Alessandra Nisch
Putin’s Wars: Testing Boyd’s Strategy of ...

President Putin made three foundational assumptions in launching his war against Ukraine that should have been correct but were not. First, Putin assumed the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and easy fight. Second, he assumed the world would denounce the invasion but tacitly allow it. Third, Putin assumed the war would deter NATO expansion.

Putin’s Wars: Testing Boyd’s Strategy of Applied Friction

#Reviewing What is the Worst That Could Happen?

#Reviewing What is the Worst That Could Happen?

Let us not turn away in the face of unattainable limits. Instead, we should push those limits and make our best attempt to imagine the unthinkable and prepare accordingly. That being said, there is no free lunch. How much time and money ought the U.S. government allocate to wargaming worst cases, or on a smaller scale, ought you devote to reading this book? The first question is too large for this review, but I will say that What Is The Worst That Could Happen? was well worth my $37.95 and an afternoon’s time, and I am confident that any reader of The Bridge will feel the same.

#Reviewing Decoding Al-Qaeda's Strategy

#Reviewing Decoding Al-Qaeda's Strategy

It is worth reviewing Al Qaeda’s strategic DNA for insights into what the group and its various factions would seek to achieve if given the opportunity. This leads the author to a prescription to contest Al Qaeda’s Salafist ideology by pointing out their extensive references to Maoist and Western strategists. I am skeptical that this would be a beneficial approach from agencies within the U.S. at least.  But, the value of this book is its message that the flea remains vigorously at work against the dog, even if we would like to ignore that itch from time to time.

The Strategic Calculus of Mass Murder: Why Genocide?

The Strategic Calculus of Mass Murder: Why Genocide?

To understand mass violence and devise effective interventions, one must break from the popular notion that mass slaughter is purposeless barbarity. The next time the Islamic State or some other actor perpetrates an act of mass violence during a military campaign, we must ask ourselves what the leadership might hope to gain or achieve, and why decision-makers would allow such insanity. There may be a method to their madness, or an underlying strategic rationality being masked by their barbarity.  

A Case for Providence: #Reviewing Destiny and Power

A Case for Providence: #Reviewing Destiny and Power

Lying beneath this humanity is the unrelenting belief that each day of tedium, each crippling struggle, progresses one toward that individual peak. It’s the foundation that built Bush into a steward that led the U.S. through shifting times, though he scarcely heaped much praise from it in the moment. Rather, he bore through it, finding solace in the records he took on paper and in dictation: his journals. The ones with which Meacham has used to fill the pages of Destiny and Power, and in doing so, craft a legacy in a time with even less certainty and even more fear than the one George H.W. Bush occupied.

#Reviewing Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory

#Reviewing Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory

Just War Reconsidered is an absolute and urgent must-read for scholars of Just War, ethics, and strategy, as well as anyone involved in the enterprise of war—military and civilian alike. And after reading it, an energetic dialogue needs to develop and be sustained as the implications of this important contribution are gradually worked out.

Geronimo: Strategy Lessons from History’s Periphery

Geronimo: Strategy Lessons from History’s Periphery

On the surface, 4 December 1966, appears inconsequential. In the context of the 1960s, a decade rife with major milestones for humanity, 4 December 1966, exists on history’s periphery. Yet upon closer examination, this date is representative of what was until recently America’s longest war. Small events shape history, yet do so subtly. In that vein, Operation Geronimo revealed both the effectiveness and limitations of combating low intensity warfare with highly mobile forces. Deeper still, Operation Geronimo demonstrated that operational successes were not trustworthy indicators of progress towards victory during the Vietnam War.

Teaching Practical Strategy: The Contemporary War and Warfare Course at King’s College London

Teaching Practical Strategy: The Contemporary War and Warfare Course at King’s College London

What follows is a contribution to the debate on improving education in strategy and military affairs for potential leaders facing the major global issues of the 21st century. As it covers a single postgraduate course at a single university in the United Kingdom, it presents a way of teaching the subject, rather than the way, and is emphatically not a definitive guide on how to teach strategy. Rather, it is intended as a "think piece" and intended to provoke further discussion and give food for thought for others engaged in teaching in these fields, be they in military, government, or academic environments.

Why Thucydides Still Matters

Why Thucydides Still Matters

Ultimately, Thucydides’ enduring relevance lies in the fact that he forces us to wrestle with the notion that war, as a contest for power, strips bare human nature under the pressure of conflict—and the results are not appealing. The Peloponnesian War shows how strategic perceptions based on the innately human frailties of fear, honour, and interest lead a state to war. Thucydides then warns us that during conflict a state’s collective morality can decline under the strain of prolonged war based on the choices it makes. He helps us understand that creating a winning strategy is all about these choices, which are shaped by a state’s strategic and military culture.

