Alessandra Nisch
Putin’s Wars: Testing Boyd’s Strategy of ...

President Putin made three foundational assumptions in launching his war against Ukraine that should have been correct but were not. First, Putin assumed the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and easy fight. Second, he assumed the world would denounce the invasion but tacitly allow it. Third, Putin assumed the war would deter NATO expansion.

Putin’s Wars: Testing Boyd’s Strategy of Applied Friction

Ambiguity

Strategic Ambiguity Out of Balance: Updating an Outdated Taiwan Policy

Strategic Ambiguity Out of Balance: Updating an Outdated Taiwan Policy

In the 1970s, China’s Chinese Communist Party (CCP) deferred resolving the Taiwan question—invading Taiwan to defeat the Kuomintang (KMT) and claim that territory—because it prioritized achieving economic development that required access to and integration with international trade and capital markets. Meanwhile, the U.S’ strategic ambiguity posture sought to stabilize the Taiwan Strait with dual deterrence of both Chinese attack and Taiwanese declaration of independence. This policy rested on two premises—that China would remain committed to peaceful and non-coercive merger, if any, and that Taiwan’s independence was not essential to American foreign policy interests—neither of which holds today.

#Leadership in an Ambiguous World

#Leadership in an Ambiguous World

The nature of serving as a military leader lends itself to an innate desire to be in control of one’s circumstances whenever possible. That said, the future is not, and likely will not be so clear, and future leaders must be prepared to succeed in this environment. By embracing a new standard in training, and more importantly education and development, we can capitalize on the ability of innovative leaders to link new explanations to old problems.