schadlow, former Deputy National Security Advisor under then-Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster and the primary author of the 2017 National Security Strategy, published a thoroughly researched book on this subject.
War and the Art of Governance is a thoughtful contribution that may offer beneficial insight to military officers and political leaders involved in strategic national security decision-making.[1] Ultimately, however, the book offers little new insight and omits too much critical material.
The book, an extension of a 2003 article in the journal Parameters, which focused on a lack of strategic planning for post-regime operations in Iraq, recounts the history of American military governance operations.[2] Schadlow works through 15 historical case studies, all of which contain some variant of the same missteps made in Iraq. From the Mexican-American War through Cold War ventures in the Dominican Republic and Panama, the author covers successes and failures in turning battlefield victory into strategic success.
The penultimate chapter hones in on the inability to synchronize combat and governance operations in the early stages of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Strategic oversight in those countries is well-covered ground, and the book has nothing particularly new to offer here. Books such as George Packer’s The Assassin’s Gate, Tom Ricks’ Fiasco, and Rajiv Chandrasekaran’s Imperial Life In the Emerald City present more thorough accounting of misconceived efforts by the Coalition Provisional Authority to reconstruct Iraq. The Iraq Study Group’s 2006 report to Congress is perhaps the most detailed history on the subject.[3] Meanwhile Seth Jones’ In the Graveyard of Empires, Ahmed Rashid’s Descent Into Chaos, and Jack Fairweather’s The Good War all provide more insightful analysis into American inability to establish civic order following the swift fall of the Taliban in 2001.
Missing from Schadlow’s book is any study of the Vietnam War, an odd exclusion in a volume about the history of errant U.S. military governance operations. Vietnam is among the most notable examples of America’s inability to match political objectives with combat success. In that war, multiple American administrations made the same mistakes repeatedly in misjudging the social and political context of the region and its people.
Schadlow details American political and military leaders' unwillingness to accept the need for restoration of civil services after the fall of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein’s regime in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively. The author refers to this as “American Denial Syndrome,” and traces it back to an American fear of a growing military with an expanded set of roles and the American notion that civilian agencies must lead occupations after conflict.[4] What her argument misses is that America’s refusal to accept the political nature of war and inability to plan for life beyond the strategic military objective is rooted, at least in part, in awful memories of Vietnam.
The author goes on to explain that a fully planned and resourced comprehensive military governance effort at the onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom could have averted the kind of violence witnessed in Iraq in 2004.[5] Gordon Rudd’s excellent book Reconstructing Iraq and Emma Sky’s remarkable The Unraveling both draw out this conclusion with greater clarity.
In Afghanistan, the strategic objectives involved the removal of the Taliban from power. Therefore, any plan to restore governance and civil services during the fighting required a transition to a new central government, police forces, and a functioning military. Such an effort to meet these political objectives would likely have taken as long as the current war in that country. Bing West’s brilliant The Wrong War offers an exhaustive analysis of why military governance was always going to be remarkably difficult in Afghanistan. West’s book is a must read by all military officers and defense analysts who believe that the American military would have succeeded in Afghanistan if only a process for the establishment of civic order were both sufficiently planned and resourced.
Similarly, considering Iraq, even with a full military governance plan, the United States would likely be right where it is now. The coalition could never leave Iraq in the hands of Ba'athists and the Sunnis, as the majority Shia would revolt at the earliest opportunity. Even the most detailed military governance plan would have required a transition of power, and a new military, formed of both Sunnis and Shia, would likely have taken at least a decade to meet the political imperatives of regime change.
In focusing on the lack of a post-regime strategy in both countries, this book misses the real reasons those wars were unsuccessful…
These concerns aside, War and the Art of Governance suggests the American failure to plan for governance in Afghanistan and Iraq resulted in the failures to resolve those conflicts, but what Schadlow does not explore is whether American goals in these places were ever realistic in the first place. This is a tremendous oversight given the book’s concluding recommendations. In focusing on the lack of a post-regime strategy in both countries, this book misses the real reasons those wars were unsuccessful: namely the political objective of regime change.
Schadlow closes the book with a series of recommendations for policymakers and senior military leaders. She argues for military control of governance operations in war and the development of governance structures and capabilities within the services. Within the national government, only the Department of Defense, which today numbers more than 2 million active duty and reserve servicemembers and more than 860,000 civilians, and which holds a budget of more than $700 billion, can occupy and govern an occupied country.[6]
The reader of War and the Art of Governance must also consider the unintended consequences of Schadlow’s recommendations. Transfer of governance operations from civilian to military control will likely increase the size and price tag of an already enormous defense apparatus in any future intervention. It might also entice elected officials to intervene in more countries or commit to regime change more often.
Ultimately, War and the Art of Governance is a useful primer on America’s long history of creating civic order during and after combat operations. Despite its flaws, the book offers some wisdom on achieving strategic victory in war beyond success in battle.
Joe Buccino is a U.S. Army officer. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government.
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Header Image: U.S. tanks under Baghdad's Victory Arch in occupied Iraq (TSgt John L. Houghton, Jr./USAF Photo/Wikimedia)
Notes:
[1] Schadlow, Nadia. War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success into Political Victory. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017.
[2] Schadlow, Nadia. 2003. "War and the Art of Governance." Parameters 33 (3): 85.
[3] Baker, James Addison, Lee Hamilton, and Lawrence S. Eagleburger. The Iraq Study Group Report. New York: Vintage Books, 2006.
[4] Schadlow. War and the Art of Governance. 14.
[5] Ibid., 246.
[6] Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense Hearing. 2019. Washington: Federal Information & News Dispatch, Inc.