President Putin made three foundational assumptions in launching his war against Ukraine that should have been correct but were not. First, Putin assumed the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and easy fight. Second, he assumed the world would denounce the invasion but tacitly allow it. Third, Putin assumed the war would deter NATO expansion.
Following the publication of the recent article “COIN Doctrine Under Fire,” I was lucky enough to ‘listen in’ on an enlightening conversation on one of the dozen listservs I frequent. While debating the merits of counterinsurgency, the list began discussing the value of capturing the pertinent lessons from a war…during and immediately following the conflict. On the discussion were of the authors of both the Army’s pre-eminent volume on Desert Storm and the first solid look at Iraqi Freedom.
In the wake of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, much ink has been spilled relating service member’s personal experiences or discussing the misapplication of American foreign policy. Few of them do both, let alone place such events in the greater context of history. In War, Welfare, & Democracy, Peter J. Munson does both by providing the reader a deep look into the driving factors in American foreign policy, punctuated by vivid images from his own personal travels. Readers will find this book both enlightening and engrossing.
I want to start this piece with a slight preface. In my last, and first, post I discussed the relative value of contributions made by the NATO assets involved in Operation Unified Protector. I discussed the relative values of their contributions in relation to the formation of the NTC. It occurs to me now that I wasn’t upfront about the manner in which I assessed relative contributions. When I rated the contributions of NATO’s combined airpower and the small but effective band of elite special operators on the ground I used the word significant. When seeking to emphasize the importance of the NTC’s establishment I used the word decisive.
A fortnight ago, the Libyan rebels swept into the capital city of Tripoli and have since begun to assert control over territory it seemed only weeks ago they would never lay claim to. The side that spent months teetering on the brink of imminent demise has now become the mortal lock. Now that they’ve reached this position of unrivaled dominance it seems the world is ready to start talking in past tense about the conflict.
Often confused for one another, Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMA) are much less influential than the societal-military earthquake-inducing Military Revolutions (MR). The confusion is not simply semantic, but rather crucial as RMAs have little to no influence beyond the tactical and operational levels of war. RMAs, as Knox and Murray tell us in “Dynamics of Military Revolution,” are no “substitute for strategy.”
In the fall of 2010 in Kunar, as the more active period of fighting subsided, we began to take a second look at the day-to-day intelligence reports we had amassed in an attempt to better understand the enemy. We had a lot of material to sift through, as there were a number of intelligence teams operating in the area. As you might be able to tell from the picture above, we tried to have a little fun with the process as well.
The Center for New American Security (CNAS) recently rolled out a provocative report titled,”Building Better Generals.” There are some valuable ideas to be considered here from LTG Barno, Dr. Bensahel, Ms. Sayler, and Ms. Kidder — especially on encouraging continued education for General and Flag Officers—and I recommend you take a look at it (see also, “’Building Better Generals’ Report Rollout Panel”)
A good sign of a successful gathering is not only the interaction that takes place at the event itself, but more importantly the conversation that occurs following. In this respect the Defense Entrepreneurs Forum has been blessed; one of the reasons I’ve been remiss in reporting out on the event is the rapidity and thoroughness that some of the participants have written on salient points from the weekend.
The enabling and assistance of states to solve their own problems—not the usurpation of sovereignty—is at the root of R2P and Sovereignty as Responsibility. Time and again representatives of R2P and the United Nations have expressed their explicit position that the UN wishes to avoid military interventions, but also wishes to prevent atrocities from occurring. This balance is prudent and necessary to ensure that states are fully functioning members of the international community and that any state that requires assistance in carrying out its duties of protection receives it in a timely manner.
