President Putin made three foundational assumptions in launching his war against Ukraine that should have been correct but were not. First, Putin assumed the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and easy fight. Second, he assumed the world would denounce the invasion but tacitly allow it. Third, Putin assumed the war would deter NATO expansion.
Looking into the future, it is critical to build more typologies for insurgent success in order to understand how states can achieve the upper hand. Most important however is conceptualizing how insurgents successfully relate their strategy of violence to their environment. Had the United States, for example, spent more time analyzing what victory looked like for the Taliban and how they planned on achieving it based on their environment, they may have bolstered America’s own strategy.
Overall, Hubbell’s work illustrates how literature, history, and art refract the memory of the Algerian War. These memories are multiple, varied, and ultimately accretive, which impedes healing and progress for both French and Algerians across both sides of the Mediterranean. Hubbell’s book will be of great interest not only to scholars of France and Algeria, but also to anyone examining memory, trauma, and contested historical narratives.
There are myriad reasons for the protracted nature of the dispute for Western Sahara. The Western Sahara’s utility as a nationalist tool since 1975 gives the Moroccan monarchy virtually no choice but to maintain its historical discourse. Other parties in the international community have not contributed to any prospect of resolution. The U.N. has failed to complete its mission to hold a referendum, Algeria continues to support the Polisario to maintain the regional balance of power, and major powers like the U. S. have put the expediency of their own priorities over neutrality or balanced mediation. One of the most frustrating aspects of the conflict’s international dimension to Sahrawis is its continued low profile.
