On Killing Remotely: The Psychology of Killing with Drones. Wayne Phelps. NY, NY: Little, Brown and Company, 2021.
Given the flurry of publication in clinical psychology on the subject, it may seem that moral injury is already a codified mental illness. Moral injury—defined as a betrayal of what is right by someone holding legitimate authority in a high-stakes situation by Jonathan Shay—has captured the imaginations of theologians, ethicists, and clinical psychologists.[1] Yet, to date, moral injury remains a syndrome, that is, a group of symptoms lacking clear definition or cause. It lacks a full-blown set of clinical diagnosis criteria, the search for which is complicated by at least three factors: quantifiability, severity, and the state of technology.[2]
Wayne Phelps (Lt. Col., USMC, Ret.) exemplifies a possible way ahead in On Killing Remotely: The Psychology of Killing with Drones, a study of crews of remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs).[3] In terms of quantifiability, Phelps makes room for analyzing a new arena for moral injury without stretching the term past its breaking point. In terms of severity, Phelps clarifies that stakes can be high without involving immediate personal danger, thus opening up discussions of comparable scenarios with the potential to morally injure. In terms of technology, Phelps distinguishes between kinds of unmanned or remote aerial technology, sketching a taxonomy and noting the unique stressors of each tool or mission.
Before Phelps’ contributions can be appreciated, it is necessary to understand the complicating factors in current moral injury research. First, there is the issue of quantifiability: will moral injury receive a singular definition or paradigmatic framework? As documented in the Journal of Traumatic Stress, there is no consensus over whether moral injury most resembles regret, betrayal, or both.[4] Nor is it clear whether to speak of it in a broad or restrictive sense. For some, moral injury has become a catch-all for any turmoil experienced by veterans that does not neatly align with trauma, as if moral injury lurked in every negative memory, perceived failure, or sin. On the other hand, philosophers like Pauline Shanks Kaurin have argued compellingly that the definition of moral injury should be distinguishable from moral perfectionism, luck, and or uncertainty, dropping the pretense that every last decision involves potential moral injury.[5]
The second factor that complicates research into moral injury is the issue of severity: can or should there be a delineation, whether by type or degree, between what is experienced by (a) a soldier who personally partook in atrocities overseas, (b) a pilot who may have been ordered to strike from thousands of miles away in chaotic circumstances, and (c) a leader in garrison in the U.S. who failed to assist a victim of abuse? There seem to be important differences in these cases, yet as the experiences become incrementally removed from combat proper, what then?
Shay’s original qualifier—a high stakes situation of life-and-death or something very close—seems to have held in the last decade as scholars have examined potential moral injury in healthcare providers, educators, law enforcement, those involved with child protection services, and refugees.[6]
There is no guarantee that Shay’s stipulation will be honored forever. The definition of moral injury showing the most promise for clinical criteria is not Shay’s but comes instead from Brett Litz, who focuses more on personal regret than interpersonal betrayal and does not stipulate a high stakes situation, only that the violated moral belief be deeply held.[7] And as the term becomes mainstream, similar to the way the term violence can now refer to everything from harsh rhetoric to property damage, or the way some flippantly refer to depression or attention deficit disorder, moral injury might become increasingly trivialized and elasticized.[8]
Third, and perhaps most resistant to new studies of moral injury, is the perilous future of technology, which alters the shape, range, and scope of human capacity to inflict pain and damage. Cyber or remote warfare, artificial intelligence, facial recognition, or weaponizing space pose new problems for the human psyche; where it was once possible for John Keegan to dream of the abolition of battle, to be almost completely replaced with impersonal, mechanized mass devastation, the tools of remote warfare may signal battle’s intense proliferation, even convenience, as the erosion of physical, psychological and emotional barriers to killing accelerates.[9]
Phelps does not directly address moral injury in On Killing Remotely. However, the context Phelps analyzes—remotely piloted aircraft conducting surveillance, strikes, and close air support—relates closely to moral injury studies.
Regarding quantifiability, Phelps’ detailed case studies give specificity, not generality, and a taxonomy, not a clumsy one-size-fits-all approach to feelings of regret or betrayal.[10] This approach aligns well with the argument of Shanks Kaurin above that moral injury is related to, but distinct from, moral uncertainty and perfectionism. Additionally, Phelps names how RPA crews have felt misrepresented in media portrayals, politically-charged discussions, and in the context of joint operations.[11] Servicemembers in one branch may not always understand the sacrifices made in another.