Extending the Second Offset and Multi-Domain Battle

Extending the Second Offset and Multi-Domain Battle

Multi-Domain Battle offers a conceptual  structure for an extension of the technological and doctrinal Second Offset. This combination can continue to offset any adversary's ability to mass effects in the cyber, information, and electro-magnetic spectrum as well as massed lethal fires. The desired capabilities needed to force seams in enemy defenses and establish temporary windows of opportunity in the physical and cyber domains will serve to set disciplined conditions for a conceptual and actual Third Offset. 

#Essays on War: Mattis

#Essays on War: Mattis

Those of us who served with him know that he is a caring, erudite, warfighting general. And we know that there is a reason he uses the callsign Chaos:  he is a lifelong student of his profession, a devotee of maneuver warfare and Sun Tzu, the sort of guy who wants to win without fighting—to cause chaos among those he would oppose. To Marines, he is the finest of our tribal elders. The rest of the world, very soon, will know how truly gifted he is. Our friends and allies will be happy he is our new Secretary of War; our enemies will soon wish he weren’t. I worked for General James Mattis three times: when he was a Colonel, a Major General, and a Lieutenant General.

#Reviewing Retire the Colors

#Reviewing Retire the Colors

Retire the Colors is a reference to the command given at the end of a service or ceremony directing the color guard to retrieve the national and unit colors and remove them from the ceremony. Rendering honors and retiring the colors marks the official end of the ceremony, and frequently, the transition to the informal social activities afterward. The reference is appropriate for this anthology of stories dealing with transition between military service and the civilian world.

The Master Strategist, Clausewitzian Genius

The Master Strategist, Clausewitzian Genius

Could Genghis Khan and Alexander the Great have achieved their unmatched successes were it not for the generals and advisors who played major roles in those successes? Arguably not. Strategy, by nature, is adaptive and evolutionary. While it is necessary for leaders to have strategic minds, it is perhaps even more important to have systems in place which allow for individuals to further develop their education and have the opportunity to influence the development of a nation’s strategy.

The Russian DNC Hack: An Opportunity for Cyber Deterrence

The Russian DNC Hack: An Opportunity for Cyber Deterrence

Deterrence strategy, too, is essentially timeless, which inherently means it is applicable even to cyber warfare. While a legitimate threat of force lies at the heart of deterrence, different modes of warfare may be necessary to accomplish the true purpose of strategy as Clausewitz saw it:  the accomplishment political goals. The U.S. political goal in this case is to prevent attacks and other wicked acts perpetrated against America in the cyber realm. Though the U.S. definitely has heavy hands in the cyber boxing arena, a better strategy is to avoid punches altogether, rather than slugging it out in the middle of the ring.

#Reviewing Citizen Soldier

#Reviewing Citizen Soldier

Citizen Soldier's depiction of combat aims for a visceral reaction and challenges viewers to place soldiers’ sacrifices within the context of our ongoing wars. And it does an admirable job, leaving you tense and guessing about the outcome of the battles and ambushes the “Thunderbirds” fought their way through. The documentary’s focus on the trials of National Guard soldiers in our present conflicts, however, ignores the wider consequences of a repeatedly deployed and increasingly depended-on reserve echelon. The continued reliance upon and the “regularization” of the National Guard should force the Army, Congress, and American society to examine the role of the Guard in our current and future military operations, whether we want to watch it or not.

#Reviewing JFK and LBJ: The Last Two Great Presidents

#Reviewing JFK and LBJ: The Last Two Great Presidents

Hodgson fails to satisfactorily qualify JFK and LBJ as the titular “Last Two Great Presidents.” He does, however, succeed in building up Johnson’s reputation, one that is often denigrated for his part in escalating U.S. participation in Vietnam. Because of Hodgson’s account, we might consider reversing Reston’s characterization of the two: perhaps it was Johnson and his social reform success who made men think while Kennedy and his foreign policy dominance made men like Khrushchev act.

There Is Only War, But War Isn’t Always Political

There Is Only War, But War Isn’t Always Political

There is no such thing as terrorism. There is only war. Although Westerners typically do not agree because the West has narrowed its definition of war to preference certain acts while eliminating others. These preferences have reduced suffering and enforced order, but they may not be the best lens for strategists to utilize if they want to understand and anticipate an enemy.

The Generals in Their Labyrinth: #Reviewing High Command

The Generals in Their Labyrinth: #Reviewing High Command

The fact that our most cherished ally is no longer able to analyze its own strategic situation, or participate fully in our strategic debates, should be distressing. Britain’s generals, brilliant as they may be, are trapped in a series of historical and organizational labyrinths. Needless to say, this situation may change, and Elliott is one of many voices calling out for reform. Until then, America must remain wary of allies who promise more than they can deliver.