As it relates to the second factor, severity, Phelps contests the idea that one’s own life must be in immediate danger in order to succumb to traumatic stress or moral injury. He argues this in a way that stays truer to Shay’s original vision of high stakes issues. He points out that analysts and pilots have found their names on terrorist hit lists and their online presence tracked and scrutinized. (Surely this constitutes high stakes.)
Phelps also clarifies that serving on the crew of an RPA is not at all like gaming.[12] It involves the analysis of countless hours of footage to gain intimate knowledge of enemies or to record the often grueling and sad aftermath of a strike. The recurring challenge to readers is to remember RPA crew members as veterans needing support. In this way Phelps outlines how moral injury research may incorporate others on the periphery of tragedy, such as emergency dispatchers or content moderators (“cleaners”) of social media.[13]
Finally, there is the matter of technology. Phelps helpfully describes the differences between five groups of unmanned aerial systems, noting that the physiological and psychological dynamics vary by proximity. Phelps demonstrates that distance itself is not disengagement: “it is the crew who is at war, regardless of physical location.”[14] Adrenaline rushes, temporal distortions, cold or shaky hands, vomiting, sweating, and altered memory often accompany the act of remote killing—all of which are comparable to physiological effects of face-to-face shooting.[15] Phelps worries most about crews operating medium and high altitude remote systems from the other side of the globe reporting high stress, acute reactions, and exhaustion after long hours of close surveillance.[16] Operators work on a crew, therefore complicating the question of moral culpability for any particular actor or action. Many crews experience the phenomenon of “a never-ending deployment.”[17] At the same time Phelps argues emphatically that RPA crews are not engaged in remote control assassinations, because these pilots, sensor operators, and analysts are truly at war.[18]
Phelps’ suggestions for improvement have already begun to be implemented, nesting quite well with other calls to improve processes.[19] The U.S. Army stands out as the branch recruiting junior enlisted Soldiers into demanding first assignments, but the U.S. Air Force fulfills the most psychologically-grueling missions. Among the recommendations: (1) implement rotating shifts similar to first responders and law enforcement, (2) deploy RPA crews forward so that there is not a blur between civilian and military life, and (3) front load training and missions with a discussion of killing by describing what could happen or is likely to happen.[20]
Whether Phelps’ work and other studies like it will move the needle toward a consensus for criteria for a clinical diagnosis is a question best left to clinicians. In the meantime, Phelps’ synthesizing efforts should not go unnoticed. He brings balance, experience, empathy, and detail to the discussion—never discounting the specific experiences of close-quarters combat, nor trivializing moral injury’s costly toll, yet warning of the new gathering shadows on the horizon of modern warfare.
Caleb Miller is a U.S. Army officer and chaplain and has written on ethics, suicide, and history in various journals and other publications. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect those of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
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Header Image: MQ-9 Reaper, Crecch AFB, Nevada 2015 (Senior Airman Christian Clausen).
Notes:
[1] Though the definition of moral injury is not settled, this definition is taken from Jonathan Shay, “Casualties,” Daedalus 140.3 (2011): 183. For an appreciation of the multidisciplinary discussion, see Joseph Wiinikka-Lydon, “Mapping Moral Injury: Comparing Discourses of Moral Harm,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 44.2 (2019): 180-181.
[2] Tine Molendijk, Willemijn Verkoren, Annelieke Drogendijk, Martin Elands, Eric-Hans Kramer, Annika Smit and Désirée Verweij, “Contextual Dimensions of Moral Injury: An Interdisciplinary Review,” Military Psychology 34.6 (2022), 742-753; cf. Harold G. Koenig and Faten Al Zaben, “Moral Injury: An Increasingly Recognized and Widespread Syndrome,” Journal of Religious Health 60.5 (2021): 2989–3011, and Haleigh A. Barnes, Robin A. Hurley, and Katherine H. Taber, “Moral Injury and PTSD: Often Co-Occurring but Mechanistically Different,” The Journal of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences 31.2 (April 2019), 99: “Moral injury is not classified as a mental disorder. It is a dimensional problem that can have profound effects on critical domains of emotional, psychological, behavioral, social, and spiritual functioning.”
[3] Wayne Phelps, On Killing Remotely: The Psychology of Killing with Drones (New York, NY: Little Brown and Company, 2021). Despite the tagline in the title, it should be noted that Phelps seems to detest the term “drone,” and so I will follow suit referring to remotely piloted aircraft.
[4] Brandon J. Griffin, Natalie Purcell, Kristine Burkman, Brett T. Litz, Craig J. Bryan, Martha Schmitz, Claudia Villierme, Jessica Walsh, and Shira Maguen, “Moral Injury: An Integrative Review,” Journal of Traumatic Stress 32 (June 2019), 357. In their words: “It is unclear how (and whether) moral injury fits into current models for classifying psychiatric disorders […] research needs to establish thresholds of moral distress that evoke psychiatric and functional problems that merit clinical intervention, especially given the absence of criteria on which to base diagnosis or seek reimbursement for services administered.”
[5] Pauline Shanks Kaurin, “Healing the Wounds of War: Moral Luck, Moral Uncertainty, and Moral Injury,” The Strategy Bridge, January 5, 2018, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/1/5/healing-the-wounds-of-war-moral-luck-moral-uncertainty-and-moral-injury.
[6] Jonathan Shay, “Moral Injury,” Psychoanalytic Psychology 31.2 (2014), 183; Griffin, et al, “Moral Injury: An Integrative Review,” 356.
[7] Litz’s definition: “perpetrating, failing to prevent, bearing witness to, or learning about acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations.” Brett T. Litz, Nathan Stein, Eileen Delany, Leslie Lebowitz, William P. Nash, Caroline Silva, Shira Maguen, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans: A preliminary model and intervention strategy,” Clinical Psychology Review 29.8 (December 2009), 696.
[8] Orin Nimni, “Defining Violence,” Current Affairs, September 17, 2017, https://www.currentaffairs.org/2017/09/defining-violence. Nimni is critical of rightwing attempts to water down the term violence by incorporating property damage and theft, but also of leftwing attempts to water down the term by incorporating speech acts.
[9] John Keegan, The Face of Battle (New York: Penguin, 1978), 342-343.
[10] Phelps, On Killing Remotely, 36-48, 137-143.
[11] “As would be expected, when you arrive on the scene in this situation, the friendly forces being shot at by the enemy express a wide array of emotions over the radio such as fear, anger, frustration, and impatience that can be felt and understood on the other end of the radio regardless of which crew position you occupy. Often troops’ lives depend on the integration and assistance of the RPA called to help them fight through the dangerous situation they are in. And you can hear the stress in their voice.” Phelps, On Killing Remotely, 73. Cf. 44.
[12] Wayne Phelps, “The Psychic Toll of Killing with Drones,” The Wall Street Journal, June 5, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-psychic-toll-of-killing-with-drones-11622865660.
[13] One higher-profile example is Vaugh Allex, the man working the ticket counter at Dulles Airport for American Airlines Flight 77: “On Sept. 11, he checked hijackers onto Flight 77. It's haunted him ever since,” NPR, September 11, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2016/09/09/493133084/on-sept-11-he-checked-hijackers-onto-flight-77-its-haunted-him-ever-since. For more on social media’s content controllers, Brian Bishop, “The Cleaners is a Riveting Documentary about how Social Media might be Ruining the World,” The Verge, Jan 21, 2018, https://www.theverge.com/2018/1/21/16916380/sundance-2018-the-cleaners-movie-review-facebook-google-twitter.
[14] Phelps, On Killing Remotely, 60-67, 121-122, 204. Cf. Terilyn Johnston Huntington and Amy Eckert, “We watched his whole life unfold. . .Then you watch the death’: drone tactics, operator trauma, and hidden human costs of contemporary wartime,” International Relations 36.4 (October 2022), 638-657.
[15] Phelps, On Killing Remotely, 63, 133-134.
[16] Phelps, On Killing Remotely, 72-75.
[17] Phelps, On Killing Remotely, 102.
[18] Phelps, On Killing Remotely, 152.
[19] David Blair and Karen House, “Avengers in Wrath: Moral Agency and Trauma Prevention for Remote Warriors,” Lawfare, November 12, 2017, https://www.lawfareblog.com/avengers-wrath-moral-agency-and-trauma-prevention-remote-warriors. They recommend that “crews must know as much as possible about their targets” and “they need the time, space, and boundaries to perform the moral homework to keep pace with their tactical actions;” they end their analysis with the encouragement that “tactics and approaches in keeping with the Just War tradition are, in fact, more effective on the remote battlefield.”
[20] Phelps, On Killing Remotely, 52, 307.